RESHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA IN LATIN AMERICA

From Resisting Neoliberalism *to the* Second Incorporation

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Chapter 5

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, THE NEW "SOCIAL QUESTION," AND THE SECOND INCORPORATION OF THE POPULAR SECTORS IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL

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This chapter analyzes two paradigmatic examples of reincorporation struggles and movements in Latin America. These are the unemployed workers' movement in Argentina and the landless peasants' movement in Brazil. These movements have been struggling for the reincorporation of the popular sectors as wage earners (members of the socioeconomic society) as well as citizens (members of the political society). The aim is to understand how pressure from below built the conditions for the second incorporation of the popular sectors in Argentina and Brazil (see Rossi 2015a, 2017, and the introduction to this section).

The transformation of sociopolitical arenas in Argentina and Brazil from import-substitution industrialization (ISI) to neoliberalism and beyond was a contentious process. In Argentina, the crisis of 2001–2003 produced a larger rupture with the neoliberal past than in Brazil. In the latter, the process was incremental and mild if compared with the rest of the cases covered by this book. However, in Argentina and Brazil, a key social movement mobilized to resist the disincorporation consequences of neoliberal reforms and struggled to achieve the reincorporation of the popular sectors. In both countries, a new "social question" emerged as a result of these struggles, and social policies and policing techniques were created or modified to deal with the popular sectors' organized unrest. Finally, both movements were incorporated into the coalition in government, though with a marginal influence in the policy-making process. Using a historical and comparative method, this chapter identifies the stages of this process of second incorporation.[1]

FROM DEMOCRATIZATION TO DISINCORPORATION

Argentina

The failed relaunch of the ISI model (1983–1989)

Democratization in 1983 brought with it both pluralism and an expectation of the recovery of welfare through the relaunching of the ISI model of development. However, with the failure of the Austral plan, ISI was rapidly dismissed. Argentina's economy suffered from stagnation, with a 7.2 percent contraction from 1983 to 1985, and during 1989–1991 a hyperinflation crisis, reaching 3,079.8 percent in 1989 (Saad-Filho, Iannini, and Molinari 2007). In 1989, the rate of unemployment reached 8.1 percent, and 47.3 percent of the population was in poverty, which led to a series of lootings in urban areas. As a result, Raúl Alfonsín ended his presidency six months early, handing power to the Peronist Carlos Saúl Menem (Partido Justicialista—PJ).

Neoliberal reforms and the lack of policies for the disincorporated popular sectors (1989–1996)

Despite Menem's promise of reestablishing the ISI model, continued high levels of inflation (197 percent), unemployment (7.1 percent), and poverty (33.7 percent) pushed him toward a heterodox neoliberal reform program with the purpose of urgently solving the crisis (Palermo and Novaro 1996). It began in 1989 with the restructuring and privatization of almost all the state-owned companies and public services. In 1991, the peso was pegged to the U.S. dollar at a one-to-one exchange rate with the Convertibility plan.

After the Convertibility plan, inflation fell dramatically, which gave Menem's reforms substantial public support. Menem's government had a parliamentary majority in both chambers thanks to an alliance with small conservative parties from the provinces (Llanos 2002) and a stable pro-reform coalition among some Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT) unions, domestic industrialists, and PJ governors (Levitsky and Murillo 2005).

In 1992, Menem initiated the first fiscal pact, an agreement with governors for the reduction of public sector jobs. This same year, the main losers of the neoliberal reforms organized the Congreso de Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA, later renamed as Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina) (see Gindin and Cardoso in this volume). In 1994, the second fiscal pact was introduced, expanding reforms to provincial service privatizations and increased reductions in expenditures. This led to the collapse of several regional economies. In December 1993 in Santiago del Estero, the first of a series of poor peripheral provinces collapsed, provoking a sequence of *puebladas* (town revolts). Since

the first *puebladas*, a diffusion process started and *puebladas* took place in numerous provincial capitals, forcing some governors to resign. They were the result of resistance by state employees to provincial fiscal austerity policies (Farinetti 1999).

After most of the core reforms were passed during the first term of office, Menem's second mandate faced increasingly high levels of contention. This was the result of the combination of a worsening social situation, as well as the increased coordination of the CTA, the Peronist dissident union Movimiento de Trabajadores Argentinos (MTA), the Maoist Corriente Clasista y Combativa, and the emerging movement of unemployed workers.

Notwithstanding the magnitude and intensity of the struggle against neoliberal reforms and the consequences of disincorporation, in 1994 the Menem government had not yet recognized the existence of a "social question" in relation to unemployment. In 1995, the rate of unemployment reached 18.5 percent, with only 7.1 percent of the unemployed receiving any kind of economic compensation and just 1.3 percent of the economically active population covered by unemployment benefits (Etchemendy 2004). To make things worse, from 1989 to 1992 all the social policies inherited from the Alfonsín government were dismantled and replaced with very limited policies (Repetto 2000).

Why were there no unemployment policies? One reason was related to the changes in the PJ-CGT relationship. Though union influence on the PJ had been reduced since the 1980s, the Menem government still considered the CGT's participation in the pro-reform coalition as more important than disincorporated workers. Compensation was focused on protecting the organizational strength of the CGT rather than helping the individual victims of the reforms in exchange for union demobilization (Etchemendy 2004).

The second reason is related to the territorialization of politics, which favored a governability agreement, in place since 1992, between the national government and Eduardo Duhalde—the governor of the province of Buenos Aires (PJ). This led to the creation of an agreement for the regular provision of national resources at the discretion of the administration of the province at around USD 650 million annually for one decade (Prévôt-Schapira 1996; *La Nación*, January 29, 1998). This agreement was the most developed of a generic type of accord that Menem entered into with provincial governors in exchange for their support of his reform policies (Gibson and Calvo 2000). The implications of this agreement were manifold. The first was that Menem accepted not to interfere with any provincial politics in Buenos Aires because Duhalde won the 1993 internal party election (Levitsky 2001). The second was that Duhalde built a strong clientelistic territorial network in Greater Buenos

Aires based on the coordination of local brokers that administered the distribution of the Plan Vida in poor districts (Repetto 2000). The third was the absence of any national social policy on unemployment in Buenos Aires and the implementation of the provincial Plan Barrios Bonaerenses.

The Emergence of the Reincorporation Movement: The Piquetero Movement

The example of *puebladas* was crucial for the organization of a movement of unemployed people in Greater Buenos Aires. As part of state reforms, the government decided to downsize the workforce of the main state-owned company, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF) (Sánchez 1997). In 1996, a first *pueblada* was organized in Plaza Huincul and Cutral-Có to claim for some alternative industrial solutions that could recover local employment in the Patagonia.

The Convertibility plan also led to de-industrialization on a massive scale in several areas of Argentina but particularly affected Greater Buenos Aires. In historically industrial districts, from 1990 onwards most major factories began to close. In 1996, the Marcha contra el Hambre, la Desocupación y la Represión was organized by the Maoist Partido Comunista Revolucionario (PCR), the Trotskyist Movimiento al Socialismo, and the Marxist-Leninist Partido Comunista de Argentina (PCA) (Flores 2005). Also, in 1997, the first pickets were coordinated that succeed in getting unemployment subsidies (Svampa and Pereyra 2003).

The main immediate goal of the *piqueteros*—the unemployed workers' movement—has been to recover full employment for the urban poor. This goal is related to the quest for reincorporating the popular sectors in the sociopolitical arena. In a mid- and long-term perspective, each *piquetero* organization has diverse goals based on their ideologies and repertoires of strategies (Rossi 2015b). Some organizations claim revolutionary aims, while others expect gradual reforms in coalition with governments. The *piquetero* movement includes several organizations with the common identity of "unemployed workers." Although the number of organizations has gradually expanded, it began with three main groups: The Liberation Theology-oriented Federación de Trabajadores por la Tierra, Vivienda y Hábitat (FTV), the Maoist Corriente Clasista y Combativa (CCC), and the Guevarist and autonomist Movimientos de Trabajadores Desocupados (MTDs).

Part of the *piquetero* movement departed from the same groups that coordinated urban land occupations in the 1980s. Among them, the FTV is the organization with the strongest links to this previous process. Others, such as the CCC, are one of the outcomes of the process of reconfiguration of the left since democratization.

Since democratization, a group of left-wing organizations had systematically failed to organize employed workers at the factory level. This took them to work at the territorial level with those popular sectors mostly ignored by the Peronist CGT. In 1995, the MTD of La Juanita was created in La Matanza, and another MTD emerged in Florencio Varela, among others. The heterogeneity of this group led to permanent divisions and the creation of new organizations. The MTDs later created the strong Coordinadora de Trabajadores Desocupados (CTD) 'Aníbal Verón,' from which, in turn, several new organizations arose.

The Emergence of a "Piquetero Social Question" (1996–1999)

From 1990 to 1994, the struggle in Jujuy against local disincorporation forced four governors to resign. The fiscal pacts led to a reduction of tax transfers to Jujuy while the province already controlled public education. The provincialization of politics and decentralization during the beginning of the neoliberal reforms moved the locus of protest to the provincial governments (Auyero 2002). For twelve days in 1997, nineteen simultaneous pickets were organized by a multisectoral coalition that included incorporated (CTA, Sindicato de Empleados y Obreros Municipales) and disincorporated unemployed workers. With the goal of making the wave of *puebladas* reach Buenos Aires, the coalition integrated by the CTA, CCC, FTV, and some MTDs organized the second Marcha Federal in 1997 (the first one was in 1994).

As social unrest grew, the national government started to enact some social policies. The Plan Trabajar was created in 1996 to relieve social unrest among unemployed people and to avoid using repression. The crucial element to note is that due to its timing, unlike what was applied to CGT unions and national industrialists, the Plan Trabajar was not a compensatory policy for the losers of neoliberal reforms to avoid mobilization or to include them in the pro-reform coalition. It came so late that its application appeared as a desperate solution to the increase in social unrest. World Bank and Ministry of Labor technocrats designed it, covering 20 percent of the unemployed workforce between 1996 and 2001 (Lodola 2005). This meant an almost 300 percent increase of coverage from the policies used before 1995.

