PART THREE

Actors and Institutions

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Social Movements and Contention in Democratization Processes

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Overview

This chapter looks at the relationship between **social movements**, **cycles of protest**, waves of strikes, and **transnational advocacy networks** of resistance to non-democratic regimes in the global wave of democratization. It will present: (a) views from social movement studies within the democratization literature; (b) views of democratization within the social movement literature; (c) illustrations of the diverse roles played by movements, depending on the type of democratization process and the stage in which mobilizations emerge (resistance, liberalization, transition, **consolidation**, expansion).

Introduction

Social movements have not been prominent in the literature on democratization. Attention to social movements also varied within the main explanations of democratization. *Modernization theory* and the *historical class perspective*, as structural approaches mainly concerned with the preconditions for democracy, recognize a central role to economic conditions and social classes, but disregard social movements. *Transitology* conceives democratization as an elite transactional process, presenting a more dynamic and contingent perspective of democratization, but recognizing a limited role for movements, unions, and protest.

Social movements scholars, until recently, have paid little attention to democratization processes, mostly focusing their interest on democratic countries, where conditions for mobilization are more favourable. When addressing the role played by movements and **contentious politics** in democratization, they mainly apply two perspectives. First, the *new social movements* approach emphasizes the innovative, post-materialist dimension and non-state centric characteristic of movements during democratization. Second, the *political process* approach considers democratization as a product of the interaction between elite negotiations and mobilization processes.

In this chapter we will review these different perspectives, and finally propose an analytic organization of the different roles that social movements, trade unions, advocacy networks, and **cycles of protest** play in the *dynamic*, *contingent*, and *contentious* shaping of democracy. In doing this, we are of course not pleading for an exclusive focus on democratization 'from below'; we are convinced that the path and speed of democratization processes are influenced by the strength and characteristics of several social and political actors. The combination of protest and consensus is in fact a main challenge for democratization processes. We are however convinced that social movements are often important actors in all stages of democratization. In our discussion of these topics, examples will be drawn especially from Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.[1]

Social Movements in Research on Democratisation

This section will briefly review the limited role assigned to social movements and protest in democratization studies prior to the emergence of a more systematic interest on the issue by social movement students. We will begin with the structural approaches (*modernization theory* and the *historical class perspective*), and move then to the elite transactional process approach (*transitology*).

Structural approaches: modernization theory and historical class perspective

The first studies of democratization emerged in the aftermath of the massive destruction produced in Europe by World War II, and the reconfiguration of world politics linked mainly to the expansion of the Soviet Union's area of influence and decolonization in Africa and Asia. Within this context, two predominantly structural perspectives developed with the intention of explaining political regime change in peripheric countries (democratic, authoritarian, or totalitarian). The intention generally was: (a) to identify the prerequisites for democracy to emerge and survive, and/or (b) to discover which social class is the key actor in promoting and sustaining a democratic regime.

Within modernization theory, Lipset's (1959) pioneer work associated the chances for the emergence of a democratic regime to economic development. This approach tended to recommend economic supports (such as Marshall Plans) as a precondition to political democratization, and accordingly considered the emergence of democracy in low-income countries improbable and its survival as precarious. Sustainable democracy required structural prerequisites, among them the development of a pro-democratic middle class. This perspective, however, does not take in much account agency and thus cannot explain why poor countries, such as Portugal (1974), Greece (1974), Ecuador (1979), Peru (1980), and Bolivia (1982), democratized before more industrialized countries such as Argentina (1983), Brazil (1985–90), Chile (1991), and South Korea (1987–88). Although powerful in explaining the survival of already established democracies, modernization theory ignores the role of social actors in *crafting* democracy, and therefore cannot explain the different tempo (i.e. from decade long transitions to abrupt changes) and the quality of democratization (i.e. from procedural to substantive democracy).

Although some modernization scholars examined the role of the organized and mobilized actors in society, the most prominent one, Huntington (1965; 1991), rejects mobilization (in particular of the working class) as a source of democratization 'from below', defining as 'praetorian societies' those with high levels

of mobilization. In his view, the potential disruption produced by claims for inclusion needs to be limited and controlled. Approaches such as Huntington's led to an additional, though inconsistent, conclusion that characterizes his version of modernization theory: that democracy needs low levels of mobilization and unionization, and that even these low levels can only be allowed after a relatively high level of industrialization has been achieved.

Several authors from diverse analytic traditions—among which Nancy Bermeo (1997), Ruth Collier (1999), Charles Tilly (2004a, b), and Doug McAdam *et al.* (2001)—have instead convincingly demonstrated the crucial role played by the mobilized actors in the emergence of democracy, and in its preservation or expansion. Especially within historical sociology, research singled out the role of 'the masses' in the first and second waves of democratization, as well as of resistance movements in the fall of authoritarian regimes at the end of World War II. A central question became: *Which is the democratizing social class?* In his historical approach Barrington Moore (1966), although agreeing with Lipset on the importance of some socioeconomic conditions, also stresses the role played by social classes (in particular, the urban bourgeoisie) in explaining first democratization in England (1642–49), France (1789–1848), and the USA (1861–65). Moore's hypotheses have been specified by Dietrich Rueschemeyer *et al.* (1992) who found that—given certain levels of economic development—the working class has been the key actor promoting democratization in the last two waves of democratization in southern Europe, South America, and the Caribbean. More recently, in another cross-national comparison, Ruth Collier (1999) suggested that the role of working class—although not so important in the nineteenth- and early-twentieth- century transitions in Western Europe as was suggested by Rueschemeyer *et al.*—was crucial in the most recent wave of democratization in Southern Europe and South America. Finally, John Markoff (1996) emphasizes the role of women's movements in demanding democratic rights in the first long wave of democratization, starting in the late eighteenth century.

