Social Movement Dynamics

New Perspectives on Theory and Research from Latin America

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Chapter 2

Conceptualizing Strategy Making in a Historical and Collective Perspective

Federico M. Rossi

Introduction[1]

In this chapter, I propose two concepts with the aim of contributing to a better understanding of historically rooted and collective processes of strategy making and performing that transcend the overemphasis of the specialized literature on contentious and public action (Goldstone 2003; Abers and Tatagiba, this volume). These concepts are *repertoire of strategies* and *stock of legacies*. I propose these concepts in this chapter as a complement to Charles Tilly's "repertoire of contention." The implications of incorporating a focus on strategies are central for social movement studies because they lead us to pay attention to actors and their intentions, and the interactions among the intentions of a variety of deliberate actors (Jasper 2012, p. 30). Moreover, with these concepts I aim to recover Machiavelli's analysis of strategies through a historical understanding of the construction of strategies.

In this chapter I claim that when studying the interaction of any social movement with the state, allies, and antagonists, the public performances identified by a "repertoire of contention" approach is just part of the story. There are many other activities performed by social movements that are part of their strategic quest for influencing political decisions that are neither contentious nor public. However, I do not propose as an alternative to reduce the analysis to the study of micro-tactics. The complete story is built by the multiple and simultaneous strategies that guide and give meaning to each tactical action performed by the collectives that constitute a movement.

1 I would like to acknowledge the comments and suggestions to previous versions of this chapter provided by Stephanie Arnett, Donatella della Porta, Jeff Goodwin, Hank Johnston, Margaret Keck, John Markoff, Mattea Musso, David Ortiz, Philippe Schmitter, Sidney Tarrow, Marisa von Bülow, and an anonymous reviewer. Thank you so much for your contributions. I presented earlier versions of this chapter at the XXIV Convegno della Società Italiana di Scienza Politica in Venice (September 16, 2010), the Center for the Study of Social Movements, University of Notre Dame (May 4, 2012), and the Pittsburgh Social Movement Forum, University of Pittsburgh (November 2, 2012).

I illustrate both concepts with an analysis of the *piqueteros* (picketers) or unemployed workers' movement of Argentina. This movement is famous for its use of roadblocks, marches, and encampments, even though they strategized much more than these three types of protest. My empirical findings are based on the print editions of 12 newspapers, hundreds of documents produced by the *piqueteros*, and nearly 40 open-ended interviews with all the main *piquetero* leaders, key allies (human rights activists, priests, and so on), key state brokers (ministries, mayors, and so on), national and provincial parliamentarians, and journalists, conducted over three fieldwork periods in Argentina between 2007 and 2009, which also included direct observation.

Tactics, Strategies, and Contention

Social movement scholars have accorded a great deal of importance to the study of tactics and strategies (Gamson 1975; Piven and Cloward 1977; McAdam 1983; Fantasia 1988; Staggenborg 1991; Ganz 2000). However, until the 2000s, theorizing on this topic was limited, and research almost exclusively focused on protest events, overlooking other forms of claim making and collective action (Taylor and Van Dyke 2004, pp. 267–68; Smithey 2009; Maney et al. 2012: xiii–xvi).

In addition, most of the literature on strategies/tactics does not draw a conceptual distinction between "strategy" and "tactic" (Jasper 2004: 14, n.1; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). Still, there have been some interesting recent efforts to clarify the differences (Fligstein and McAdam 2011; Maney et al. 2012; Meyer and Staggenborg 2012; Doherty 2013). Nepstad and Vinthagen (2012) have proposed the clearest distinction between tactic and strategy. These authors suggest a "Clausewitz-inspired understanding" that could help scholars: "… we define *tactics* as the means and plan to win a single campaign (one battle) and *strategy* as the plan of how to win the struggle (the war). Thus, tactics involve the small-scale repertoire and subgoals of the movement, while strategy is about how a movement reaches its goals" (Nepstad and Vinthagen 2012, p. 282, n.1). In order to avoid any conceptual confusion, I draw on the difference between tactic and strategy proposed by Nepstad and Vinthagen.

A fundamental approach to strategizing is Tilly's concept of "repertoire of contention." His concept has allowed us to study contentious and public events and their slow pace of change as part of what is known as "contentious politics." Tilly (1995, pp. 26–27) defined the repertoire of contention as a limited set of actions based on a relatively deliberate process of choice, in which social relations cluster together in recurrent patterns based on social and cultural capital accumulated through struggle. As he clearly said: "In stressing open, collective, discontinuous contention, the analysis neglects individual forms of struggle and resistance as well as the routine operation of political parties, labor unions, patron-client networks, and other powerful means of collective action, except when they produce visible contention in the public arena" (Tilly 1995, pp. 32). In other words, his definition

is unambiguously limited to disruptive acts performed in the public space (Tilly 1986, pp. 3–4; 2008, pp. 203–04). This focus means that Tilly's definition does not allow for the study of a case of mobilization that did not happen. For example, one that was planned and organized by the members of a movement but never carried out. In this way, the narrative built would neglect that a public action emerges because several other non-public actions were performed and led to a contentious result. As a result, Tilly's conceptualization alone is unable to explain two crucial aspects of the dynamics of interaction of social movements: first, situations where contention does not emerge, and second, the relationship between the public and contentious events generally described by the media and most narrations and those that were not reported because they were not performed in the public space. The full picture of the strategic dynamics of interaction of social movements with the state, allies, and antagonists emerges if we broaden our scope beyond the contentious and public dimension of social movements only.

In contrast, with the goal of developing an agency-based approach to social movements, Jasper (2004, 2006, 2012) proposes the study of tactical options as a result of concrete dilemmas faced by agents. Jasper (2004, p. 4) suggests that we need "… to understand what happens at the micro level of individuals and their interactions in order to improve our theories at the macro level …" For this purpose, he proposes a series of "strategic dilemmas/trade-offs" that would allow us to understand the daily decisions of individuals without having to recourse to rational choice theory. The main issue with the concept of "strategic dilemmas/trade-offs" is that it suggests the universality of micro short-term tactical decisions. As a result, this perspective successfully eliminates several limitations of rational choice theory, but still lacks "… an understanding of how much dilemmas are interrelated and how their solutions are constrained" (Meyer and Staggenborg 2012, p. 6). An additional problem with this approach is that although sometimes an action seems to be logical when its effects are retrospectively analyzed, the "… social agents have 'strategies' which only rarely have a true strategic intention as a principle" (Bourdieu 1998, p. 81). It is, thus, necessary to trace the history of the strategy/tactic that is being performed to provide a contextualized meaning of it.