The approach of the Menem government to the growing social unrest associated with unemployment came before the legitimation of the *piqueteros* as a political actor. Instead, the *piquetero* protests were merely considered a "social question" attributable to the novelty of their claim and the type of actor involved, which were both new for Argentina. The gradual recognition of a "social question" started in 1994 when the secretary of social development was created and put under the direct control of the presidency. However, it

was not responsible for unemployment policies; it was merely an agency for the discretionary distribution of resources to control unrest (Repetto 2000).

The arrival of the "*piquetero* question" on a national level resulted from the termination of the informal territorial agreement between the presidency and the governorship of Buenos Aires. The process began when the secretary of social development was given to Ramón Ortega in 1998. In an attempt to become the PJ presidential candidate, Ortega fought with Antonio Erman González (Ministry of Labor) for the responsibility of dealing with the unemployment issue, the administration of subsidies, and for the upgrading of the secretary into a ministry (*Clarín*, May 9, 1998). Ortega would lose his battle with González. However, as an unintended consequence, Ortega's ambition led to the virtual violation of a decade-long informal agreement for the distribution of territorial responsibilities among the national and provincial levels in Buenos Aires.

Ortega's short tenure was the starting point for permanent disputes about the responsibility of the "*piquetero* question" among the Ministry of Labor and the secretary of social development in subsequent governments. Simultaneously, since the Ortega-González dispute, the "unemployment question" became the "*piquetero* question." Even though the movement was not yet considered as a legitimate actor on a national level, its claim was recognized. In theoretical terms, this is the departure point for the construction of a *piquetero* policy domain. By "policy domain," I mean: "(1) the range of collective actors . . . who have gained sufficient legitimacy to speak about or act on a particular issue; and (2) the cultural logics, frameworks, and ideologies those actors bring to bear in constructing and narrating the 'problem' and the appropriate policy responses" (Jenness, Meyer, and Ingram 2005, 300). In brief, the accumulation of *puebladas* since 1993, the organization in Buenos Aires of the *piqueteros*, and the intragovernmental dispute for electoral purposes brought the "*piquetero* question" to the national agenda.

Brazil

The Weak Relaunch of the ISI Model (1985–1990)

José Sarney, the unexpected president, was a member of the ISI coalition that sustained the developmental model, so he did not do much to produce deep reforms. His government focused on the attempt to relaunch ISI with the 1986–1987 Cruzado plan and an important constitutional reform in 1988.

The process of disincorporation started in the 1980s, bringing unemployment and increasing impoverishment in the cities. Within this context, "Many people of rural origin sought shelter in the agricultural sector, but the

impact of modernization on land access during the previous decades could not be wholly reverted" (Ondetti 2008, 92).

Concerning rural social policies, during Sarney's government the new constitution produced a legal framework for agrarian reform focused on the social utility of land. Even though Sarney chose the most prestigious person on agrarian reform issues for the Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA), which developed the ambitious first Plano Nacional de Reforma Agrária, his government did not change the approach to agrarian reform. The strong ISI coalition that was built during the military regime between traditional landowners and industrialist was still powerful enough to stop any attempt of applying the first Plano (Branford and Rocha 2002).

In 1986, a new rural organization, the Movimiento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), tried to meet President Sarney. They sought redress for the assassination of some of their members and an allied priest. Although Sarney did not meet with them, he arranged mediation by the Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil (CNBB) (Fernandes 2000). Despite this advance, the MST still had to wait a bit more to be considered a legitimate interlocutor in the political arena.

In 1990, the failure of the ISI relaunch manifested itself when inflation reached 1,000 percent. That same year, Fernando Collor de Mello, a neoliberal reformist outsider, was elected as the new president.

The Emergence of the Reincorporation Movement: The Landless Peasants' Movement

The landless peasants' movement is composed of approximately 110 organizations (Feliciano 2011), but unlike the *piqueteros*, there is a central organization: the MST. It was founded in 1984 as a result of the coordination of peasant local struggles for land. In 1975, during the military government, the Brazilian Catholic Church created the Commissão Pastoral da Terra (CPT) for the organization of rural Christian base communities (CEBs). Inspired by liberation theology, the CPT sought to organize peasants for land reform and was much more successful than the urban CEBs in Argentina. The MST's central claim is land tenure solely for those persons who cultivate and live on it (Harnecker 2002). This communitarian perspective implied a radical noncapitalist land reform with the hope of building a new political and socioeconomic order (Hammond and Rossi 2013).

Even though the MST and the CPT emerged before the application of neoliberal reforms, most of the 110 organizations in the Brazilian countryside appeared between 1994 and 1998 (Fernandes 2000). This was the result of local divisions from the MST in a few cases and mostly a result of emulation

of a successful method for popular sectors' reincorporation in a context of massive and abrupt social exclusion. In some cases, a couple of organizations emerged with some strength in certain regions of Brazil. The Movimento de Libertação dos Sem Terra (MLST) was founded in 1994 in Pernambuco by members of the Brasil Socialista tendency of the PT. The Liga dos Camponeses Pobres (LCP) was founded after the 1995 Corumbiara killings and is linked to the Maoist Liga Operáia. Trade unions also created landless peasants' organizations to compete with the MST. For instance, the Movimento dos Agricultores Sem Terra (MAST), a middle-size organization in Pontal de Paranapanema, was created by the CGT do Brazil in 1997. Finally, other organizations emerged for related struggles, such as the Movimento de Atingidos por Barragens (MAB) in 1991, the Movimento dos Pequenos Agricultores (MPA) in 2000, and the Movimento de Mulheres Camponesas in 2004. This last group has been closely linked to the MST, covering issues that the MST is not working on and coordinating actions through the Vía Campesina Brazil. Overall, the MST has concentrated the majority of land occupations; for instance, in Pernambuco 34 percent, in São Paulo 27 percent, in Bahia 17 percent, in Pará 67 percent, in Paraná 29 percent, and in Minas Gerais, 52 percent of the families occupying land between 2000 and 2010 were MST members (Feliciano 2011, 41, graph 8).

Martins (1994, 156) argues that the struggle of the landless peasants' movement is not for agrarian reform but for their "recognition as not only workers, but as persons with the right of being paid for their work . . . Peasants, thus, want social changes that lead to their recognition as members of society" (quoted in Fernandes 2000, 21). In other words, they struggle for the same as the *piqueteros*: their reincorporation as wage earners and citizens. Fernandes (1998) argues that the growth of rural unrest was a result of the negative impact of neoliberalism in the urban and rural popular sectors, pursuing land occupation as an alternative quest for being socioeconomically integrated. Moreover, Pereira (2003) quotes sources that say that in the 1990s, approximately 40 percent of the landless peasants mobilized for land reform were previously part of the urban unemployed popular sectors. In Argentina, the resistance to neoliberalism and the quest for reincorporation was framed as an urban problem, while in Brazil, it was framed in rural terms because there was a legal framework inherited from first incorporation—mainly, the Estatuto da Terra of 1964—that was consolidated with the Constitution of 1988, building a tradition of institutions and actors that made this policy area more favorable for reincorporation struggles than the urban one (Rossi 2015a).

Neoliberal Reforms and the Reemergence of a "Rural Social Question" (1990–1994)

President Collor controlled inflation and initiated the first generation of neoliberal reforms with a series of privatizations. In 1990, the government closed the first Plano and 40 percent of INCRA officials were dismissed, disregarding the "rural social question" (Buainain 2008). In 1992 the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT), the Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura (CONTAG), the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), and the MST organized a coordinated protest against neoliberal reforms and for a solution to the "rural social question."

Collor could not dismantle the ISI coalition, and his government became isolated as a result of policies that were affecting the middle classes (confiscation of savings), national and international banks (attempts to postpone debts moratoriums), and the traditional economic and political elites (verbally attacking them and trying to exercise autonomy from them). When in 1991 inflation returned and privatizations stalled, his power disappeared.

In 1992, Collor's political isolation and street protests led him to resign just before an impeachment process was initiated. Vice President Itamar Franco's transitional government was very important for the legalization of the "rural question." Since the Constitution of 1988, the legal framework had not been updated, and the new articles on agrarian issues were never regulated. In 1993, the legal framework for INCRA was produced, giving it a budget and legal power to expropriate land.

Franco's mandate was one of relative openness for movements. His presidency legitimized the MST as a national political actor; he met with its national leadership in February 1993 (Fernandes and Stédile 1999). With the goal of reducing poverty, Franco implemented a PT proposal calling for the first Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar, giving its coordination to the CNBB (*Correio Braziliense*, June 9, 2011). In this meeting, neo-corporatist participation predominated, as several ministries, municipal governments, the CUT, CONTAG, CNBB, and other organizations were involved. Movements such as the MST were not formally members of this council.

Coordinated actions toward reintroducing the rural question in the political agenda increased, and in 1994, the Fórum pela Reforma Agrária e Justiça no Campo was created by several leftist and Catholic sectors, which included the CUT, CONTAG, CPT, MST, Cáritas, and the MAB, among others.

After this interlude, first generation neoliberal reforms resumed when Fernando Henrique Cardoso became minister of economy. With the 1994 Plano Real, inflation was controlled and a new currency established. Its success also paved the way for Cardoso's victorious presidential electoral campaign that same year.