Elite transactional process approach: transitology

While in the historical class perspective there is more concern for interactive historical paths than in classic modernization theory, both perspectives tend to overlook the role played by contentious actors, and the interactive mechanisms associated with democratization[2]. Agency is instead central in the so-called 'transitology' approach, which however did not pay much attention to social movements as potential actors of democratization.

After the 1970s wave of democratization in southern Europe, political science approaches to the construction of political institutions have privileged parties as main democratic actors (Higley and Gunther 1992). Even the more dynamic approaches to democratization (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Linz and Stepan 1996), that took into account the timing of the different steps of democratization, tended to perceive the *'reforma pactada/ruptura pactada'* in Spain (1977) as the model for successful democratization. This stressed a necessary de-mobilization of 'mass politics' (or at least their channelling within institutionalized political parties) for an effective consolidation of democracy.

Within this tradition, the most influential work on democratization is by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986). In the theoretical volume concluding their broad research project, O'Donnell and Schmitter dedicate a section to what they call the 'resurrection of civil society', which means the short disruptive moment when movements, unions, churches, and the society in general push for an initial liberalization of a non-democratic regime into a transition towards democracy. For the authors, this is a moment of great expectations when 'the people' emerges, but:

> *In any case, regardless of its intensity and of the background from which it emerges, this popular upsurge is always ephemeral. Selective repression, manipulation, and cooptation by those still in control of the state apparatus, the fatigue induced by frequent demonstrations and 'street theatre', the internal conflicts that are bound to emerge over choices about procedures and substantive policies, a sense of ethical disillusionment with the 'realistic' compromises imposed by pact-making or by the emergence of oligarchic leadership within its component groups are all factors leading toward the dissolution of the upsurge. The surge and decline of the 'people' leaves many dashed hopes and frustrated actors.*
>
> (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 55–6).

Thus, civil society short life is not only inevitable, given the re-channelling of **participation** through the political parties and the electoral system, but also desirable, as it is considered the only way to avoid

frightening authoritarian soft-liners into abandoning the negotiation process with the pro-democracy moderates. In this vein, elites are not only the source of the democratization process, but also the ones who control its outcome. While for O'Donnell and Schmitter contentious politics favours the move from the liberalization of a non-democratic regime to a transition to democracy, for the authors in Higley and Gunther's (1992) volume, any kind of social movement, protest or strike must be controlled and demobilized in order to assure a consolidated procedural democracy. While in O'Donnell and Schmitter's view democratization is made possible by a division between (authoritarian and democratic) elites, in Higley and Gunther's analysis it is the consensus among negotiating elites that allows for consolidation. Transitology, thus, emphasizes the contingent and dynamic nature of the democratization process, but tends to reduce it to a bargaining among political elites in a context of uncertainty.

Within transitology Linz and Stepan (1996) present a model of extended transition, where not only the immediate liberalization/transition bargaining process is important, but also the characteristics of the previous non-democratic regime (i.e. authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian, sultanistic), the way the non-democratic elites exit from **state** power, the historical characteristics of the political parties and the elites, and when it ends the uncertainty climate. Their model of democratization pays explicit attention to 'civil society', defined in contrast to the 'political society' (i.e. the elites and institutionalized actors):

> *A robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and state can help transitions get started, help resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, help consolidate, and help deepen democracy. At all stages of the democratization process, therefore, a lively and independent civil society is invaluable.*
>
> (Linz and Stepan 1996: 9)

Though recognizing its role in theory, the authors do not yet give much empirical space to civil society. They however reflect on the relationship between the characteristics of the previous authoritarian regime and the chances for the emergence of pro-democratic mobilizations (Linz and Stepan 1996: Ch. 3). Totalitarian regimes are those that, by eliminating any pluralism, jeopardize the development of autonomous organizations and networks that could then be the promoters of democracy. Sultanistic regimes, due to the high personalization of power, have a manipulative use of mobilization for ceremonial purposes and through parastate groups, discouraging and repressing any kind of autonomous organization that could sustain resistance networks. Authoritarian regimes, mainly when they were installed in countries with previous (semi) democratic experience, are the ones which generally experienced the most massive mobilizations, and the best organized under-ground resistance based on several networks that either pre-existed the regime or could be formed later, thanks to the higher degree of pluralism.