A crucial difference between Jasper's and Tilly's approaches to the study of tactical/strategic action is the answer they offer to a classic problem posed by Marx (1926[1852], p. 23) in remarkable terms: "Men make their own history, but not just as they please. They do not choose the circumstances for themselves, but have to work upon circumstances as they find them, have to fashion the material handed down by the past. The legacy of the dead generations weighs like an alp upon the brains of the living." While Jasper (2012) disregards the contextual factors as irrelevant, considering that this could take us to a return to structuralism, other authors, such as Bourdieu (1998), Tilly (1986, 2006, 2008), and Meyer and Staggenborg (2012), consider that what limits actors' free choice of strategies is crucial. The question with Jasper's view is that it omits the limitations posed to human agency by historical legacies of past struggles, which provide a meaning to and guides, limits, and enriches each short-term tactic. Whereas how to resolve

the relationship between strategies chosen by collective actors and the legacies of past struggles was one of Tilly's main concerns.

In brief, while Jasper (2004, 2006, 2012) has been producing some of the most interesting conceptual ideas on small, short-term, and individually based tactics, Tilly (1986, 1995, 2008) made the most important conceptual contribution to the study of large, long-term, and collectively based repertoires of contention. However, while Jasper offers a universalistic approach to tactics, Tilly's historical approach only focused on public and contentious actions. Thus, there is a clear gap between public collective disruption and small tactical decisions.[2] In order to fill in this gap, I emphasize a historical and collective approach to politics to analyze the background of strategies. Then, a conceptualization of collective action that falls outside the realm of public protest needs to be incorporated into the current debates in the literature. In this chapter I propose a conceptual solution to this gap in the literature that would allow us to explain the historically rooted dynamics of *strategic* interaction between social movements and allies and antagonists.

Let us first look at the main characteristics of the case that will illustrate my conceptual proposal—the *piqueteros*.

The *Piqueteros*: The Unemployed Workers' Movement of Argentina

Throughout the 1990s, neoliberal reforms implemented in Argentina included hundreds of privatizations and resulted in de-industrialization and unemployment on a massive scale. These reforms downsized the work force of the largest state-owned company, the corporation Treasury Petroleum Fields (YPF), reducing the number of workers from 51,000 in 1989 to less than 11,000 in 1992. At the same time, YPF transferred oil fields deemed unprofitable to the provinces or closed them entirely. The social consequences of this decision were quickly felt in those petroleum enclaves that had been fully dependent on YPF. In 1996, the first *pueblada* (social uprising) was organized in the province of Neuquén to demand alternative industrial solutions in order to restore local employment levels. As no solution was offered, in 1997 a second *pueblada* took place, after which the national government started providing unemployment subsidies (Sánchez 1997; Auyero 2003).

De-industrialization particularly affected suburban areas such as La Matanza in Greater Buenos Aires. La Matanza is the most populated suburban area of Argentina with more than one million inhabitants. Historically an industrial district, after 1990 all the larger factories began to close—among them those of the automobile industry such as Volkswagen, Chrysler, Borgward, and MAN (Merklen, 2005, p. 54, n. 23)—which meant the loss of many jobs and the collapse of entire communities. Local Christian and left-wing activists reacted to this critical situation by building a movement of unemployed poor people.

2 For a review of some efforts to solve this gap, see Abers and Tatagiba (this volume).

In 1996, the first mobilization against unemployment was organized in Greater Buenos Aires. Party militants of the Maoist Communist Revolutionary Party (PCR), the Trotskyist Movement towards Socialism (MAS), and the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Argentina (PCA) organized the "March Against Hunger, Unemployment, and Repression" in La Matanza. In 1997, the first pickets in Greater Buenos Aires to succeed in getting unemployment subsidies were organized (Svampa and Pereyra 2003). Since then, the main immediate goal of the protestors, known as the *piqueteros*, has been to reinstate full employment for the urban poor. This goal has been related to the quest for the reincorporation of urban poor people into Argentina's socio-political arena (Rossi 2013b, 2015).

Multiple ideologies are present within the *piquetero* movement, and in order to understand the complexity of this movement it is also necessary to comprehend the ideological and organizational divisions within the left in Argentina. Although the number of organizations that compose the movement has gradually expanded, its original basis was in three main groups that share a common identity of "unemployed workers": (1) the Liberation Theology-based *Federación de Trabajadores por la Tierra, Vivienda y Hábitat* (Workers' Federation for Land, Housing, and Habitat, FTV); (2) the Maoist *Corriente Clasista y Combativa* (Classist and Combative Current, CCC); and (3) the Guevarist and autonomist *Movimientos de Trabajadores Desocupados* (Unemployed Workers' Movements, MTDs).

An important part of the *piquetero* movement originates in the same groups that coordinated urban land occupations in Greater Buenos Aires in the 1980s. Of these organizations, the FTV has the strongest links to this past experience. In 1981 and 1982, activists from Christian-based communities (CBCs), with the support of the local bishop, organized the first massive urban land occupations in Quilmes (Fara 1985). This was done via CBC-related human rights organizations, and the process initiated in Quilmes later spread to La Matanza (Merklen 1991). These two main CBC-organized land occupations, and their later expansion, became the seeds for the future growth of the FTV. The FTV now operates in those same neighborhoods where the original organizations staged their land occupations. In other words, the same people that occupied land in the 1980s were those who created the FTV, building upon the legacy left behind by CBC actions.

The Maoist CCC was created in 1996 as part of a long process of reconfiguring the left after democratization. The first major event against neoliberal reforms was the Federal March of 1994. This national mobilization was coordinated by left-wing and Peronist labor federations, as well as left-wing parties such as the Trotskyist MAS and the Maoist PCR. Increased cooperation in the wake of the Federal March led to the creation of the CCC by connecting the PCR with some members of the MAS.