FROM RESISTING DISINCORPORATION TO THE CRISIS OF NEOLIBERALISM

Argentina

The Piqueteros Increased Resistance to Neoliberalism (1999–2001)

By the end of Menem's second government—engulfed in a socioeconomic crisis—the *puebladas* continued to spread across the country. Even though inflation was no longer an issue, the economic recession, coupled with deindustrialization and mass privatization, maintained high levels of unemployment (15.6 percent) and increased the number of those living below the poverty line (27.1 percent) in 1999. Within this context, the province of Corrientes, like many others, was trying to operate with fiscal restraint. However, in 1999 a series of events kicked off a new *pueblada* that ended with the intervention of the federal authorities in the province. In October, the presidential elections were held, and the Unión Cívica Radical-Frente País Solidario (UCR-FREPASO) Alianza beat the PJ candidate (Sánchez 2000).

The Alianza consisted of the UCR, a centennial catchall party with several governorships and thousands of local governments, and the FREPASO coalition of small center-left parties that was less than a decade old with no executive posts. Due to the poor showing of FREPASO in the crucial elections for the province of Buenos Aires, the executive cabinet was almost totally formed by UCR members.

For more than ten days in May 2000, the Unión de Trabajadores Desocupados (UTD) of Mosconi organized a third *pueblada,* which was followed by strong police repression (*Clarín*, May 12–13, 2000). Parallel to this conflict, the Dissident CGT (ex-MTA) called for the first national strike against President Fernando De la Rúa to resist the approval of a new labor law that would increase flexible working conditions. Notwithstanding social unrest and union resistance, the government decided to decrease the pensions and salaries of state employees. Unions responded by organizing a new general strike coordinated by the Dissident CGT and the CTA.

From July to August, the CTA, in cooperation with the Dissident CGT and other organizations, staged a 300 km march to Buenos Aires to demand a universal unemployment subsidy and a monthly allowance for poor families with children. This march would later evolve into the Frente Nacional contra la Pobreza (FRENAPO), a popular front for the universal right to income for citizens.

In 2000, a corruption scandal affected the UCR members of the coalition. FREPASO leader and vice president Carlos "Chacho" Álvarez supported an investigation against the will of President De la Rúa. This unsustainable situation forced De la Rúa into a major reshuffle of the cabinet without consulting

Álvarez. This increased the already marginal position of FREPASO and resulted in the resignation of Álvarez and almost all the FREPASO members in government.

It was also in 2000 that the FTV and CCC initiated the Matanzazo, the first massive picket carried out in Greater Buenos Aires. It had the support of the CTA, part of FREPASO, the La Matanza mayor, and the vice-governor. This new correlation of forces was particularly unfavorable for the reluctant new minister of labor Patricia Bullrich. There was no other way out for the national government than to finally provide the FTV and CCC with legitimacy as national political actors, something the rest of the political spectrum did during the Matanzazo protest (Calvo 2006).

In June 2000, a fifth *pueblada* was organized in Mosconi. This *pueblada* introduced an innovation in the policing of protest. It was the first disruptive event in which the *gendarmería* intervened within the framework of the recently reformed Código Procesal Penal that allowed the military police to intercede in social protests (Law 24,434; *Página/12*, May 2006 and June 21, 2001). Even though the *gendarmería* was already in charge of conflicts in rural and enclave areas since the first *puebladas* in Cutral-Có and Plaza Huincul, in such occasions the intervention was done within a different legal framework. The *gendarmería's* role from redemocratization to the emergence of the *puebladas* and *piqueteros* was as guards for borders and national roads. Thus, when *piqueteros* blocked a national road, the *gendarmería* was in charge of applying the right to free transit. Since the reform, the *gendarmería* included among its duties taking part as an antiriot force.

The Piquetero Movement's Legitimation and the Neoliberal Crisis (2001)

The sustained conflict in Mosconi, Tartagal, and La Matanza, plus the new cabinet changes, placed the resolution of the *piquetero* issue high on the government's agenda. Since the Matanzazo and the legitimation of the FTV, CCC, and UTD of Mosconi, the dispute centered on the definition of the political or social character of the *piqueteros*' policy domain and for the control of this policy domain. Within a new context, these conflicts implied the continuation of the struggle for the policy domain that emerged at the end of the Menem presidency. Throughout De la Rúa's mandate, the resolution of the *piqueteros*' claims would continue to be the purview of the Ministry of Labor, with a secondary role for the Ministry of Social Development. A difference in this period was that the latter was a more active contender than before in the quest of gaining some participation in the *piqueteros*' policy domain.

As contention grew, the *piquetero* movement expanded. For instance, in 1999 the Trotskyist Partido Obrero created the Polo Obrero (PO). The first

public action of the PO was participating in the first Asamblea Nacional Piquetera (July 2001), after which it grew exponentially. The Asamblea was the first massive convention of the *piqueteros* coordinated by the FTV and CCC. The second Asamblea (September) represented the crystallization of the movement's diversification during this period. The FTV and CCC called for the continuation of this coordinating body, but most of the other organizations refused to follow. Unlike the MST in Brazil, for the *piqueteros* it was impossible to achieve centralized coordination through a dominant organization.

In October, economic stabilization policies caused unemployment to reach 19 percent (plus 16.2 percent underemployment), and levels of poverty were at 35.4 percent in Greater Buenos Aires. The government lost the legislative elections and its majority in both chambers. This meant the end of any possibility for De la Rúa to propose policies without PJ agreement. As a result, part of the PJ believed that the president should step down before the end of his term (*Página/12*, December 7, 2001). What the PJ semiloyal opposition could not foresee was that the legislative election had not favored the PJ as the winner (19.3 percent). In a country that never had less than 75 percent electoral turnout, this election had for the first time more nonvoters (27.2 percent) and negative voters (15.7 percent) than votes for any single party (Calvo and Escolar 2005). The effect of this election was the deterioration of the legitimacy of the entire political elite. To make things even worse, in November there was a rush into dollars that forced the government to limit the maximum weekly amount that could be taken from banks. This caused the emergence of a protest movement of bank savers.

During December, social unrest grew as the government weakened and reduced the economic survival alternatives for the population. From December 14 to December 22, 261 lootings were organized in several cities (Auyero and Moran 2007). The mobilized middle classes and the PJ semi-loyal factions (but not the *piqueteros*) were the key figures in the national *pueblada* of December. To stop the intensification of lootings, De la Rúa declared a state of emergency on December 19. The first reaction to the speech given that day by the president was a general defiance to the resolution. The urban middle classes spontaneously started a *cacerolazo* (saucepan banging) in Buenos Aires and in other big cities. Later that night, thousands went to the Plaza de Mayo to demand the resignation of the government, the Supreme Court, and all the governors, deputies, senators, and union leaders (Rossi 2005).

On December 20, the accumulated lootings and *cacerolazos* pushed the national cabinet to quit in favor of the formation of a government of national unity with the PJ. However, the continuation of protests and lootings for the

rest of the day led to the resignation of the president. Finally, on the December 23, the governor of San Luis, Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (PJ), was named by the parliament as interim president.

During the inaugural ceremony, Rodríguez Saá declared that the country had defaulted on the national external debt and promised to create a new currency and one million jobs in his ninety-day mandate. Although during his government's tenure no substantial public policy decision was taken in the *piquetero* policy domain, it nevertheless represents the national legitimation moment for the whole movement. In five days, the president met with the main social actors that had resisted disincorporation: the CTA, the non-Menemista CGT, the pensioners and retired groups, the human rights movement, and the *piqueteros*.

The consequences of this first meeting of the *piqueteros* with a president were similar to those achieved by the MST, CPT, and CONTAG with Itamar Franco: an enlargement in the number of legitimate actors by including the reincorporation movement as a core actor in the policy domain. Since that moment, meeting with the president became a common practice for the *piqueteros*, beginning a process of increased incorporation.

On December 27, Rodríguez Saá declared his interest in continuing beyond the agreed mandate, but that night a third *cacerolazo* emerged, rejecting his desires. Three days later, the weakened president resigned (Rossi 2005).

Brazil

The Landless Peasants' Increased Territorial Resistance to Neoliberalism (1994–1996)

President Cardoso continued with the privatization process started by Collor. From 1994 to 1999, Brazil experienced the largest process of denationalization of its history. Some of the most important and profitable companies, such as the Companhia Vale do Rio Doce and the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, were sold, as well as state monopolies such as the telecommunications company Telebrás.

During this period, unemployment grew—though never as much as in Argentina—to numbers doubling those of the previous two decades. While in 1986 unemployment was at its lowest levels (3.3 percent), during Franco's mandate it reached 6 percent (1993), and during Cardoso, it hit 9.6 percent (1999) due to the serious external trade imbalances produced by the Real currency stabilization program, as well as important losses in gross domestic product (GDP). On the other hand, inequality was decreasing in a slow but stable fashion, though preserving the very high historical Gini coefficients, particularly in rural areas.

Cardoso's policies were—intentionally and unintentionally—dismantling the ISI model. Among the unintentional consequences of his policies was the lowering of land price by 45 percent (on average), economically weakening traditional landowners (Sallum 2003). In addition, pressure from the landless peasants' movement and CONTAG for reincorporation in rural terms put land distribution into question, one of the pillars of the ISI model in Brazil. In Pontal de Paranapanema (São Paulo), one of the most contentious areas of Brazil in the 1990s, the MST discovered that there were 900,000 hectares of public land illegally occupied. The success of the MST in achieving several expropriations in Pontal provoked the reactivation of the União Democrática Ruralista (UDR) in 1996.[2] During this period, in Pontal as elsewhere, several new organizations emerged emulating the MST, such as the MAST in 1997. However, in contrast to what was happening in Argentina, the MST kept its dominant position and avoided the fragmentation that the *piqueteros* suffered.