Linz and Stepan add another ideal-typical regime, post-totalitarian, but this seems to be more an intermediate step in the democratization of totalitarian regimes, than a regime type per se. Two sub-types of **authoritarianism**, not mentioned by these authors, are important for our purpose: (a) bureaucratic-authoritarianism, where a technocratic civic-military elite commands the de-politization of a mobilized society for capital accumulation (O'Donnell 1973), and (b) populist-authoritarianism, where the elites mobilizes the society from above for legitimating the regime while incorporating the lower classes. While some South American and South East Asian countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, South Korea, Taiwan, etc) were bureaucratic-authoritarian; the predominant model in some Middle East and Northern African countries (Egypt, Algeria, etc) was the populist-authoritarian. Linz and Stepan hypothesize an interesting relationship between the type of non-democratic regime, and the potential for the emergence of movements, protests, strikes, and underground resistance networks that antecedent liberalization, and accompanies democratization. This might offer not yet fully developed explanations for the differences that tend to appear in the degree and pace of protest emergence in democratization periods.

Linz and Stepan (1996: Ch. 2) also stress the need to consider multiple simultaneous transitions (e.g. simple, with only regime change; dual, with a change in regime plus economic system; triple, with change also in the nation-state arrangement). In this sense, it is not only important if the previous regime was authoritarian or totalitarian, but also if it was a capitalist or a communist one. Additionally, when there is a triple transition, the problem of nation-state building appears when nationalist movements mobilize in the name of contending visions of which should be the

demos of the future democracy. Thus, while in the Soviet Union (1991) regional mobilization led to the dissolution of the political unit, in Spain it did not. Basque and Catalan nationalist movements undermined the **legitimacy** of Francisco Franco's regime, but were unsuccessful in achieving independence. Czechoslovakia (1989–92), for instance, experienced a peaceful dissolution of the polity along with a democratic and capitalist transition. These changes can only be explained through the intertwined role played by regime elites, democratic elites, mobilized groups, and international pressures. Within social movement literature, the role of movements was emphasized in the analysis of the moderation or radicalization of the claims for autonomy/independence, and how this has favoured or jeopardized the transition to democracy (see Oberschall 2000; Glenn 2003; Reinares 1987).

Even though the dynamic, agency-focused approach of transitology allowed for an interest in the role played by movements in democratization to develop, it did not focus on them. In addition to its 'elitist bias', some other assumptions of transitology have been criticized. As Ruth Collier and James Mahoney (1997) argue, transitologists tend to emphasize the role of individuals over collectives, which reduces the process to strategic instrumental thinking, ignoring class-defined actors such as unions and labour/left-wing parties, and it is state-centric, subordinating social actors to state actors. As Gideon Baker (1999) contends, transitology tends to consider movements and protest actors as manipulated by elites and focusing on very instrumentally defined purposes. While an inevitable and desirable 'elitization' of the democratization process might be considered as the 'iron law' of transitologists, further research by the new social movements scholars and later by the political process students showed the important interplay between elites and the mobilized social actors as the necessary (though not sufficient) condition for a democratization process, questioning the elite-led/elite-ended logic that previously dominated democratization studies. A general agreement among scholars that have analysed democratization in non-elitist perspectives is that not even the Spanish transition model can be considered a purely elite-controlled bargaining process. Massive strike waves, terrorist attacks by nationalist movements, and an ascending cycle of protest characterized the transition (see Maravall 1982; Reinares 1987; Foweraker 1989), being better defined as a destabilization/extrication process (Collier 1999: 126–32) or as 'a cycle of protest intertwined with elite transaction' (McAdam *et al.* 2001: 186). In sum, transitology is accused of ignoring the long term, dynamic, contingent, and contentious process associated to the creation of the conditions for the breakdown of non-democratic regimes (Box 12.1). The next section addresses this question.

BOX 12.1 KEY POINTS

- Modernization approaches have given little attention to agency (in general) and social movements in particular, focusing on the economic conditions for democratic stability.
- Other scholars have focused on the social classes that led democratization processes, paying however more attention to their structural conditions than to their mobilization.
- The dynamic study of democratization has considered social movements as short-lived relevant actors in the liberalization stage only, focusing research on the institutional actors specially when addressing transition and consolidation.
- Even though some authors mention a robust civil society as facilitating democratization process, transitology approaches have traditionally paid little empirical attention to its characteristics and development.

The Role of 'Democratization from Below': Perspectives from Social Movement Studies

With few exceptions (e.g. among Latin American scholars), the literature on social movements has shown little interest in democratization processes. Only recently the concept of contentious politics, as opposed to routine politics, has been proposed in order to link research on phenomena such as social movements, revolutions, strike waves, nationalisms, and democratization (McAdam *et al.* 2001). Even those who accord an important role to social movements disagree on the positive versus negative effects of their intervention. Sometimes people mobilize against democratic regimes, demanding authoritarian solutions to political or economic crisis, providing the non-democratic actors with a popular source of legitimacy (e.g. middle class women's protests against Salvador Allende's government in Chile

in 1973, and more recently, urban middle classes protests requesting a coup against Dilma Rousseff in Brazil in 2015–16), and some actors seek restrictions of democratic rights in democratic regimes (e.g. European anti-immigration and xenophobic movements, white supremacists movements in the USA and South Africa). In other cases, movements trying to promote democratization might have the unintended consequences of increasing state's repression, or facilitate the emergence of undemocratic actors (e.g. collapse of the Weimar Republic in Germany, some Arab Spring failed democratizations).