In 1996, the PCR also helped to spread contention from the province of Jujuy to neighboring Salta with the creation of the *Unión de Trabajadores Desocupados* (Union of Unemployed Workers, UTD) of Mosconi in association with a network of former YPF workers. Simultaneously, another process of reorganization was taking place. In La Matanza, some PCR leaders had been involved in 1980s land

occupations that were similar to those led by the CBCs, the precursor groups of the FTV. The outcome was a territorialized approach just like the one taken by the FTV. The creation of the CCC–Unemployed Workers Sector as one of three divisions of the CCC was the result of the PCR's redefinition of poor people as constituting "The same components that characterize the [working] class: those in work, those who have retired, and the unemployed" (national leader of the CCC, interviewed September 17, 2007).

Finally, the third main sector in the movement is the one related to Guevarist and autonomist ideologies. Since democratization, a group of left-wing organizations had systematically failed to organize employed workers at the factory level. This led them to work at the territorial level with popular sectors mostly ignored by the Peronist General Labor Confederation (CGT). The future MTDs were conceived in 1995 thanks to support that the human rights organization Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo Association gave to certain informal groups working in shantytowns. In La Matanza, the MTD of La Juanita was established, and in Florencio Varela, a former guerrilla member and a local Catholic priest, among others, started another MTD. From the beginning, the heterogeneity of this *piquetero* sector led it to splinter into new organizations.

The Repertoire of Strategies Concept

The *piquetero* movement is well known for its repertoire of contention. It is, indeed, this contentious dimension—and specifically its regular use of pickets—that earned this movement its name of *piqueteros* (picketers). A journalist presenting the movement to an English-speaking audience described the main characteristics of the *piqueteros* as follows:

> Very noisy and equally efficient, the *piquetero* movement in Argentina is well organized. They come in hundreds—men, women, and children—to demonstrate. About once a week, and sometimes more, and most of the time without any warning, they block some of Buenos Aires' main streets, causing major traffic obstructions (…) and forcing the city to organize itself in order to avoid total chaos. (…) Although some pickets are organized to show support to the Kirchner administration, the *piquetero* movement is mostly one of protest against the government (*Piquetero Movement – Argentina*, 00.00 to 1.12 minutes, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AKE1fIrtMR4, accessed October 10, 2012).

This same journalist goes on to explain the steps taken by the movement in a public action directed at the state:

> These *piqueteros* were marching towards the Plaza de Mayo, Buenos Aires' main square, in front of the House of Government. They were stopped by the police a few hundred yards before reaching the plaza. They decided to camp

> out where they were until the president agreed to get them what they wanted: a job. (…) And so they did for 35 hours until the government finally agreed to their demands. The picket has become the most prominent way of protesting nowadays in Argentina—a common method, indeed, and a legal one, at that. But not a popular one (*Piquetero Movement – Argentina*, 1.13 to 1.49 minutes, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AKE1fIrtMR4, accessed October 10, 2012).

In fact, as this narrative illustrates, the repertoire of contention of the *piquetero* movement has been composed predominantly of roadblocks, marches, and encampments.[3] This dimension of politics is the one that had been the main focus of most of Tilly's (1986, 1995, 2006, 2008) research, and is the one that led to his formulation of the extremely useful concept of "repertoire of contention."

However, even this highly contention-prone movement engages in informal collaboration strategies and in bridge building with government officials, and these initiatives cannot be understood through the concept of repertoire of contention. They were the result of strategic decisions to avoid pursuing contentious actions. When an analysis of the history of the *piqueteros*—and any other social movement—is widened beyond contentious and public politics, a double logic of interaction emerges that embraces both public militancy and less public strategic retrenchment. If we were to reduce the analysis to the repertoire of contention, these other strategies would be missed.

Therefore, two questions arise as critical for improving the explanations of strategy making and performing by social movements: *How can we analyze the interaction of a social movement with the state, allies, and antagonists without reducing the analysis to its public and contentious dimensions only?* And, *how can we put strategy making in historical perspective?* The answers to these questions lie in the existence of two types of repertoires being simultaneously performed by the same movement. On the one hand, there is Tilly's repertoire of contention, which is public, militant, and glacially slow to change. This is corroborated by the *piquetero* movement's repertoire, which remained steadfast in its use of roadblocks, marches, and encampments. However, the narrative somewhat changes when the history of the movement is analyzed using an interpretative Weberian approach (*verstehen*) based on in-depth interviews with movement leaders and state brokers and direct observation of movement activities. If Tilly's sources were supplemented with the ones I suggest in this chapter, the analysis of the movement would gain access to public, semi-public, and private events that are both contentious and non-contentious. These events broaden the scope of collective action and need to be theorized to help explain what happens in social movements when contentious events are not taking place. I suggest that the concepts "repertoire of strategies" and "stock of legacies" bring into the analysis elements intentionally excluded from the concept of "repertoire of contention."

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3 Between 1997 and 2012, the print media reported 19,811 roadblocks/pickets, the vast majority of them organized by the *piqueteros* (Ichaso 2013).

The basic idea is to consider contentious and routine repertoires simultaneously, not limiting the analysis to the in-the-public-space aspects of the movement, and achieving a fuller depiction of historical events. Thus, these concepts allow for explaining aspects that the previous concept was ignoring.

By repertoire of strategies I mean a historically constrained set of available options for non-teleological strategic action in public, semi-public (evolving across specific groups), or private arenas. This concept differs from the repertoire of contention in three main ways. First, the repertoire of strategies is more dynamic. Second, it is not solely contentious nor always public. It includes Tilly's forms of public disruption as well as non-contentious private actions such as informal meetings with politicians, audiences with the president, and so on. I use the term "strategy" and not "tactics" because movement actors choose a contentious and public action versus another form of action as part of the movement's long-term goals and a wider understanding of the social reality. Each strategic choice will necessarily include many tactical decisions to achieve the goal. The third difference is that the repertoire of strategies is mostly defined in its relationship to medium- and short-term changes in the political context, while the repertoire of contention is associated with longer-term changes.