The coordination among movements, unions, and churches to resist disincorporation increased in this period. In 1995, the Fórum pela Reforma Agrária e Justiça no Campo organized its first national campaign called Grito da Terra to press the government for giving INCRA autonomy from landowners, upgrading it from a department of the Ministry of Agriculture to a presidential department. March to May also witnessed the organization of the Campanha Nacional em Defesa dos Direitos dos Trabalhadores e da Cidadania contra as Reformas Neoliberais by a coalition of leftist parties, movements, and unions, which included the MST, MAB, CPT, CUT, and the PT. In September, the CNBB started to organize the Grito dos Excluídos to protest against "the situation of growing social exclusion in Brazilian society" (Vieira 2004, 12). However, not only was the government ignoring these claims against disincorporation, it also continued with neoliberal reforms. In 1995, the Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar was closed, suffering the same fate of all the other neo-corporatist councils. Instead, the family-based cash transfer program Rede de Proteção Social was created as the main social policy.

There was also an intensification of competition between the main organization coming from first incorporation and the more expressive reincorporation movement. As the MST increased land occupations, the demobilization of CONTAG became evident. It was in Pernambuco, the state where CONTAG originated, where this competition emerged strongest. The CONTAG was created in 1963 during first incorporation, and since its origins, the Federação dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura do Estado de Pernambuco (FETAPE) has been its most powerful federation (Pereira 1997). In Pernambuco, disincorporation was as abrupt and massive as in the YPF enclaves and Greater Buenos Aires. Economically, the main industry of Pernambuco collapsed in

1994–1995, closing most sugar cane mills and tomato sauce factories (Carvalho Rosa 2010).

From 1995 to 1996, the expansion of the landless peasants' movement of disruptive power and higher degrees of subnational violence ended in two repressive situations that became turning points in the correlation of forces between the MST and the national government. In August 1995 in Corumbiara (Rondônia), at least ten peasants and two policemen were killed in a violent confrontation between the Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais de Corumbaia and the police. One year later, in Eldorado dos Carajás (Pará) another violent confrontation between the MST and the police led to nineteen peasants killed and earned Brazil international condemnation of the treatment that the Cardoso government was giving to the "rural social question." The repercussions of these two events were such that for a second time a president received the MST national leadership (May 1996). In addition, they produced a reduction of state repression, which stimulated the MST's national diffusion.

The "Rural Social Question" as a Reincorporation Policy (1996–2001)

Since 1996, the national government promoted several innovations toward institutionalizing the "rural social question" and reducing the levels of social unrest in what became the most ambitious land reform program in Brazil, settling around 375,453 families by the end of Cardoso's second mandate (fig. 5.1). The program was done within the tension of two simultaneous logics. On the one hand, it applied the expropriation model based on the 1988 legal framework, a model defended by the landless peasants' movement. On the other hand, in 1998 the government implemented the Banco da Terra, a program of negotiated or market-based land reform through which peasants could purchase land with the help of a flexible loan given by the state. This second model was designed by the World Bank and rejected by movements (Branford and Rocha 2002; Navarro 2008).

Thus in Brazil, the "rural social question" reemerged as a compensatory policy for disincorporated workers instead of the massive program of unemployment subsidies implemented in Argentina. Land reform in Brazil was a result of the existence of a dense network of rural organizations struggling for land issues that could mobilize the mass of expelled urban workers; there were no equivalent urban reincorporation movements. The pressure of the landless peasants' movement on the government led to the elaboration of what Cardoso's minister of agrarian development, Raúl Jungmann, called a "sponge" land reform program: "Capitalism expels people [from the system], and you sponge it up, capitalism expels again, and you sponge it up" (author's personal interview, 2008). This means that agrarian reform was done to reincorporate



FIGURE 5.1. Number of families in land occupations versus number of families in rural settlements in Brazil, 1988–2010. Source: DATALUTA (2011).

the disincorporated urban and rural popular sectors when the economic system could not absorb them by its own. Moreover, during the 1980s–2000s, the popular sectors occupying lands were mostly unemployed urban workers (Ondetti 2008, 124).

Since the 1980s, the agrarian question went through several cycles of reabsorbing excluded popular sectors. Overall, agrarian compensatory policy expanded in the 1990s–2000s due to three developments. These were the magnitude of disincorporation, the emergence of a rural reincorporation movement, and the lack of a universal unemployment subsidies program.

In 1996, INCRA recovered its autonomy and budget. It was moved from the landowner-controlled Ministry of Agriculture to the new Extraordinary Ministry of Land Policy. Simultaneously, the Cardoso administration passed two crucial laws for facilitating agrarian reform. One established the procedure for land expropriation, and the second increased taxation of unproductive land, which rose from 4.5 percent to 20 percent (Pereira 2003). In addition, the Department of Agrarian Conflicts was created for the resolution of contentious events associated with the "rural social question" (Buainain 2008).

As unemployment grew, the fragility of laborers created by disincorporation produced a reduction in the strike power of unions (see Gindin and Cardoso in this volume). At the same time, the reincorporation movement increased its capacity to mobilize the popular sectors under territorial logics (see fig. 5.1). While the MST consolidated as the main reincorporation organization, movements were weaker in the urban space, though they coordinated their efforts through the Central dos Movimentos Populares (CMP) since 1993. In 1996, the Grito da Terra was organized again and has continued annually since then. In 1997 the parties that participated in the Fórum das Oposições, the CGT do Brasil, the CUT, CONTAG, CMP, MST, and other organizations, constituted the Fórum Nacional de Lutas, a permanent coalition that planned several mobilizations against Cardoso's reforms.

For the MST, the problem with Cardoso was not land reform but the lack of concern for the "social question" produced by neoliberal reforms (Pereira 2003; Ondetti 2008). In April 1997, the MST organized the Marcha Nacional por Reforma Agrária, Emprego e Justiça. More than a thousand landless peasants walked for one thousand kilometers to Brasília on the date when the first anniversary of the Eldorado dos Carajás killings was commemorated. From 1998 on, this march would be transformed into Abril Vermelho, an annual event focusing on land occupations across Brazil for an entire month. This massive action of land occupations became the MST's most important coordinated contentious event. From April to May, the Fórum Nacional de Lutas organized the Campanha Reage Brasil to generate an equivalent mobilization to that of rural popular sectors by the urban middle classes and popular sectors. In December, the Encontro Popular Contra o Neoliberalismo por Terra, Trabalho e Cidadania brought together six thousand social movement delegates in São Paulo.

In 1999, the Department of Agrarian Conflicts was upgraded into the National Agrarian Ombudsman. The Ombudsman was created with the goal of mediating in rural conflicts to reduce the degree of violence and earn some time to find the best expropriation deal or an alternative solution for each conflict. In this sense, the new institution introduced mechanisms similar to those used by trade unions' tripartite negotiations—linking ministries for the resolution of conflicts and developing a common procedure for the state involvement in the "rural question" (Buainain 2008). However, the Ombudsman was partially different from first incorporation tripartite institutions due to its territorialized nature that took it to work across the country in association with each subnational branch of INCRA.

Most conflicts were territorially resolved on the spot after an occupation was done. However, neo-corporatist negotiations for rural organizations also

emerged in this period. Once CONTAG controlled the Grito da Terra, its annual mobilization routinized in trade-unionist claims, with Minister Jungmann centralizing negotiations and linking each claim with the corresponding ministry.

The "rural question" was for Brazil the main expression of the "social question" produced by the massive disincorporation of popular sectors since the ISI model failed and neoliberal reforms were applied. The "rural social question" was not new for Brazil, but its reemergence was the result of a strong network of rural organizations that could reframe the struggle for reincorporation as a territorial struggle for land. Land occupations during the disincorporation period played an equivalent role in Brazil to the pickets and factory occupations in Argentina: they allowed disincorporated popular sectors to achieve access to resources that could allow them to struggle for their reincorporation into wage-earning society. This, however, does not mean that agrarian reform was synonymous with reincorporation, but in Brazil it substituted for social policies to assist the victims of neoliberalism.

Immediately after starting his second mandate, Cardoso sharply devaluated the real. Then, in 1999, his government began to replace agrarian reform with cash transfers as its main social compensation policy. This new approach represented an expansion of the Rede de Proteção Social, with twelve cash transfer programs organized by territorial (municipal level) and income (family unit) logics covering urban and rural populations. This program reached 37,572,173 people by the end of 2002 (Draibe 2003).

The two sides of a new "social question" are the emergence of new social policies as well as new policing techniques. The Cardoso administration was under pressure due to increased contention organized by the landless peasants' movement. In its attempt to reduce land occupations, the government issued Interministerial Ordinance (PI) 325 of 1998 that established a procedure to limit the occupation of INCRA offices by landless peasants' organizations. In 2000, the Provisional Measure (MP) 2027 determined that each land occupied would not be subject to land expropriation for two years and, if occupied again, for four years. And in 2001, the government started to reduce INCRA's financial support for the MST's educational and health programs. In addition, the PT gradually distanced itself from the MST's radical methods because it planned to present candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as a moderate social democrat. Due to these factors, the landless peasants' movement faced difficulties in performing its two main contentious strategies, with a consequent sudden drop in the number of land occupations in 2001 (see fig. 5.1). Though it certainly diminished the MST's power "to lead the opposition to neoliberalism" (Ondetti 2008, 180), this did not mean a total demobilization. Among

others, the Fórum Nacional de Lutas coalition continued organizing national campaigns against neoliberalism.

THE SECOND INCORPORATION: BETWEEN CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Argentina

Defining the Relationship between the Reincorporation Movement and the State (2002–2008)

In Argentina, 2002 was a very contentious year. Even though lootings were mostly controlled, the *piqueteros* increased the number of protests and continued to grow. The *cacerolazos* became organized as part of the assemblies' movement, a short-term ally for the *piqueteros* (Rossi 2005). The process of factory occupations that started back in 2000 expanded and became organized with the support of left-wing parties, unions, assemblies, and *piqueteros* (Rossi 2015c). Simultaneously, levels of poverty (54.3 percent) and unemployment (21.5 percent), plus an 18.6 percent rate of underemployment, reached their worst peaks in Argentina's history.