In many cases, however, a correspondence between social movements and the promotion of democracy can be found. Among others, Charles Tilly (2004b: 131) said:

> What causes the strong but still incomplete correspondence between democratization and social movements? First, many of the same processes that cause democratization also independently promote social movements. Second, democratization as such further encourages people to form social movements. Third, under some conditions and in a more limited way social movements themselves promote democratization.

As the relationship between social movements and democratization is not simple, the main question for social movements' scholars has been: *When and how do movements promote democratization?* This section reviews the two main approaches in social movements' studies that have tried to answer this question: the *new social movements*, and the *political process* approaches. We will begin with a brief overview of these standpoints, and then analyse the role of social movements in each stage of democratization.

The social movement literature has been very much focused on the Western European and North American experiences and only recently has systematic attention been paid to relations between social movements and democratization. In Europe the *new social movement* approach has looked at the emergence of a new actor in post-industrial society. Alain Touraine (1981), the most prominent exponent of this perspective, argued that the capital-labour conflict has been surpassed by new conflicts related to the self-representation of the society and the types of actions related to its transformation. Thus, the new conflicts developed outside of the factory and the labour movement, and the claims for taking state power were abandoned by the women's, students and environmental movements of Western Europe. Although its original aim was to explain a very different phenomenon, the new social movements approach was widely applied in the 1980–90s Latin American transitions, emphasizing the cultural and social democratization exercised by movements, de-centring the state as their main interlocutor (Slater 1985; Jelin 1987; Escobar and Álvarez 1992).

As interest in Latin American democratizations and the new social movements approach decreased, the *political process* approach became more prominent in studies of regime transformation as a result of the emergence of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Developed initially in the USA, but then rapidly spread in Europe, the political process approach devotes more systematic attention to the institutional context than the new social movements approach, highlighting the interrelationship amid governmental actors, political parties, social movements, and protest. Trying to elucidate what favours the emergence of contention in liberal democracies, scholars within this perspective have proposed a curvilinear relation between the emergence of protest and the openness of political opportunities (Eisinger 1973). Recently, however, some North American scholars within this approach proposed the reformulation of transitology's perspective, taking into account the role played by contentious politics (McAdam *et al.* 2001; Schock 2005; Tilly 2004b). While social movements are not necessarily promoters of democracy, the elitist dynamic model does not fully explain democratization processes. Social movements play in fact different roles in each specific stage of the democratization process (see Rossi and della Porta 2015 for a detailed analysis).

Cycles of protest and waves of strikes during democratization

Democratization is, in general, linked to two contentious dynamics: (a) a pro-democratic **cycle of protest**, and (b) an increasingly massive and non-syndical wave of strikes. According to Joe Foweraker (1995: 90, n. 2) '[d]emocratic transitions express a wide variety of trajectories and outcomes. The role of social movements within them is conditioned by the specific rhythm of the "protest cycle", the shape of the political opportunity structure, and the contingency of strategic choice'. In Spain, Brazil, and Peru, for instance, strike waves were very important during the entire or part of the democratization process (Maravall 1982; Sandoval 1998; Collier 1999). While Peru's democratization is

very much associated with a strike wave (1977–80) against a highly unpopular authoritarian regime (Collier 1999), Brazil experienced a strike wave (1974–79), followed by a cycle of protest (1978–82) mainly mobilized by **urban movements** (Mainwaring 1987). Sometimes cycles of protest and strike waves converge, in many other occasions strike waves are stronger in the first resistance stages, decline later and, then, re-emerge during liberalization and transition in coordination with the upsurge of a cycle of protest originating from underground resistance networks.

As Table 12.1 shows, the role of social movements and other contentious actors varies in different stages of the democratization process. The rest of this chapter will illustrate this point with empirical cases.

Resistance to the non-democratic regime

Democratization as a process starts much earlier than transitology generally acknowledges. The elites begin a bargaining process because something happens that pushes some of them to withdraw their support for the non-democratic regime. One of the causes that undermines the legitimacy and the (national and international) support for the regime, is the role played by the *underground networks of resistance*. Latin American new social movements scholars were the first to study the role of the cultural and political *resistance to the authoritarian regimes* and the construction of alternative democratic networks (e.g. Jelin 1987). Human rights movements, trade unions, and churches promote the de-legitimation of the authoritarian regime at international forums such as the United Nations, and in clandestine or open resistance to the authoritarian regime at the national level. The resilience of resistance networks under the impact of repression plays a decisive role in this stage, as they can lead to splits in the ruling authoritarian/totalitarian elites and force even unwilling elites to initiate liberalization (Schock 2005).