Like Bourdieu (2000, p. 145), I look at action as the product of the accumulation of historical legacies.[4] Though acknowledging the contextual constraints on actors' choices, my approach has two fundamental differences with Bourdieu. First, collective actors, not individual agents, perform repertoires of strategies. Second, my definition is rooted in a perspective that is less structuralist than Bourdieu's, allowing for spaces for rupture and dislocation. On the other hand, I draw upon one of the attributes of Bourdieu's "habitus": that the actor's choices are not necessarily coherent (Bourdieu 2000, p. 160). Therefore, the definition of repertoire of strategies is sustained by the idea of the restricted nature of the available options perceived as feasible by the actor. While for Bourdieu the individual agent is structurally predisposed to selecting a particular strategy, I emphasize that strategic choice is the result of a historically constrained set of available and concatenated options (which I call the stock of legacies—more on this shortly). To sum up, the accumulation of strategies by a collective actor builds repertoires based on evaluating (whether correctly or not) their (and/or others') past strategies and, thus, opting to emulate, readapt, or reject them in a (socially delimited) conscious and oblivious fashion.

The concept of repertoire of strategies has two specific attributes that differentiate it from that of ideologies: It only represents the strategic options chosen, and, though being modular, it is rooted in time and space. It allows for the selection of strategies (contentious or otherwise), in public, semi-public, or private arenas, and thus offers a tool for improving the analytical connection

4 Emirbayer (2010) points out some similarities between Tilly and Bourdieu concerning the contextual constrains for action that are linked to the analysis I am presenting here.

among multiple types of simultaneous actions pertaining to the same actor. In other words, the repertoire of strategies has a historical origin and tradition that can explain it, but it can, and generally is, redefined by other actors coming from diverse ideological positions and different historical moments. This variety can be clearly seen in Table 2.1, which shows the main national *piquetero* social movement organizations (SMOs), their variety of ideologies, repertoire of strategies, and shared repertoire of contention. Various organizations have similar ideological traditions, such as *Barrios de Pie* (Standing Up Neighborhoods) and the *Movimiento Independiente de Jubilados y Desocupados* (Independent Movement of the Retired and Unemployed, MIJD), and use a different repertoire of strategies, while other organizations with different ideological traditions, such as the MTD "Aníbal Verón" and the UTD of Mosconi, use the same repertoire of strategies. Also, some strategies are widely used, such as "*basismo*" (territorially based grassroots assemblies) and "trade unionist" practices, while other strategies are restricted to one or a few organizations, such as "witnessing" and "NGO-ization." Therefore, there is no straightforward relationship between ideology and repertoire of strategies.

Table 2.1 Main *piquetero* SMOs, ideologies, repertoire of strategies, and repertoire of contention, 1996–2009

Piquetero social movement organizations	Ideology	Predominant repertoire of strategies	Predominant repertoire of contention
Barrios de Pie	National-populist	*Basismo* Multi-class popular front State colonization	Encampment March Roadblock
Coordinadora de Trabajadores Desocupados (CTD) "Aníbal Verón" (Movimiento Popular Revolucionario [MPR] "Quebracho")	National-populist	Moderate *foquismo* Witnessing	Encampment March Roadblock
Corriente Clasista y Combativa (CCC)	Maoist	*Basismo* Insurrectional alliance with the right Trade unionist	Encampment March Roadblock
Frente Popular "Darío Santillán" (FPDS)	Autonomist	Autonomist-introspective *Basismo*	Encampment March Roadblock
Federación de Trabajadores por la Tierra, Vivienda y Hábitat (FTV)	National-populist and Liberation Theology	*Basismo* Multi-class popular front State colonization Trade unionist	Encampment March Roadblock

Piquetero social movement organizations	Ideology	Predominant repertoire of strategies	Predominant repertoire of contention
Movimiento Independiente de Jubilados y Desocupados (MIJD)	National-populist	Insurrectional alliance with the right Witnessing	Encampment March Roadblock
Movimiento "Evita"	Left-wing Peronist	*Basismo* State colonization	Encampment March Roadblock
Movimiento Sin Trabajo (MST) "Teresa Vive"	Trotskyist	Morenist entryism Presentialism	Encampment March Roadblock
Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados (MTD) "Aníbal Verón"	Guevarist	Moderate *foquismo* Trade unionist	Encampment March Roadblock
Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados (MTD) of La Juanita	Social-democratic	NGO-ization	Encampment March Roadblock
Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados (MTD) of Solano and allies	Autonomist	Autonomist-introspective *Basismo*	Encampment March Roadblock
Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados "Teresa Rodríguez" (MTR) – Coordinadora de Unidad Barrial (CUBa)	Guevarist and Trotskyist	Moderate *foquismo* Trade unionist	Encampment March Roadblock
Movimiento Territorial Liberación (MTL)	Marxist-Leninist	Multi-class popular front Trade unionist	Encampment March Roadblock
Polo Obrero (PO)	Trotskyist	Morenist entryism Presentialism	Encampment March Roadblock
Unión de Trabajadores Desocupados (UTD) of Mosconi	Syndicalist	Moderate *foquismo* Trade unionist	Encampment March Roadblock

Notes: The time period does not imply that the organizations have applied these strategies continuously, but rather represents only the period during which the listed repertoires were considered predominant.

As stated, repertoires of contention and repertoires of strategies are intimately related. Table 2.1 shows that the use of the same contentious action by several organizations in a movement may result from different repertoires of strategies. Alternatively, the use of different contentious methods may result from the same strategy. In other words, repertoire of contention and repertoire of strategies refer to things happening within the same movement that are related but different. Let us look at some of the strategies for the *piquetero* movement to see why these

actions were taken, how they were connected to previous ones, and how they are similar or different to previous and contemporary actions.

Multi-Sectoral Strategies

Among their several strategies, the *piqueteros* adopted three types of multi-sectoral strategies between 1996 and 2009. By multi-sectoral strategies I mean different versions of a strategy based on the idea that in order to achieve the desired political goals, it is crucial to join efforts with diverse segments of society and/or political groupings. Multi-sectoral strategies are not always contentious and involve many not-so-public actions.