Duhalde was chosen by the parliament as an interim president until elections were called for in 2003. After meeting with the CCC and FTV, Duhalde publicly promised to expand unemployment subsidies under a new system that implied an enlargement of the restricted *piqueteros*' policy domain to a general-policy constituency. The Programa Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (PJJHD) became part of a redefinition of the state's approach to the legitimated *piqueteros* and its claim. From then on, it would involve an agreement between the FTV, CCC, and Duhalde. In the case of the FTV, Duhalde offered them the opportunity to direct the Programa Arraigo (in charge of legally regulating land occupations). This was the first time that a *piquetero* organization had become part of the national state structure.

Days later, Duhalde declared a 29 percent devaluation of the peso, which quickly reached 400 percent. During the next week, Duhalde called for a social-Christian approach to the resolution of social conflicts through the massive expansion of the PJJHD and the constitution of the Mesa del Diálogo Argentino—a space for negotiation and articulation inspired by the Moncloa Pact.

The government invited all *piqueteros* to the dialogue, but only the FTV, CCC, and the Movimiento Independiente de Jubilados y Desocupados (MIJD) participated. The rest of the movement not only rejected state incorporation but also the multisectoral types of strategies promoted by the FTV and the CCC. The original division of the movement that had emerged in the first and

second Asambleas Piqueteras created a clear inside/outside division during this period. The PO, MTL, MTR, and other *piqueteros* organized the Bloque Piquetero Nacional (BPN) for the escalation of the national *pueblada* of December toward reaching the immediate end of the Duhalde government. The BPN also worked in alliance with the MIJD, the Coordinadora de Trabajadores Desocupados (CTD) "Aníbal Verón," the Movimiento Sin Trabajo (MST) "Teresa Vive," and Barrios de Pie (Burkart et al. 2008). This sector of the movement adopted a confrontational strategy.

The core of the government's approach toward the *piqueteros* was the promotion of governability agreements with some organizations and the demobilization of the social movement sector that promoted an insurrectional path through certain policies. To achieve this, the Duhalde cabinet adopted three simultaneous strategies.

The first strategy was the expansion of the restricted unemployment policy domain to a general constituency. The Duhalde government initially opted to expand preexistent policies: the Programa de Emergencia Laboral of the De la Rúa mandate reached 287,079 people in November 2002 and was later quickly extended without much control. The other was the PJJHD, the most far-reaching unemployment program ever applied in Latin America, which distributed almost two million unemployment subsidies (Neffa 2008).

The second strategy was the rebuilding of the state's capacity for governability. This strategy involved reconstructing the link with the PJ territorial network and avoiding confrontation with any—electoral or contentious—actor. This strategy also involved the return of the administration of unemployment subsidies to the municipalities, which included the creation of several local Consejos Consultivos. This decentralization process was done to reestablish the municipal role in controlling social unrest, which included the rebuilding of PJ clientelistic networks.

The third strategy was the state's selective distribution of resources and use of policing of protest to weaken the insurrectional component within the *piqueteros*. Duhalde's demobilization strategies were, however, not effective with the MTR and CTD "Aníbal Verón." During Duhalde's mandate, these organizations carried out the most contentious actions, and his government offered the most drastic repressive response, killing two *piqueteros* during a roadblock on the Pueyrredón bridge in Buenos Aires.

Massive media coverage of the killings and the swift international and national outcry in favor of the *piqueteros* brought forward the date for the elections, originally scheduled for October 2003, to April, with no clear favorite for president. The elections showed the effects of the 2001–2002 crisis period on the party system (see Ostiguy and Schneider in this volume). It atomized

the party system, diluted the UCR's electoral power, but reinforced the hegemonic tendency of the Peronist electoral alternatives. As a result, Néstor Kirchner (Peronist Frente para la Victoria, FpV) won the election with 22.2 percent of the vote.

Territorial Incorporation and the Establishment of a Piquetero Policy Domain

Kirchner was a Duhalde-backed candidate, but he had received fewer votes than the combined number of unemployed and underemployed people (34.4 percent in 2003). In addition to this, Kirchner had no parliamentary majority and was faced with a highly conflictive context. His government would be characterized by the territorialized incorporation of the *piqueteros* as part of the mobilization base of the Peronist FpV coalition, the decrease in protest repression, but the preservation of the judicialization of social conflicts.

The meetings of Kirchner with the *piqueteros* were organized by the social movement sector and never included all the movement simultaneously. The purpose was to provide each sector with specific resources in order to incorporate, co-opt, and/or demobilize the organizations. After these meetings, the FTV, Barrios de Pie, and the newly created Movimiento "Evita" joined the governmental coalition. In 2004, the CCC ended its alliance with the government, and the Organización Barrial (OB) "Túpac Amaru" (a former member of the FTV, located in Jujuy) and part of the MTL would participate in the coalition as external allies. In 2007, part of the MTD "Aníbal Verón" of Florencio Varela joined the sector that was supportive of the government. The *piqueteros* went on to occupy several executive posts at the national, provincial, and municipal levels, but preserved a secondary role in the decision-making process of the *piqueteros*' policy domain. Additionally, this period would be related to the initial entry of the *piqueteros* into the provincial and national parliaments, though not all as part of the governmental coalition.

The rest of the movement did not accept the government's invitation and continued with a contentious strategy. Overall, the *piqueteros* started to demobilize, while roadblocks entered into the Argentine repertoire of contention—as the 2008 peak of roadblocks by landowners shows (fig. 5.2). Those organizations that did not support the government unsuccessfully reorganized their forces to confront it. As a result, the 2003–2008 period consolidated a dynamic but clear division of the movement into two sectors based on the position of the *piqueteros* as either inside or outside the Kirchner government.

The incorporation of the *piqueteros* and their relationship with the government went through a process of formalization. This went hand in hand with the need to build a territorial base for the governmental coalition. While

Figure 5.2: Annual number of pickets in Argentina, 1997–2011



* Until September

Source: Centro de Estudios para la Nueva Mayoría. Reproduced from Rossi (2017, fig. 3.1).

the Secretary of Employment was still the main institution responsible for the administration of unemployment subsidies, the *piqueteros* were never allowed to participate within the structure of the Ministry of Labor. Instead, the Secretary General of the Presidency was the main governmental department that was opened up to the movement. The reincorporation process initiated by Duhalde and expanded by Kirchner implied—just like the first incorporation—the institutionalization of political conflict and the development of spaces for its resolution. Due to the territorialized nature of the second incorporation (Rossi 2015a, 2017, and the introduction to this section), the departments of the state in charge of this process were not those of the first incorporation (the Ministry of Labor). Instead, the main spaces were two newly created ministries—the Ministry of Social Development and the Ministry of Federal Planning—and the redefinition of the role of the Secretary General of the Presidency.

The FTV joined the coalition by viewing the Kirchner period as "a government under dispute" between the traditional PJ and the new forces coming from movements. The role of the FTV in government was to push the coalition—as it also attempted during the Alianza—toward a more progressive position. Within the multiclass electoral popular front strategy, the FTV followed different stages in its interaction with the government. From 2003 to 2005, personalized links with governmental officials prevailed, and the FTV could be considered as an ally that was external to the government. Once the Kirchner government was able to realign its correlation of power with Duhalde and ended the joint government agreement, the FTV also redefined its relationship. From 2005 to 2006, the FTV emulated a strategy that Barrios de

Pie had adopted since the beginning: colonizing spaces inside the state. This led to the creation of the Subsecretary of Land for Social Habitat under the new Ministry of Federal Planning. In this subsecretary—as in all the other departments of the Ministry of Federal Planning—there was no participation from any other *piquetero* organization.

Barrios de Pie entered government as an external ally in the quest to colonize spaces inside the state. Even though it had a different strategy from that of the FTV, it shared the interpretation of the Kirchner presidency as a government under dispute. Due to this, Barrios de Pie adopted the strategy of occupying as many elective or appointed state posts as possible. In a similar vein to what happened with the FTV, an area for the exclusive control of Barrios de Pie was created. The Subsecretary of Training and Popular Organization was under the responsibility of its national coordinator until 2008.

The Movimiento "Evita" was created in 2005 from above and below. This organization was the result of Kirchner's goal of building a territorial group and the coordination of non-PJ left-wing Peronists. The origins of the Movimiento "Evita" go back to when a sector of the CTD "Aníbal Verón" created the MTD "Evita" in 2002 in La Plata. This organization focused its strategy of government participation on the province of Buenos Aires from 2003 to 2007. The aim of the national government was to expand the weak Kirchnerista networks in this province, colonizing the governorship. In 2003, an agreement with Governor Felipe Solá made Vice-Chief of Cabinet Emilio Pérsico the movement leader. Since his 2003 gubernatorial reelection, for Solá, the Movimiento "Evita" meant the chance to build a territorial base to compete with Duhalde. For the Movimiento "Evita," it implied the possibility to build the network it needed and access resources to expand the organization just as Barrios de Pie was doing at the national level.

Kirchner would end the distribution of PJJHD and divide tasks related to the "*piquetero* question." Even though the responsibility for all unemployment programs and subsidies always remained under the control of the Secretary of Employment, a clear distribution of roles between the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Social Development was established for the first time in 2004. Since Decree 1506/04, the Ministry of Labor's responsibility over unemployment subsidies and training to reenter the labor market would be confirmed as exclusive, while the Ministry of Social Development gained responsibility for the rest of the social policies related to the *piquetero* policy domain (i.e., the territorial claims for access to water, health, education, and so forth). Only a third ministry would be directly involved in the *piquetero* policy domain, and this was the Ministry of Federal Planning, mainly for house-building and legalizing occupied land. In this way, the dispute for the

responsibility of the *piquetero* policy domain initiated in 1999 was closed because it formalized the state departments' responsibilities for the "*piquetero* social question."