In countries with a majoritarian Roman Catholic population the Catholic Church played an important

Table 12.1 The Role of Social Movements and Contention in Different Stages of Democratization

Stage	Role of social movements	Examples
Resistance	• Underground networks of resistance and cooperation among activists • International delegitimizing campaigns, denouncing of human rights violations	• Human rights movements and transnational advocacy networks • Church-based networks
Liberalization	• Promoters of the expansion of the transition towards procedural democracy, or for the resistance to the process • Essay of new democratic practices (i.e. cultural [re] democratization)	• Trade unions strikes • Religion movements • Urban movements • Military led or controlled counter-movements
Transition	• Mobilization intertwined with elite pacts: Claims for justice and for the elimination of the reserved powers that limit the emerging democracy, or support to the authoritarian elites	• Human rights movements • Women's movements • Trade unions strikes • Right wing solidarity networks
Consolidation	• Movements introduce demands for a consolidated and inclusive substantive democracy, or claims for recovering the lost 'order' by limiting political or social rights	• Land-reform movements • Indigenous movements • Employment movements • Anti-immigration movements • Security protests
Expansion	• Campaigns for the democratization of international governmental organizations • Essay of local/national post-representative democracy • Quest for the achievement of substantive democracy, expanding the sociopolitical arena	• Global justice movements • Poor people's movements

active role. In some countries, church-related actors played a pro-democratic role. The *Vicaría de la Solidaridad* in Chile condemned the repression, persecution and assassinations ordered by Augusto Pinochet, while helping coordination of the unions, parties and grassroots activists that organized protests against the regime in the 1980s (Lowden 1996). In Brazil, with the incorporation of liberation theology, the church helped recreate grassroots empowering spaces through the *Comunidades Eclesiais de Base* (CEB) (Burdick 1992). The role played by the CEB was central in the struggle for democratization, and the church worked as a broker in a pro-democratic coalition with the trade unions and urban movements. Similarly, in the Basque Countries, the local clergy supported the opposition against the Francoist regime, helping preserve the *Euskera* language (della Porta and Mattina 1986). And in Poland a pro-democratic alliance developed between the Catholic Church and *Solidarność* union, which proved to be crucial in the network of resistance that helped to create the necessary resources for the massive mobilizations during liberalization and transition (Glenn 2003; Osa 2003).

In other countries, such as Argentina, the authorities of the Catholic Church played the role of the supportive bystander, and in some cases became an active participant in state terrorism (Verbitsky 2005; Obregón 2005), while civic networks played the delegitimizing roles (Wright 2007). The *Madres de Plaza de Mayo*, the *Servicio de Paz y Justicia* (SERPAJ), and the *Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos* (APDH), among other organizations of the human rights movement in coordination with human rights **transnational advocacy networks**, initiated national and transnational campaigns for 'truth and justice' in order to learn the fate of the around 30,000 'disappeared'—kidnapped and killed by the military. By 'naming and shaming', social movement organizations contribute to damage the image of authoritarian regimes in international forums such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States (Brysk 1993; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Although authoritarian regimes are closed to any kind of political opposition, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) have shown that a 'boomerang pattern' develops when human rights networks sensitize third countries and intergovernmental organizations to generate political pressure on an authoritarian regime:

> *Governments are the primary 'guarantors' of rights, but also their primary violators. When government violates or refuses to recognize rights, individuals and domestic groups often have no recourse within domestic political and judicial arenas. They may seek international connections finally to express their concerns and even to protect their lives. When channels between the state and its domestic actors are blocked, the boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of international networks may occur: domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside.*
>
> (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 12)

Resistance to authoritarian regimes also developed inside non-religious cultural groups. In the Czech Republic, the main organization in the democratization movement, the Civic Forum, emerged from the action of a network of artists and theatres constructing a space for autonomy and expression after strong state repression of students' protests (Glenn 2003). During the resistance stage, social movements and their allies may be effective promoters of democratic values and understandings that erode a non-democratic regime and set the **necessary conditions** for liberalization to take place.[3]

Liberalization and the upsurge of mobilization

Democratization needs an acceleration of certain dynamics in order to occur. That produces the perception among the authoritarian elites that there is no other choice than opening the regime if they want to avoid an imminent or potential civil war or violent takeover of power by democratic and/or revolutionary actors. This was the case in the failed civic-military socialist revolution in Portugal in 1974 that started the transition into a democratic (although capitalist) regime; and the effect produced by protracted insurgency in El Salvador (1994) and in South Africa (1994) (Wood 2000). The intensity of the protests and strikes plays a crucial role in shaping the regime elite chances of pursuing a long and controlled transition or a short extrication from state power. Therefore, during the *liberalization* stage, organized society publicly (re) emerges in a much more visible fashion after the elimination of some restrictions in what has been called a 'resurrection of civil society' (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). During this stage movements may promote the expansion of the transition towards effective democracy, or resist the democratization process. In fact, trade unions, labour/left-wing parties, and urban

movements, mainly in shantytowns and industrial districts have been presented as main actors seeking democracy (Collier 1999). In Chile, shantytown movements organized by members of the Communist Party in Santiago were among the main promoters of a 1983–87 cycle of protest that—though not fully effective—made clear for Augusto Pinochet that some source of legitimacy was necessary in order to stay in government, and so led to the initiation of a controlled transition (Schneider 1995; Hipsher 1998).