A first type of multi-sectoral strategy is the "multi-class popular front," which implies, in the Argentine context, that left-wing parties and organizations should accept alliances with Peronist organizations (Justicialist Party [PJ], CGT, and so on), particularly with their more progressive wings.[5] Before being adopted by the *piqueteros* in relation to Peronist political, social, and labor organizations, this strategy was used in Latin America in the quest to unify the left during the Spanish Civil War (1936–39). It was mostly successful in Chile, while in Argentina, it emerged in the 1950s in the context of the debates about Peronism after the dissolution of the Comintern (Angell 1998). The use of this strategy by the *piqueteros* can be noted in their relationship with President Néstor Kirchner's Peronist government (2003–07). While the *Movimiento Territorial Liberación* (Liberation Territorial Movement, MTL) (linked to the PCA) was internally divided as to whether or not to support the government, the FTV and *Barrios de Pie* were allies of the government as part of what they conceived as a multi-class popular front.[6]

A second type of multi-sectoral strategy is the "insurrectional alliance with the right" promoted by the CCC (of the PCR), but also in a less structured fashion by the MIJD. Since its beginnings, the PCR has rejected armed struggle as promoted by guerrilla organizations. At the same time, it has had a long-standing relationship with some sectors of the armed forces. This has been sustained as part of their strategy of building an insurrectional alliance with the right. This strategy

5 Such alliances include multiple classes from the point of view of the *piquetero* organizations that enter into them, because, while they perceive themselves as composed of the working class (or the popular sectors), Peronist organizations reject any classist distinction, and Peronism is characterized by the integration of trade unions, national industrialists, and some middle classes (Rossi 2013a).

6 The main leader of the party behind *Barrios de Pie* explained to me the multi-class popular front strategy during the Kirchner administration in the following way: "… this is not our government, it is an alliance government. (…) It is a heterogeneous government with various interests that in some cases are counter-interests. So it is natural that there are several conflicts within the government. This is neither a reactionary nor a revolutionary government. It is just an alliance government…" (Interviewed September 20, 2007).

seems similar to the popular multi-class front that other *piquetero* organizations promote, but differs in some crucial respects: It is electorally abstentionist, and it is inspired by the Maoist 1940 anti-Japanese united front (Mao 1965[1940], p. 422). Thus, until 2009 the CCC promoted a protracted struggle in a multi-sectoral coalition with Peronist organizations with the expectation of leading to a popular insurrection that would bring down the regime.

The multi-sectoral alliance used by the CCC is based on the PCR politburo's interpretation of the Peronist PJ as the equivalent of the Chinese Kuomintang party due to its high level of internal heterogeneity, which opens up the possibility of exploiting the divisions among PJ elites in the same way as Mao Zedong proposed to do with the Kuomintang in 1940 (Mao 1965[1940], p. 427). To achieve this goal, they seek the support of the right-wing factions of the PJ and middle-size rural producers, while establishing long-term personalized contacts with PJ mayors. This coalition played a salient role in the 2008 rural lockout against a tax increase on the export of commodities.

A third type of multi-sectoral strategy is what I call "state colonization." *Barrios de Pie* adopted this strategy from 2003 to 2008, when it was a member of the governmental coalition. Using a multi-class popular front strategy in combination with Ernesto "Che" Guevara's beehive tactic, *Barrios de Pie* encouraged their members and leaders to actively participate in as many electoral, appointed, or technical positions that they could possibly negotiate with the PJ and the other coalition members in the national government, while also taking up as many local and provincial posts as possible. In this sense, this strategy implies accepting the Peronist organizations as tools that are useful, while simultaneously considering as crucial the access to gatekeeper positions of the state. As a result, in the province of Buenos Aires *Barrios de Pie* achieved middle-range positions in the Ministry of Human Development and in several municipalities. They also succeeded in securing several provincial sub-secretariats as well as national ones in the Ministry of International Relations and the Ministry of Social Development, and since 2007 have also had a few members elected to the national parliament, among other posts. Amid all the *piquetero* organizations, *Barrios de Pie* is the one that, until 2008, had achieved the greatest penetration of their members into the state apparatus. This was emulated by the FTV, although with much less success. The FTV suffered from internal indiscipline and co-optation as a consequence of imitating state colonization. Finally, the *Movimiento "Evita"* adopted the strategy, with a focus on the province of Buenos Aires, by formally participating in the functional structure of the PJ.

In brief, the three types of multi-sectoral strategies are diverse according to whether they adopt an internal or external relationship with the government or party, as well as according to which wing of the PJ or CGT they choose to ally themselves with. In the same sense, while the insurrectional alliance implies a non-electoral approach, the CCC, MIJD, and most of the *piqueteros* always play a role directly or indirectly during electoral periods (clientelism, protests, boycotts,

and so on). This is different from the multi-sectoral coalition with the left-wing sectors of the PJ and state colonization strategies, which involve inclusion in the government coalition and access to parliamentarian and/or other kinds of electoral positions. Lastly, state colonization is focused on penetrating the state rather than the allied organizations.

Witnessing Strategy

The predominant repertoire of strategies of the *piqueteros* is much richer than these three multi-sectoral strategies and includes other, very different, strategies such as the one I have called "witnessing." This strategy is a way of showing the oppression of the political system through the personal experiences of the leaders of an organization. This strategy has been widely used around the world and can be traced to various adaptations, such as Gandhism and the Palestinian Intifada. In the *piquetero* movement, two organizations make systematic use of this strategy, in two variants. The *Coordinadora de Trabajadores Desocupados "Aníbal Verón"* (Coordination of Unemployed Workers "Aníbal Verón," CTD) of the *Movimiento Popular Revolucionario* "*Quebracho"* (Popular Revolutionary Movement "Quebracho," MPR) uses it for insurrectional purposes, while the MIJD uses it for electoral goals. These differences are not ideological, as they can both be considered national-populist anti-imperialist groups; the repertoire of strategies is what differentiates them. On the one hand, the CTD "Aníbal Verón" (MPR "Quebracho") uses violence against private property, as during the 2007 burning of the Neuquén Popular Movement's party office. This protest was not carried out undercover, but was openly played out in front of the media, followed by a public declaration at the location of the event by one of its leaders, thereby fulfilling his goal: to be immediately sent to jail.