In 2007, Kirchner ended his mandate with an unemployment rate of 8.5 percent, just one national strike in April (which was not related to wage demands), and an increasingly demobilized *piquetero* movement. Concerning the parliament, the legislative elections were crucial for the expansion of the partial incorporation of the *piqueteros*. It led to the election of the first *piquetero* representatives to the national parliament and increased the number of provincial and local legislative posts occupied by the movement. Barrios de Pie was the organization in government that gained the most from this legislative election, getting two national deputies. The FTV did not manage to elect national legislators but did gain four Buenos Aires provincial senators and a provincial deputy.

However, the 2007 presidential elections demonstrated the limits of the process. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner won the elections with 45.29 percent of the vote, putting her government in a much better position than her husband's previous mandate. This was not expressed through more posts for the *piqueteros*; rather, their number remained roughly the same. Simultaneously, Néstor Kirchner became PJ party president and increased his reliance on the PJ mayors' territorial network. This decision led Barrios de Pie to consider that it had been defeated by the PJ in the internal struggle for power, gradually leaving the coalition between 2007 and 2008. The FTV continued to characterize the Fernández de Kirchner mandate as a government under dispute, and the Movimiento "Evita" opted for the consolidation of its strategy, joining the national council of the PJ.

For those *piqueteros* outside of government, the 2007 elections represented a new electoral opportunity. The MIJD presented Raúl Castells as its presidential candidate and Nina Pelozo for the Buenos Aires governorship. Néstor Pitrola, the national leader of the PO, was the Partido Obrero's presidential candidate, while the MST "Teresa Vive" supported a presidential ticket with no *piqueteros*' representatives of their Movimiento Socialista de Trabajadores. For all these parties, the national electoral results were below 1 percent. However, the PO achieved a relatively good result in Salta and elected some provincial legislators. The MTD of La Juanita entered the Coalición Cívica party and its leader won a seat as national deputy. Finally, the CCC rejected electoral politics and promoted electoral abstention.

Until December 2008, Fernández de Kirchner preserved the Secretary General of the Presidency as a *piquetero's* collegiate body. Simultaneously, the FTV expanded its control over executive posts. This set of affairs would be

preserved until the rural lockout would shock the government and alter the configuration of the *piquetero* movement.

The End of the Incorporation Process (2008)

Just one year after the Fernández de Kirchner mandate started, the new minister of the economy changed taxes to agricultural exports to increase state revenues and control food inflation. For the government, this tax was crucial for the sustainability of the second incorporation process.

Rural associations contested this decision as it would mean a decrease in their profits in a period of worldwide growth in the price of commodities. A coalition of all rural associations called for a lockout of agricultural production, causing scarcity of certain products in supermarkets. The president gave a televised speech rejecting the protest and their demands, which on the same night was responded with some *cacerolazos* in small and medium cities that were dependent on agribusiness production and in the traditional upper-middle-class districts of all the main cities. During that same night, some FTV, Movimiento "Evita," Barrios de Pie, and Frente Transversal Nacional y Popular leaders went to the square with a clear purpose: "Tonight we mobilize to confront the pro-coup sector that wants to overthrow the popular government lead by President Cristina Kirchner" (FTV communiqué quoted by *La Nación*, March 26, 2008). While those sectors promoting the lockout were accused of attempting to destabilize the government, the sectors supporting the government were accused of being authoritarian.

On May 20, a second lockout ended, but negotiations failed again, and on May 25 in Rosario around 250,000 people participated in a protest in favor of the lockout (*La Nación*, May 26, 2008). The president decided in a last desperate move to send a bill to parliament legitimating the tax resolution. In an extremely polarized situation, two massive protests were organized on July 15 to separately press for the approval or rejection of the law. In an extended parliamentary debate that finished with a tied result, the vice president, in clear disagreement with the president's position, rejected the law with his deciding vote. The next day, the tax resolution was annulled and with it the possibility of making reincorporation policies economically viable in the long term.

Brazil

Defining the Relationship between the Reincorporation Movement and the State (2002–2005)

When the first Brazilian president of worker origins took power, the ISI model had been abandoned and replaced by a liberal-developmental model, whose

"aim [was] not to rebuild the entrepreneurial national State but to reform the State so that it might push private development and social equality" (Sallum 2003, 198–99). Cardoso had built a quite technocratic state structure that controlled the policy agenda. Lula's two mandates were mostly defined by continuity in economic terms, but, in political terms, they represented a breaking point in the incorporation of social actors into the political arena. The model of reincorporation initiated in the period of government under the PT was a state multisectoral model, combining neo-corporatist and territorial dimensions.

Even though the MST, MPA, MAB, MLST, CONTAG, and other organizations expressed their support for Lula's government, they saw Lula's moderation process as a negative signal of the will to produce major transformations similar to the ones happening in Bolivia and Venezuela. First, Lula's vice president José Alencar came from the center-right Partido Liberal (PL). Moreover, during the electoral campaign, Lula published the Carta ao Povo Brasileiro to assure international creditors that he would not declare a default, avoiding the path of Argentina. In addition, the PT lacked a clear majority in parliament (though it was the main party, it had less than 20 percent of the lower chamber and senate) and won only the governorships of three peripheral states (Acre, Mato Grosso do Sul, and Piauí). As a result, the transformative possibilities of the new government were quite limited (Gonçalves Couto and Fernandes Baia 2004; Hunter 2010). Finally, the lack of a major crisis of neoliberalism—as the ones of Argentina and Bolivia—did not produce a radical break with the past. For these reasons, the MST interpreted Lula's government as "a government under dispute" between a right-wing sector that would push for the preservation of the neoliberal path initiated by Collor and a left-wing sector that would push for the introduction of a new development path.

During 2003–2004, a huge increase in land occupations happened as a result of a combination of the growing expectations for agrarian reform, the MST leadership strategic decision of pushing the government toward the left to produce a rupture with the neoliberal path, and the government decision of not applying MP2027. However, the government did not react with more expropriations or settlements to the increased number of occupations. Only in 2005 did the government start to settle more families, but soon after winning reelection the decreasing tendency returned and consolidated with the lowest numbers of settlements and expropriations until that moment (see fig. 5.1; Ondetti 2008).

As a coalitional government, Lula distributed ministries by political party and organization that provided the legislative, neo-corporatist, and territorial support for his mandate. The amplitude of the coalition was such that the groups in government had overtly contradictory aims and perspectives,

confirming—according to the movements—that this was a government under dispute. The first cabinet distributed ministries between the PT, the PL, the Partido Comunista do Brasil (PC do B), the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), the Partido Verde (PV), and some business representatives. In the rural policy domain, this logic was also reproduced. The Ministry of Social Development was given to a CONTAG ally, the INCRA to a MST and CPT ally, and the Ministry of Agriculture to the president of the Sociedade Brasileira de Agribusiness.

The developmental-liberal coalition excluded the traditional landowners. In 2003, the government met with the MST leadership and decided to stop applying MP2027. The traditional landowners reacted informally and institutionally against this decision. First, in Paraná they founded an armed organization against land occupations. Second, between 2003 and 2005, the landowners' legislative group created a commission to investigate the main organizations of the landless peasants' movement (Ondetti 2008).

The critical moment in the dispute for influencing the direction Lula's government should take on the rural question and the role of the reincorporation movement in this coalition emerged with the struggle of the Fórum Nacional pela Reforma Agrária e Justiça no Campo for the application of the most ambitious agrarian reform program in Brazilian history. The strategy was to occupy positions inside the state while pushing for the creation of the second Plano Nacional de Reforma Agrária (the INCRA presidency was the main position occupied by an ally of the Fórum). At the end of 2003, in a context of increased rural unrest and after a year of vacillating on agrarian reform, Lula upon request of the MST asked for a second Plano with the goal of launching the much-promised agrarian reform. The resulting draft relied exclusively on the expropriation model and initially aimed to settle around one million families in the remaining three years of government. While the government accepted the condition to use only the expropriation model—closing the Banco da Terra program—the goal proposed by the second Plano was considered too ambitious, and it was reduced to around four hundred thousand families. This new goal was accepted by CONTAG but rejected by the landless peasants' movement (Navarro 2008).

In other words, Lula continued with the same approach to the "social question" started by Cardoso in 1999, replacing agrarian reform with cash-transfer policies as the main reincorporation policy. In 2003, Lula integrated three previously existing programs (Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, and Auxilio Gás) with a new one—called Cartão Alimentação—into the Bolsa Família program. By the end of 2003, the program had reached around 11,100,000 vulnerable families. As a key element of the reincorporation pro-

cess, in 2004 the government created the Ministry of Social Development as the main institution for the administration of the "social question" (Fenwick 2009).

Lula's government retained and expanded other institutions created by Cardoso. Concerning the policing dimension of the reincorporation process, in 2004 the National Agrarian Ombudsman was upgraded into a permanent department of the Ministry of Agrarian Development. Before becoming the Department of the Agrarian Ombudsman and for Conflict Resolutions, it was a group of mediators working inside INCRA and the ministry, but with no formal structure.

The direction taken by the government did not please the landless peasants' movement, which gradually distanced themselves from the coalition. By 2005, the MST and CPT had abandoned any position inside government and became openly critical of it.[3] While the MST and MLST continued supporting Lula for reelection in 2006, the CPT—among others—did not. The lack of a total rupture with the government led to the emergence of the Movimento Terra, Trabalho e Liberdade (MTL) as the result of the unification of a series of smaller landless peasants' organizations linked to some tendencies of the PT that had defected from the party to create the Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL) from 2004 onwards. Being in opposition to the government did not exclude the MTL from being received by Lula on more than one occasion.[4]

Reformulating Neo-Corporatism: The Participatory Expansion and Routinizing of Contentious Politics

Lula cannot be considered a president that produced a total renewal of the Brazilian political setting. In Brazil, "Modifications to corporatism are likely to be incremental, seeking to *overlie* rather than *replace* old corporatist institutions" (Doctor 2007, 135). The changes that Cardoso made were expanded or reformulated by Lula as a partial break with the neo-corporatist past.