Transition to procedural democracy

During the *transition* to democracy, social movements may seek democratization, social justice, and the elimination of the reserved powers that limit the emerging democracy. Although political opportunities for mobilization open up due to the high uncertainty of this stage, nothing is yet defined, and cycles of protest may push in opposite directions. In fact, 'Mobilization strengthens the ability of challengers and elites to make claims yet also limits the range of acceptable outcomes because of the conditional nature of popular support' (Glenn 2003: 104). 'Old' (labour, ethnic) movements and 'new' (women's, urban) movements participate in large coalitions asking for democratic rights (Jelin 1987; Eckstein 2001). Generally speaking, the transition stage is characterized by the mobilization of a pro-democracy coalition of trade unions, political parties, churches, and social movements. Without this coalition democracy is usually not achieved because contending counter-movements are likely to push for restoration of the authoritarian/totalitarian regimes. Some right wing or military networks might also resist transition or try to violently produce a democratic breakdown. This is exemplified by the *Carapitanda* military group in Argentina in 1987, 1988, and 1990, which tried to end the trials against the military who had tortured and assassinated during the 1976–83 authoritarian regime (Payne 2000). In other cases the reaction comes from the regime *nomenklatura*, with an increase in repression, as in the case of the 1989 crush down of the Chinese students' movement, or the request of external support for controlling the situation, as it happened in Poland in 1981 (Ekiert and Kubik 1999; Zhao 2000).

The bargaining dynamic among elites and the increased radicalization of contention in the streets intensify the reciprocal relationship between elites and movements. Glenn (2003: 104) argues that the intertwined logic of the transition is manifold: (a) mobilizations affect elite negotiations: they introduce new actors to the political arena, alter the power relationships among the contending parties, and insert new demands into the process reshaping the course of action; and (b) elites' negotiations affects mobilizations: the bargaining itself changes the degree of openness of the political opportunities for movements by modifying part of the claims and acceptable interlocutors of the process.

The moment at which the society is demobilized and politics is channelled into party politics is considered by transitologists as the end of the transition period. This outcome, however, is only one of many possible ones in actual transitions. While in Argentina, Bolivia, and the Andean region demobilization did not occur after the transition, in countries such as Uruguay and Chile politics was quickly institutionalized through the party system. While not yet fully studied, demobilization does not seem essential to consolidation, which depends instead on the presence of a relatively institutionalized **party system** in centralized and strong states, with parties that have historically monopolized the decision-making process and that were not fully dissolved by the authoritarian regime (Rossi 2007). Moreover, Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman (2005) argue that keeping elites under continuous popular pressures after transition is a major mean to a successful consolidation.

While in many cases traditional parties monopolized politics again, in a few others the leaders of the pro-democracy movements won the first free and open elections. This happened mainly in those countries where the party system was redone from a one-party system to a multi-party one as in Central and Eastern Europe, or where parties were historically weak, or were weakened by the military regime. The quantity of pro-democratic movement leaders that later occupied important institutional positions is larger than usually acknowledged. Some of the better known examples of social movement leaders who then assumed relevant institutional roles are: (a) Lech Walesa, the main leader of *Solidarność* who became the first post-Soviet president of Poland; (b) Nelson Mandela, the leader of the anti-apartheid movement, who became South Africa's first democratic and black president; (c) Václav Havel, who was twice elected president (first of Czechoslovakia and then of the Czech Republic) after organizing the successful Civic Forum that took Czechoslovakia to democracy and a

peaceful division of the country; and (d) Raúl Alfonsín, who gained the presidency as a leader of the *Unión Cívica Radical* (UCR), one of the historical parties of Argentina, but also due to being a well-known human rights activist and the vice president of the APDH organization. These examples show that the distinction between civil and political societies is artificial and that the assumption of a necessary monopoly on mobilization by classical parties in order for a democracy to consolidate is misleading.

Consolidation of a procedural (or substantive?) democracy

In the political science literature, *consolidation* is generally linked to the end of the democratization process as signalled by the first free and open elections, the end of the uncertainty period and/or the implementation of a minimum quality of substantive democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996; O'Donnell 1993). Democracy, however, cannot be consolidated without the universal and effective application of citizenship rights, which transcend voting. In this stage, movements in many countries claim for the rights of those who are excluded by 'low intensity democracies' and ask for a more inclusive democracy (i.e. land reform, employment, indigenous, and women movements) and the end of the authoritarian legacies (Rossi 2017). Claims framed by movements in the name of 'rights', 'citizenship', and their political practices play a crucial role in creating citizenry (Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley 2003). As Joe Foweraker (1995: 98) observed, 'The struggle for rights has more than a merely rhetorical impact. The insistence on the rights of free speech and assembly is a precondition of the kind of collective (and democratic) decision-making which educates citizens'. In brief, social movements usually produce long-term impacts that are not only institutional, but also cultural and social, contributing to the very definition of citizenship rights (della Porta 2017). In many cases, even the paths of participation in democratic transitions affect the quality of democracy (della Porta 2017; della Porta *et al.* 2018). These transformations are developed through the movements' alternative practices and values which help to sustain and expand democracy (Santos 2005). Furthermore, in their struggles for incorporation as citizens and wage-earners, some poor people's movements play an important role in the achievement of a more substantive democracy (Rossi 2017).