On the other hand, the MIJD has made use of symbolically disruptive tools, such as setting up a popular soup kitchen in the richest neighborhood of Buenos Aires, organizing the participation of one of the MIJD leaders as a contestant on a prime-time television dance show, and protesting in front of McDonald's branches for the supply of 1,000 Happy Meals for the children of MIJD members. Raúl Castells, one of the main leaders of the MIJD, summarizes their strategy: "The Coca-Cola marketing strategists said that a message has to be recurrent and witty (…) We want socialism: this is our recurrent message. And we'll make it witty. The traditional left is dead boring. They have 100 years of history and people pay less attention to them than to a flock of sparrows" (*La Nación*, July 29, 2007). In the 2007 election the MIJD used this accumulated media coverage for electoral purposes by presenting Castells as a presidential candidate under a newly created MIJD ballot, which ended up garnering 54,893 votes (0.3 percent). In 2011, the MIJD could improve its electoral results, winning its first seat in the House of Representatives.

The CTD "Aníbal Verón" partially differs from the MIJD because it is abstentionist, and thus considers its witnessing strategy as part of an insurrectional

path that has the potential to set a revolutionary process into motion, as explained by one of the CTD leaders:

> We still believe in the power of the people, which has to do with a strategy that calls for the need to get the people out in the streets. And additionally we don't believe that "the people" or "people" are closed categories because this would mean denying the [socio-economic and cultural diversity of] Argentina. In other words, the issue with the electorate, with the public opinion polls and these kinds of things, is what they conceal: the existing political proscription (Interviewed December 27, 2008).

While for the MIJD the perspective is based on a pragmatic understanding of the mass media, as Castells explains:

> The goal of our political struggle is socialism, but we don't have the economic resources [to promote our ideas] and because of this we use the mass media to spread our ideas. It was one thing to start a social revolution 100 years ago, but it's quite another to do it now, when almost every house has a television and seven million people have Internet access (…) For us, the issue is not who are the owners of the media, but who are its consumers. Otherwise, we would not bother with this program because the journalist is tied to the government, or that other one because it's part of an international monopoly that subjugates us. If we saw things this way we would not use any mass media because there are no big TV channels owned by the workers, no cooperative newspapers or influential radio stations that are part of the popular struggle. For us, this [the mass media] is not the interlocutor, but the one who is listening to it or reading it (*Página/12*, May 20, 2007).

To sum up, in both cases the purpose is to repeatedly access the media in the face of a lack of economic resources to generate their own propaganda. They promote their voice by presenting themselves as witnesses of the oppression of the system. In this way, both organizations hope to increase the number of sympathizers and gain empathy for their organizations and their message by partially relying on the mass media as a vehicle for the dissemination of their ideas and the recruitment of activists.

Trade Unionist Strategy

Just a few of the strategies are directly related to the repertoire of contention. In the *piquetero* movement, only the "trade unionist" and "moderate *foquismo*" strategies are directly associated with the use of the picket. The trade unionist strategy can be defined as Sorelian. In this strategy, while there is systematic use of radical methods, claims are intentionally moderate (Sorel 1999[1908], p. 201). Sorel (1999[1908], p. 118) talks of the general strike as a *myth* in which major

transformation is comprised. The success of the *piqueteros'* strategy is based on another myth, one that has the same power and logic as the general strike: the total picket. In other words, the importance of small protest events, like pickets, is crucial for expanding insurrection based on the idea of wide-ranging economic collapse as the general strike would imply. In Sorel's words:

> It is possible, therefore, to conceive socialism as being perfectly revolutionary, although there may only be conflicts that are short and few in number, provided that these have strength enough to evoke the idea of the general strike: all the events of the conflict will then appear under a magnified form and, the idea of catastrophe being maintained, the cleavage will be perfect. Thus the objection often urged against the revolutionaries may be set aside: there is no danger of civilization succumbing under the consequences of a development of brutality, since the idea of the general strike may foster the notion of class struggle by means of incidents which would appear to bourgeois historians as being of small importance (1999[1908], p. 182).

In other words, the trade unionist strategy can be defined as a systematic use of the mythical disruptive power of the *total picket* for moderate aims by vertical organizations that seek to enter into negotiations and make use of institutional and rhetorical trade unionist tools.

The main leader of the UTD of Mosconi argued that, after a decade of struggle, they had improved the hourly rate of pay for newly re-employed workers in the petroleum enclave where this *piquetero* organization is located. This achievement has been called the "*piquetero* hour" (a 350 percent increase on the hourly rate). This trade unionist achievement was the result of improving the picketing strategy in Mosconi by completely blocking the entrances to the local branches of transnational petroleum companies. However, the trade unionist strategy is not only related to the use of the picket as a protest tool, but to the wider influence of the trade unions' logic within the *piquetero* movement. Reproducing the bureaucratic organization of most unions in Argentina, the FTV is a wholly top-down and personalized organization with power concentrated in its main leader and building a loosely structured network across the country.[7] As the FTV is controlled by the national leader's group and minimum standards of democracy have not been respected, a number of internal conflicts have occurred within the FTV over its lifetime. This also explains the unsuccessful attempts by MTL and *Barrios de Pie* activists to achieve leadership posts inside the FTV (Armelino 2008).

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7 According to Barker et al. (2001, p. 20), "Bureaucratic organization involves a hierarchy of offices, with decision-making concentrated at the top, and command following down. Members are either directly excluded from decision-making, or only indirectly consulted through intermittent elections to top offices, occasional conferences, and ballots. Officials are commonly appointed rather than elected. Channels of communication are top-down and monopolized by the leadership."