In January–February 2003, several councils were created with the aim of integrating ministries with corporatist, territorial, and individual actors, building a participatory infrastructure for the elaboration of social policies. The main council was the Conselho de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (CDES): "The CDES did not erase past traditions of state-society relations but built on what was already a multipolar hybrid system of interest representation in which corporatist and pluralist associations worked together, clientelistic practices survived alongside open lobbying, and sector-oriented tripartite negotiations took place alongside the particularistic access of large firms to high-level bureaucrats and members of the government" (Doctor 2007, 135).

The goal of the CDES was to help in the production and implementation of social policy reforms. However, the CDES gradually changed its purpose into an economically focused council. The subrepresentation of social movements—getting just sixteen of the ninety-one available seats (which included ten seats for ministries and one for Lula)—led to their informal organization into a subgroup that could articulate their positions and tried to push the CDES toward the development of social policies that could produce policy recommendations in several areas (Doctor 2007).

The "rural question" was partially handled through the reopening of the Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional. This council was originally created by Franco, later closed by Cardoso, and reopened by Lula. In 2003, this council had some participation from movements such as the MST, unions including CONTAG, CUT, Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores (CGT of Brazil), and Força Sindical, and institutions of the CNBB such as the Pastoral da Criança, among others.

These were not the only councils; by the end of Lula's second mandate, there were thirty-four councils, eighteen of them with social-movement participation. Most of these councils were part of the structure of the ministries, such as the new Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente or the expanded Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Rural Sustentável. However, not all of these councils produced effective participatory policy-making processes. For instance, while the Conselho Nacional de Segurança Pública of the Ministry of Justice was a technocratic council, the Conselho Nacional das Cidades—during Minister for Cities Olívio Dutra's (PT) mandate—was a very participatory council, with much involvement from urban movements. In 2005, when Dutra left the ministry, the new minister Márcio Fortes (Partido Progressita) developed a quite technocratic and clientelistic relationship with movements. Participation of movements was also very important in the Ministry of the Environment until Marina Silva left the government in 2008 (Abers, Serafim, and Tatagiba 2014). In other words, it was mostly in ministries created for dealing with territorial and reincorporation movements that the development of more participatory councils was possible.

As in Argentina, the Secretary General of the Presidency played a central role in the informal relationship with the reincorporation movement. In 2003, its historical role of articulating the executive with the other branches of the state was transferred to the newly created Secretary of Institutional Relations. Meanwhile, the National Secretary for Socio-Political Articulation was created as a subsecretary of the secretary general with the aim of coordinating the relationship of the state with social organizations. In contrast with Argentina's secretary general, in Brazil no members of social movements participated

in the Articulation Secretariat–in Brazil, the articulation secretary included only public officials, all coming from the PT, and most of them from CUT or the PT tendency Campo Majoritário.

Even though the Articulation Secretariat was an institutional space for the informal relationship with movements, only CONTAG could routinize and—as a result—formalize its relationship with the secretariat. Since 2005, annual demonstrations by Grito da Terra and the Marcha das Margaridas (women's sector), both exclusively organized by CONTAG, accomplished this. As a neo-corporatist organization, after each annual demonstration CONTAG presented its claims to the Articulation Secretariat, which then arranged meetings with the ministries that were in charge of the policy areas of CONTAG's interest. The only equivalently routinized mobilization of the MST—the Abril Vermelho annual campaign of land occupations—has not reached this type of neo-corporatist relationship, being solved through informal dialogues between the MST, the articulation secretary, the agrarian ombudsman, INCRA, and the local governments that are being affected by land occupations.

The End of the Incorporation Process (2005–2007)

If social movements still held any hopes that the PT government might alter its approach to the "rural question," the *mensalão* corruption scandal dashed them. This break point introduced new divisions in the landless movement. In 2005 it was discovered that PT officials and members of the cabinet were buying some legislators' support. The *mensalão* showed social movements that the PT had transformed into a catchall party and that it had reduced the power of the left-wing sectors inside the coalition (Wainwright and Branford 2006; Hunter 2010). However, the dissatisfaction with the government started *before* the *mensalão*. The less ambitious second Plano was under risk of failing earlier that year: a 25 percent budget cut made impossible the fulfillment of a promise to settle 115,000 families (*Folha de São Paulo*, March 30, 2005; fig. 5.1).

Social movements had a different reaction to the corruption scandal than unions. In August 2005, the CUT and the Coordinadora dos Movimentos Populares organized a demonstration in Brasília for justice, political reform, and to defend the government of Lula from what they considered an attempt to destabilize it. In December, the MST started to publicly criticize the government (*Folha de São Paulo*, September 8, 2005). Thus, despite the *mensalão*, the MST remained ambivalent about their opposition to Lula's government.

The lack of influence of the reincorporation movement in the policy agenda led to the decision of the MLST to occupy the national parliament in 2006. The MLST still believed Lula's government could be pushed towards the left

in its second term, and it partially achieved its goal: the MLST received an increase in resources for land settlements. Simultaneously, however, the PT national council decided to expel Bruno Maranhão—the MLST leader and PT national secretary for popular movements (*Folha de São Paulo*, June 7, 2006).

The MTL had not supported the Lula government since 2004. However, the *mensalão* created more PT dissidences, and the PSOL grew in number. Because of this, the MTL experienced some increase in its human and material resources. In 2006, the MTL became part of a coalition of unions and movements that opposed the government.

In parliament, there were also changes concerning social movements and CONTAG representatives. On the one hand, in 2006 CONTAG won three seats for federal deputies, increasing its representation in parliament by two seats. This change allowed CONTAG to create the Frente Parlamentar de Agricultura Familiar. On the other hand, in 2006 the MST, MBA, and MPA's discussions about how to interpret and face Lula's government caused the first coordination difficulties for the Frente Parlamentar da Terra created by the MST.

The reincorporation process played out over two social policy stages. The first took place from 1993 to 1999, when agrarian reform was the main reincorporation policy. The second occurred from 1999 to 2012, when cash transfer programs such as Bolsa Família gradually replaced it. This process had two important consequences for the movement. First was an increase in the movement's divisions, as the MST never decided on a total rupture with the PT and continued to support PT presidential candidates. The second was a decrease in the number of land occupations due to the demobilization effects of Bolsa Família. While there was an increase in the number of settlements from 2003 to 2005, from 2006 to 2010 there was a constant decrease, until they reached the lowest historical numbers since redemocratization (see fig 5.1). In parallel, but in the opposite direction, the Bolsa Família program expanded its coverage consistently, from 3,600,000 families in 2003 to 11,100,000 in 2006 and 12,900,000 in 2010.[5]

Because the main constituencies mobilized by the landless movement were the disincorporated urban popular sectors, the application of policies that provided some partial reincorporation made it difficult for the MST leaders to convince the urban poor of the benefits of abandoning shantytowns to occupy land in the countryside. The MST leaders perceived the demobilizing effect of cash transfer programs, considering that it was not offering real reincorporation: "We are struggling against welfarist social policies that do not create employment . . . Here you have *Bolsa Família*, *Vale Gás*, *Vale Alimentação*, and other stuff that kill hunger on people but they also produce complacency on

people . . . the public of agrarian reform is the poor population of the city. It has always been. But now this population does not want anymore to go to the countryside, and face the difficulties of settlements. . . ." (MST coordinator in Roraima, quoted in *Jornal do Brasília*, April 28, 2008).

The application of the liberal-developmentalist first Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC) (January 2007–December 2010), which had not included agrarian reform as part of its goals, was a clear signal of the end of agrarian reform as a reincorporation policy. However, movements still resisted this strategic decision taken by the government. In 2008, the Fórum Nacional pela Reforma Agrária e Justiça no Campo created the Campanha pelo Limite da Propiedade da Terra, and the same year the left-wing tendencies of the PT could reopen the Núcleo Setorial Agrário of the PT (closed in 2002).

THE AFTERMATH OF SECOND INCORPORATION

Argentina

The Neo-Developmental Model (2008–2012)

The rural lockout had important effects on the process of reincorporation in Argentina. Due to the enormous political costs of the defeat for the government, there was an increase in institutionalization, but the process reached a stalemate that signaled the end of the second incorporation stage. Even though a neo-developmental model was introduced, this model lacked institutional sedimentation to reach the degrees of strength necessary to become sustainable in a period of low commodity prices. Among the main reasons were the impossibility of reducing agribusiness' and traditional landowners' centrality in the balance of trade. This led to an eternal trap for Argentine growth: much of the reincorporation resources came from commodity exports.[6]

For the *piqueteros*, there were some important changes in their alliances as a result of the lockout and the decision of Néstor Kirchner to become PJ president. In December 2008, Barrios de Pie made its departure from the Fernández de Kirchner coalition official. This meant in many cases that the Movimiento "Evita" occupied most of the national and provincial positions in Buenos Aires that had been vacated by the former.

In 2009, the activities of the collegiate body of *piqueteros* in the Secretary General of the Presidency ended due to marginal results and the increased space conferred to the traditional Peronist leaders to the detriment of the *piqueteros*. As part of a process of augmented institutionalization, this informal space was replaced in March 2009 with the Subsecretary of Relationships with Civil Society. However, there was no access to the Ministry of Labor for dis-

incorporated workers' organizations, as unions preserved the control of this department (the struggle to officially participate in this ministry by several *piqueteros* notwithstanding). In 2008, the Movimiento "Evita" had particularly struggled for a position in the Ministry of Labor, but was instead appointed to the Subsecretary of Social Economy Commercialization in the Ministry of Social Development. In other words, the *piqueteros* could never transcend the secondary role that was given to them; neither could they overcome the informal, territorialized, individualized, and horizontally and vertically uncoordinated interactive logic of politics that traditional Peronist leaders dominate.