Expansion to post-representative democracy

Finally, social movements may play important roles in the *expansion of democracy* (a not yet fully studied stage in democratization), addressing both the democratic reform of the international system of governance and the transcending of representative democracy in the national level, thorough experiments of participatory and deliberative democracy (Baiocchi 2005; Rossi 2005; della Porta 2009). There are at least two main perspectives on this issue. First, the **global civil society** perspective (Kaldor 2003) emphasizes the democratizing role played by a worldwide organized civil society, located between the state and the market (Cohen and Arato 1992), in the democratization at a supra-national scale. Second, research on the **global justice movements** (della Porta and Tarrow 2005) and transnational advocacy networks analysis (Keck and Sikkink 1998) notes the role played by human rights, indigenous, women, and alter-**globalization** groups in the promotion and expansion of national democratic regimes, as well as in the reformulation of the not so democratic procedures of the international governmental organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Grimson and Pereyra 2008; Wood 2012). In the case of the global justice movements, proposals for reform are especially oriented towards a broader transparency of decision-making in international governmental organizations, increased controls by the national parliaments, as well as the opening of channels of access for social movement organizations.

BOX 12.2 KEY POINTS

- Protest cycles and waves of strikes play an important role in democratization processes.
- The role of social movements tend to vary in the different stages of democratization:
  1. Underground networks of resistance undermine internal and international supports for authoritarian regimes;
  2. The intensity of the protest might accelerate processes of liberalization;
  3. Social movements are often important allies of political parties and other collective actors in pro-democracy coalitions during the transition phase;
  4. Also during and after democratic consolidation alternative praxis of democracy are practiced within social movements.

Conclusion

Though movements have played important roles in promoting democracy, they have not always been effective. In 2011 pro-democracy mobilizations in Tunisia initiated a massive wave of protests in the North of Africa and the Middle East known as the 'Arab Spring', with however mixed effects. While Tunisia democratized and some sort of liberalization was achieved in countries such as Jordan or Morocco, in Egypt and Yemen, after liberalization, there was a return to authoritarianism that oppressed dissidence. Even worse, Syria and Libya, and subsequently Yemen, entered into brutal civil wars. This and other cases such as the students' protests in China in 1989 and in Hong Kong since 2013, show that mobilization for democracy *alone* does not produce democratization.[4] A combination of several factors is necessary for effective democratization to take place (Box 12.2). The main reason for the need to combine perspec-tives from above and from below is that 'the 'mode of transition', the context of the democratization process, the types of actors involved in the process, and their strategic interactions, all influence the kind of democracy that is established' (Pagnucco 1995: 151). The literature discussed in this chapter shows that the following combination of elements produces the most favourable setting for democratization: (a) a non - syndical strike wave and/or a pro-democracy cycle of protest; (b) increased political organization in urban areas, and a relatively dense resistance network; (c) in Roman Catholic countries, a church that is actively involved in the struggle for democratization; (d) international pressure from human rights advocacy networks; (e) a division among the authoritarian/totalitarian elites concerning whether to continue the non-democratic regime, and (f) the existence of pro-democratic elites able to integrate the demands for democracy coming from below (at least until transition is well initiated).

There are also configurations that can negatively influence democratization. Difficulties emerge: (a) when the transition must deal with simultaneous contending movements demanding national independence and alternative exclusionary *demos* views; and (b) when terrorist attacks and/or guerrilla movements develop during the democratization process rejecting democracy as a plausible immediate outcome. These two elements do not make democratization impossible, but may put the process at risk of never consolidating or of only bringing limited liberalization of authoritarianism. Though not a closed answer, the still ongoing important accumulation of research on twentieth-century democratization and the recent comparative efforts with the twenty-first-century struggles for democracy (see della Porta 2014) may well help us to improve our understanding of a *dynamic*, *contingent*, and *contentious* shaping of alternative paths toward democrac*ies*.

? QUESTIONS

1. How do structuralist approaches define the role of social movement in democratization processes?
2. Who are the main authors that approach the role of social classes in democratization processes within a historical comparative approach and what do they suggest?
3. Which role do transitologists assign to social movement in the different steps of democratization?
4. What is the potential for social movements in different types of non-democratic regimes?
5. Are social movements always favourable to democracy?
6. How do cycles of protest and waves of strikes interact with democratic processes?

Visit the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book for additional questions to accompany each chapter, and a range of other resources: www.oup.com/uk/haerpfer2e/.

FURTHER READING

Boudreau, V. (2004), *Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). This book is one of the few comparative research published in English about resistance movements against the recent authoritarian regimes of Burma (Myanmar), the Philippines, and Indonesia within the contentious politics approach.

Collier, R. B. (1999), *Paths toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America* (New York: Cambridge University Press). This book presents a comparative analysis of the role played by unions and labour/left-wing parties in the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century democratizations.

della Porta, D. (2014), *Mobilizing for Democracy: Comparing 1989 and 2011* (New York: Oxford University Press). Addressing the waves of protests for democracy which started in Eastern Europe in 1989 and in the Middle East and Mediterranean Area in 2011, this book points at the importance of social movements for democratization processes, distinguishing however different paths of participation of civil society.

della Porta, D. (2017), *Where did the Revolution Go? Contentious Politics and the Quality of Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). This book singles out the effects of paths of participation of civil society in democratization processes on the quality of democracy.

della Porta, D., Andretta, M., Fernandes, T., Romanos, E., and Vogiatzoglou, M. (2018), *Legacies and Memories in Movements. Justice and Democracy in Southern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). This book analyses the impact of the memory of their respective transitions to democracy on the social movements that mobilized against austerity in Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

Eckstein, S. (2001) (ed.), *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements*, 2nd edn (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press). This book shows the different roles played by urban movements, human rights movements, guerrilla movements, women's movements, and the Catholic Church in the 1970-1980 democratizations in Latin America.