Moderate Foquismo Strategy

There is another strategy that consists of a different use of the picket by the *piqueteros*. Moderate *foquismo* implies the use of radical methods for moderate goals. *Foquismo*, or the *foco* theory of guerrilla warfare, was developed by Ernesto "Che" Guevara as an armed strategy for expanding conflict through a small group of men and women. Its adaptation to nonviolent use in a democratic setting for immediate reformist goals is what I call "moderate *foquismo*." This strategy prevails among some organizations. It is attached to a vanguardist conception of politics and implies the construction of a site or "*foco*" of conflict and its diffusion by what he called the "beehive effect" (Guevara 1997[1963], p. 389). In Guevara's words:

> Let's consider how a guerrilla *foco* could start (…) Relatively small nuclei of people choose favorable sites for the guerrilla war, be it with the intention of triggering a counterattack or to bide time, and then start to act. The following must be very clearly established: in the early stages, the relative weakness of the guerrilla is such that it must only work on putting down roots, getting to know the environment, making connections with the population and strengthening the places that will eventually become its support bases (1997[1963]: 387).

This strategy predominated among some *piquetero* organizations in Greater Buenos Aires, Mar del Plata, and Cipolletti. Territorially, they created *focos* of organization with local networks by taking control of *juntas vecinales* (neighborhood associations in poor districts and shantytowns). Later, when the political opportunities were interpreted as favorable due to the increase in unemployment and the lack of access to unions to mobilize workers, the network activated the *focos*, now renamed as MTDs. Contentiously, the *Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados "Teresa Rodríguez"* (Movement of Unemployed Workers "Teresa Rodríguez," MTR), the CTD "Aníbal Verón" and the MTD "Aníbal Verón" had focused on systematic pickets at specific locations in Buenos Aires, and particularly the Pueyrredón Bridge (the main southern entrance to the city of Buenos Aires) as a moderate *foquismo* strategy.

NGO-ization Strategy

Other strategies that compose the repertoire of the *piqueteros* do not have a contentious dimension. For instance, the "NGO-ization" strategy means the moderation of claims and contentious strategies in a process of collaboration with middle-class foundations and companies for project-focused agendas of action relying on donors. NGO-ization is the strategy that has been used by one small organization only—the MTD of La Juanita, a pioneer in the formation of the *piquetero* movement. After rejecting the claim for unemployment subsidies as a source of clientelism, this organization initiated a strategy of gradually mutating

into an NGO, working under the same logic as any post-1990 professionalized NGO. It started to get funding from international donors and allied with private companies and middle-class parties.

The Stock of Legacies Concept

The repertoire of strategies represents the predominant set of strategies used by a movement in a specific time period. But, *what delimits the actors' perception of the availability of strategies in their repertoire?* As in the case of the repertoire of contention, there are elements that limit what the repertoire can contain. While the repertoire of contention changes very slowly, linked as it is to macro-transformations such as regime changes, the repertoire of strategies is more dynamic, which implies that its demarcation is based on actors' participation in a historical accumulation of events, experiences, and intentional learning processes that build a "stock of legacies." *By stock of legacies I mean the concatenation of past struggles, which, through the sedimentation of what is lived and perceived to be lived as well as what is intentionally learned, produces an accumulation of experience that adds or eliminates specific strategies from the repertoire of strategies as both a self-conscious and oblivious process.*

The concept is inspired on Schutz's (1967, pp. 76–77) concept of "stock of experience." According to Schutz (1967, pp. 77–78), a "meaningful lived experience" is the reflective product of each individual's flowing stream of experience that builds a stock of knowledge, that which enables each person to guide his or her conduct in the course of their life. In a stock of legacies, the actor opts for actions based on a set of identified available options that are open to innovation. But this process of selection is not that of an entirely free agent, nor is it the result of a coherent deliberation. Rather it is limited by socialization, from among (mis)perceived accumulated available options, and within a restricted set of legacies that enrich or impoverish the range of the stock. The stock of legacies offers a complementary explanation to the purely structural limitations to innovations suggested by Tilly (1986, p. 4, 390–91; 2006, pp. 42–45, 48–49; 2008, pp. 203–04), which tend to make it much easier to explain the stability of repertoires than changes to them.

The stock of legacies materializes as an empirical question when trying to understand, for instance, why the *piquetero* movement only emerged with particular intensity in certain places. An ex-priest and main leader of one of the pioneer *piquetero* organizations explained this situation to me in the following way:

> **Q:** How do you explain that in Greater Buenos Aires there seems to be three main places where everything emerged …?
>
> **A:** The experience of struggle. Despite the crises, which always happen, the lessons of past experience always linger. In other words, you don't go back

> to zero. You don't go back to the beginning. Situations recur, but with the accumulation of learnt experience. The southern zone [of Greater Buenos Aires] was combative in the 1970s; these were industrial areas, with a relatively high level of industrialization. All this was later dismantled, but the experience of struggle and resistance still lingers, and it re-emerges every now and then—as if going into crisis mode (Interviewed September 28, 2007).

This "experience of struggle" that "always lingers" was echoed by many others I interviewed. The words of the ex-priest poignantly captures the stock of legacies concept.

Piquetero's *Stock of Legacies*

Three main national legacies comprise the overall stock of legacies of the *piquetero* movement. In each SMO the influence of each legacy varied, which explains many of the strategic options chosen in concrete historical situations, as well as investing them with a sense of Weberian *verstehen*.

The first element in the movement's stock of legacies is the experience of the armed struggle of the urban guerrillas and the consequences of repression under both democratic and authoritarian regimes between 1975 and 1989. This legacy has a dual basis. On the one hand, it arises out of the trauma produced by the last authoritarian regime and the effect that this had on the perceived strategic alternatives within the left's re-evaluation of democracy (Carr and Ellner 1993). This is due to a phenomenon that Roberts (1998, pp. 41–42) also identified in Chile and Peru, what he called the left's affirmative and disconfirming experiences of their respective last authoritarian regimes. In Argentina, many of the *piquetero* leaders had disconfirming experiences as guerrilla veterans and now value some aspects of democracy, even if they are divided about its short-, medium-, and long-term value. On the other hand, the legacy of armed struggle is based on attempts by former guerrilla groups and left-wing Peronists to politically reorganize in Greater Buenos Aires between 1981 and 1987. This produced a legacy of organizational and contentious action from former groups of urban guerrillas within a protracted and self-restrained disruption strategy. Signs of this legacy can be seen in the vanguard organizational models used and the moderate *foquismo* strategy that predominates in the *piquetero* movement in south Greater Buenos Aires and in parts of the province of Salta.