Since 2010, unions recuperated their mobilization power as inflation grew and employment was recovered. However, issues over the definition of the relationship with the government kept them divided (see Gindin and Cardoso in this volume). The *piqueteros* were less mobilized than before, but still organized and divided. The sector that continued supporting the government attempted several times to create a group that could give them more power inside the coalition.

Regarding the evolution of the *piquetero* policy domain, a new employment program was created that weakened the *piqueteros*' position vis-à-vis PJ mayors even more. The Programa de Ingreso Social con Trabajo "Argentina Trabaja" meant that the *piquetero* policy domain partially returned to the control of the PJ mayors' network for the first time since 2003. As a sign of the coalition's reconfiguration, the "Argentina Trabaja" meant a reversal from previous policies that were developed alongside the *piqueteros*. In any case, the relationship between movement and government was less formalized in institutions, preserving the movement's secondary role as well as a higher degree of autonomy in comparison to the one achieved by unions during the first incorporation.[7]

Brazil

The Liberal-Developmentalist Model (2007–2012)

With the beginning of the first PAC, the reincorporation process finished due to the building of specific midterm policies that established a liberal-developmental model.[8] The period 2007–2012 should be considered as the aftermath of the reincorporation period because no substantial change was produced on the institutions and state-social movements' relations since that year. Finally, the presidential election of Dilma Rousseff (the main brain behind the first PAC) consolidated the path initiated by Lula.

Lula's last three years in government and Rousseff's mandate exhibited continuity in economic and social policies. During the first two years, Rous-

seff's government was paralyzed by several corruption scandals that led to numerous cabinet reshuffles, and it was very much limited in its transformative possibilities by the coalitional nature of Brazilian politics. The government was mostly focused on solving these scandals, controlling inflation, reducing public expenditures, and expanding cash-transfer policies (von Bülow and Lassance 2012).

The MST gave its customary critical support to Rousseff, but the relationship was more distant than with Lula. Social policy continued to expand Bolsa Família, reaching 13,400,000 families in 2011.[9] The expansion of cash transfer policies was done in a similar fashion to that of her predecessor. In June 2011, Rousseff launched the Brasil Sem Miséria program, which combined Bolsa Família with Bolsa Verde and Plano Viver Sem Limite. In October 2012, this expansion continued with the creation of Brasil Carinhoso. During Rousseff's tenure, the logic of incremental changes continued by combining preexistent programs toward building a bigger one that covered more vulnerable people.

Meanwhile, agrarian reform was dismissed as a reincorporation policy. The lack of interest for agrarian reform was such that the INCRA presidency was vacant for the first three months of Rousseff's government until an MST-ally director occupied it. In addition, due to the lack of budget for land expropriations, Rousseff's first year offered the lowest number of settlements (22,000 families) since redemocratization. During 2012, the situation deteriorated so much that INCRA and Ministry of Agrarian Development officials initiated a strike for more budget, more employees, and the improvement of the infrastructure for agrarian reform (*Brasil de Fato*, April 4 and June 18, 2012).

Finally, Rousseff did not redefine the roles of the main institutions responsible for the "social question" inherited from Lula's administration. Almost all councils were kept open and working as before. The informal relationship between social movements and the Secretary General of the Presidency continued to be structured as during the Lula mandate after an attempt to expand and institutionalize social participation inside each ministry failed when the Congress annulled Decree 8,243 in October 2014.

Since then, Rousseff's weakness increased by means of the government's difficulties to produce a clear rupture with the neoliberal past in a coalition that gradually gave more power to its conservative allies. Rousseff debilitated even more due to more corruption scandals, economic recession, and massive protests in 2013 and again in 2015–2016. Showing the recursive logic of incorporation waves, a civic coup d'état against Rousseff by the conservative sector of the coalition consolidated the aftermath of second incorporation in 2016.

CONCLUSION

Brazil can be defined by its gradual metamorphosis, while Argentina by its quick rupture and change. This makes Brazil a case more difficult to define as post-neoliberal than Argentina, though in both cases there was a second wave of incorporation that combined elements from below and above. While in Brazil the process had a mixture of neo-corporatist and territorial features, in Argentina it was mostly territorial. In both countries, however, first and second incorporation actors started to share institutional spaces. In Brazil, these spaces were increasingly formalized and corporatized, leading to the gradual exclusion of the territorially based actors. In Argentina, competition produced a dispute over weak reformed corporatist institutions and the creation of less-formal territorially based spaces inside the state. However, this also led to the gradual reduction of *piqueteros*' power vis-à-vis unions. In both countries, nevertheless, the social policies implemented since the emergence of territorial contention led to a process of collapse or gradual change of the neoliberal political setting. Argentina and Brazil incorporated popular movements into the state as (almost) equals to first incorporation actors. In both countries, though, this new relationship with a government open to receiving and (at least) listening to their claims resulted in divisions among reincorporation movements in their disputes over the determination of degrees of change and continuity produced between the 1990s and the 2010s.

More recently, in both countries, the return to power of conservative neoliberals signaled the possible consolidation of the aftermath phase. However, there was an important difference between Argentina and Brazil. While the latter went through a novel democratic electoral transition, in the former the logic of first incorporation was reproduced, ending the reincorporation process with a coup d'état.

criteria for resource distribution according to political-partisan lines to favor groups aligned with the Bolivarian regime. The scarcity of resources also affected the protagonism of popular organizations and drastically reduced their role in policy decision making. Under the pretext that it faced an economic war, the administration issued a Decree of State of Emergency and Economic Emergency in 2016. The decree gave extraordinary powers to the Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción (CLAPs, Local Committees for Provisions and Production), which in practice replaced not only the social missions and related programs but the existing network of social organizations as well. The CLAPs were formed from ideologically pro-Chávez organizations such as the Bolívar-Chávez Battle Units (Unidades de Batalla Bolívar-Chávez), the Francisco Miranda Ideological Front (Frente Ideológico Francisco de Miranda), the National Union of Women (Unión Nacional de Mujeres), and representatives of communal councils, among others. Thus, the comunal councils changed from being a space for participating in decision-making policy to vehicles of political-partisan control of programs to alleviate poverty, to manage deficits of food and medicines, and to distribute them according to a political-partisan logic.

7. The socio-environmental movement is composed by the articulation of the human rights, indigenous, and ecological social movements.

8. See www.amigransa.blogia.com.

9. According to the Gaceta Oficial 40.855, Decree No. 2.248, the "Zona de Desarrollo Estratégico Nacional Arco Minero del Orinoco (AMO)" was created on February 24th, 2016, by the Venezuelan government. It has an extension of almost twelve hundred thousand square kilometers, and the objective is the extraction of gold, diamonds, cooper, bauxite, coltan, and other important minerals. More than 150 companies from 35 countries are involved, and the main investors at this moment are Canada, United States, China, and Democratic Republic of the Congo. The socio-environmental movement has criticized the project, claiming it will cause great ecological damage on the river basins of the Orinoco and Caroni. In addition to destroying the tropical forest and its diversity, it will have a severe negative impact on cultural diversity, affecting indigenous communities such as the Baniva, Piaroa, Yekuana, and Jivi and their territories.

CHAPTER 5. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, THE NEW "SOCIAL QUESTION," AND THE SECOND INCORPORATION OF THE POPULAR SECTORS IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL

1. This chapter reproduces paragraphs of my book *The Poor's Struggle for Political Incorporation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

2. In 1994, traditional landowners decided to close the UDR because they were feeling that agrarian reform was abandoned as a national policy.

3. CONTAG was also critical of the agrarian policies of the Lula governments.

4. Other organizations, such as the LCP, were always in opposition to Lula, but they still had a regular dialogue with INCRA officials.

5. Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger, www.mds.gov.br/saladeimprensa/noticias/2012/outubro/imagens/19102012-evolucaoanualbf-9anos.jpg (viewed October 20, 2012).

6. The return to power of conservative neoliberals reinforced this situation. The first decision taken by President Mauricio Macri was to—almost completely—eliminate any kind of export taxes to commodities in December 2015. This has severely unfinanced the national state, self-justifying the need for austerity policies.

7. As part of the aftermath of second incorporation, the Macri government continued with the same social policies inherited from the Fernández de Kirchner government. As a result of a proposal of the CCC and the Movimiento "Evita," Macri even further institutionalized the relationship with the reincorporation movement in the Ministry of Social Development with the creation of a social security system for informal and cooperative-based workers.

8. The second PAC started in January 2010 and ended in December 2014.

9. Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger, www.mds.gov.br/saladeimprensa/noticias/2012/outubro/imagens/19102012-evolucaoanualbf-9anos.jpg, viewed October 20, 2012).

CHAPTER 6. INTRODUCTION TO PART II: LABOR UNIONS IN LATIN AMERICA: INCORPORATION AND REINCORPORATION UNDER THE NEW LEFT

1. Note the difference in polarity of the two indices: greater deregulation is higher on the flexibility index and lower on the labor standards index, which aggregates provisions regarding freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike. For a description of the indices, see Stallings (2010, 145–48).

CHAPTER 7. SOCIALISM WITHOUT WORKERS? TRADE UNIONS AND THE NEW LEFT IN BOLIVIA AND ECUADOR

1. *Dancing with Dynamite* is the title of Ben Dangl's (2010) excellent book on the relationships between the MAS and social movements.

2. Executive Order 1701 limited collective bargaining and possibilities to unionize. The constitutional mandate 04 reduces compensation for "unattended layoffs," favoring the layoffs of skilled workers and bypassing the Public Service Organic Law. Decree 813 (July 2011) creates the purchase of "mandatory waivers." The new constitution (2008) prohibits strikes by all public sector workers in defiance of the ILO standard to differentiate between essential and nonessential services. The Criminal Code makes organizing or participating in strikes an act of terrorism punishable by eight to