Escobar, A. and Álvarez, S. (1992) (eds), *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America. Identity, Strategy and Democracy*, (Boulder, CO: Westview). This book is the most prominent example of the new social movement approach applied to Latin American transitions and struggles for consolidation of democracy, includes chapters about urban movements, human rights movements, women's movements, unions and the Catholic Church.

Foweraker, J. (1989), *Making Democracy in Spain: Grassroots Struggle in the South, 1955-1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). This is one of the main books on grassroots resistance movements and networks to the authoritarian regime of Franco in Spain.

Klandermans, B. and van Stralen, C. (2015) (eds), *Movements in Times of Democratic Transition* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press). This edited volume presents a unique dialogue between theory and empirics in social movement studies of democratization processes. It first presents different theoretical perspectives on the role of social movements in democratization and then offers several analyses of crucial cases from South Africa, Central East Europe, and Latin America.

Keck, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998), *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). This book comparatively analyses the role of human rights transnational advocacy networks in the delegitimizing of authoritarian regimes and the aftermath prosecution of human rights violators. It includes an important theoretical argumentation about advocacy networks role and its distinction with movements.

McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., and Tilly, C. (2001), *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). This book proposes a series of mechanism that—if combined in a specific way—may produce democratization processes, thus presenting an ambitious theoretical proposal that redefines the role of contentious politics in major regime transformations.

Pagnucco, R. (1995), 'The Comparative Study of Social Movements and Democratization: Political Interaction and Political Process Approaches', in M. Dobkowski, I. Wallimann, and C. Stojanov(eds), *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* (London: JAI Press), 18: 145–83. This article is the first work in English that tried to combine the political process approach with transitology with the intention of finding theoretical cross-fertilization.

Rossi, F. M. (2017), *The Poor's Struggle for Political Incorporation* (New York: Cambridge University Press). Putting poor people's movements into the long-term perspective of societal transformations produced by authoritarianism and neo-liberalism, this book studies poor people's struggles for substantive democracy in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil.

Tilly, C. (2004a), *Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650-2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). This book presents a major social and historical analysis of the role played by contentious politics in the creation of democracy in Europe, and its impact in subsequent de-democratization, and re-democratization.

IMPORTANT WEBSITES

<www.amnesty.org> Amnesty International is the first and main worldwide human rights organization. Created in 1961 in the UK, it struggles for the universal application of civic and political rights through the defence of those individuals who suffer the violations of their rights by democratic or authoritarian states.

<www.civicus.org> CIVICUS is an international alliance of trade unions, faith-based networks, NGOs, etc. based in South Africa that works on the empowerment of organized citizens' activism, especially in areas where participatory democracy and citizens' freedom of association are threatened. Since 2000 it develops The Civil Society Index Program to assess the state of social organizations around the world.

<www.abuelas.org> Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo is one of the main organizations of the human rights movement of Argentina. Since 1976 integrated by the mothers and mothers-in-law of 'disappeared' women that were pregnant during the 1976–83 dictatorship of Argentina. Since democratization they have been looking for the appropriated children of their sons and daughters and taking to court those individuals responsible for human rights violations.

<www.forumsocialmundial.org.br> World Social Forum is a global open meeting space of individuals, organizations, networks and social movements to debate ideas and coordinate actions with the purpose of expanding democracy in the promotion of a more equitable and with solidarity world. It met for the first time in 2001 in Porto Alegre (Brazil) and since then meets regularly in all the continents and every year or two in a worldwide scale.

<www.opendemocracy.net> Open Democracy is the main global independent online media organization offering critical analysis of world politics in a democratic space that is free from the economic control of news corporations. Scholars and activists from all across the world write articles on diverse topics, with specialized sections on democratization and social movements, such as *Arab Awakening*, *Open Global Rights*, *Open Movements*, and *Democracia Abierta*.

NOTES

1 We would like to thank Amr Adly, Leonardo Morlino, Philippe Schmitter, the book's editors and four anonymous reviewers for their useful suggestions.

2 Collier (1999) develops a dynamic analysis of democratization processes, but concentrates her analysis on working class actors (i.e. unions and labour/left-wing parties) with the intention of finding empirical answers to Moore's puzzle.

3 For a comparative research of the role played by resistance movements and state repression in the struggles for democratization in the authoritarian regimes of Ne Win (1958–81) in Burma (Myanmar), Ferdinand Marcos (1965–86) in the Philippines and Thojib (Raden) Suharto (1967–98) in Indonesia, see Boudreau (2004).

4 This complex relationship had been extensively studied in recent works by Tilly (2001; 2004a and b)