The second shared legacy is the CBCs' practice of *basista* organization and their urban land occupations between 1979 and 1982, and their re-emergence in the 1990s. As stated by Cerrutti and Grimson (2004) and Merklen (2005), the territorialized mobilization that characterizes the *piquetero* movement is, in part, the historical continuation of the land occupations promoted by the CBCs in the period of democratization. This legacy explains why in some Greater Buenos Aires districts the *piquetero* movement quickly emerged as an organized process.

Finally, the third shared legacy is trade unionism, which is the result of the accumulated experience of syndicalist and communist unionism since the late nineteenth century and Peronist unionism since the 1950s.[8] This has resulted in a large accumulation of former factory union delegates, who in some cases became the main leaders of various *piquetero* organizations, for example the CCC, PO, MST "Teresa Vive," MTL, UTD of Mosconi, MTD of La Juanita, and CTD "Aníbal Verón" (MPR "Quebracho"). The CCC and MTL, for instance, define themselves as politico-syndical organizations, and one national leader of the MTL explains "… that [it] was a very important element for those of us who were trade union delegates and knew how trade unions worked, [because] we transferred all our experiences into the organization of the unemployed movement" (Germano 2005, p. 142).

With these new concepts in our toolkit, events similar to the ones described by the journalist quoted above can be reconstructed with the incorporation of additional events that were performed in different arenas, but as part of the same set of events that (sometimes) includes contentious politics. In other words, the two repertoires are interrelated, but they have crucial differences that allow for explaining different phenomena. In addition, each micro and daily tactical trade-off can only be meaningful when viewed as part of a repertoire of strategies and a repertoire of contention, the specific context in which these repertoires are used, and the perspective for the future that they imply.

Explaining Innovation in the Repertoires of Strategies

Some strategies have a long tradition with international roots, such as the three multi-sectoral strategies analyzed. But others are specific to Latin America, like "*basismo*," which entails a strategy of territorial organization of the popular sectors in Argentina. As the name implies, this strategy is meant for building "from below" several territorially based nodes of action sustained on assembly-based methods of organizing in urban and suburban poor areas. *Basismo* is also an example of a strategy that originated as part of the repertoire of a specific ideological group,[9] but has then been widely adopted by others, such as autonomists (*Frente Popular "Darío Santillán"* [Popular Front "Darío Santillán," FPDS], MTD of Solano), Maoists (CCC), national-populists (*Barrios de Pie*), and Peronists (*Movimiento "Evita"*). Yet, with other strategies that compose the *piquetero* repertoire, the opposite happens. One example is "Morenist entryism," an adaptation by Nahuel

8 Argentina has the highest rate of unionization in Latin America, reaching 50.1 percent at its peak, versus, for instance, 24.3 percent in Brazil (Roberts 2002, p. 15, table 1).

9 As Prévôt-Schapira (1999, p. 228) explains, "*Basismo* was forged in activist Christian engagement." In Argentina, the development of *basismo* was linked to the legacy of Peronism and its relationship with "integrist" and ultramontane Catholicism.

Moreno of Leon Trotsky's notion of the united front.[10] In Argentina, after the coup against Juan Domingo Perón in 1955, the Trotskyist party Workers' Word used this strategy in order to infiltrate and command Peronist unions (Tarcus 1996, p. 117).[11] The post-democratization Morenist entryism strategy within the *piquetero* movement can be defined as the quest to penetrate other popular organizations with the goal of disputing the hegemony of the labor movement from inside its constituent organizations and build a vanguard that can guide the unemployed and employed workers towards a classist united front.[12] The PO did this by coordinating seven meetings of the National Assembly of Employed and Unemployed Workers (2001–05), as well as the *Bloque Piquetero Nacional* (National Piquetero Block) coalition (2002–05, until the PO was expelled). Despite this strategy having been useful for the PO, it did not spread outside the Trotskyist *piquetero* organizations. How and why some of these strategies have diffused across countries, historical periods, and ideological traditions while others have had more limited take-up is a relevant Tillyian question that, in the case of the repertoire of strategies, has a non-Tillyian answer.

Because the repertoire of strategies is less structurally determined than the repertoire of contention, its transformations happen as a result of debates that are permanently renewed among the *piquetero* leaders, as well as the party, union, and intellectual elites related to them.[13] These debates sometimes set into motion some modifications that are partially based on experiential learning. In other words, the repertoire of strategies does not evolve through slow and gradual changes at the state and regime levels, but rather through teaching and learning, intergenerational transmission, trial and error, emulation, and so on. In empirical terms, this means that innovation in repertoires of strategies and their diffusion can take place much quickly and easily than in repertoires of contention.

One way this occurs is through emulation and teaching. Figure 2.1 shows the front cover of a training course handbook for activists organized by the FPDS in 2009. Activists and intellectuals used this handbook to teach members of the FPDS autonomist ideas about the strategic relationship with the state, as well as giving examples of successful struggles in Latin America. There are many other situations like this one, where strategies are transmitted and created in semi-public

10 Trotsky had also developed his idea of a united front as an adaptation of a previous strategy. His idea was based on Friedrich Engels' proposal of infiltrating the German Social Democratic party with socialist officials (Tarcus 1996, p. 326).

11 Since the last re-democratization, Moreno (1980, pp. 179–84) reformulated parts of his strategy because Peronism was legalized and many left-wing organizations were into demise under the authoritarian regime of 1976–83.

12 Morenist entryism is used outside Argentina because it was widely taken up by Trotskyist groups after Moreno presented his strategic approach to the International Committee of the Fourth International (Leeds 1958).

13 Several examples of intentional production of strategies by intellectuals in Asia, Africa, and Latin America can be found in Baud and Rutten (2004).



Figure 2.1 **Front cover of a handbook for the *Frente Popular Darío Santillán's* Fourth National Camp for the Training of Activists, November 2009**

Source: Political Training School of the FPDS.

or private gatherings (see note 13). Among the *piqueteros*, it is not only the FPDS that organizes training gatherings. Since 2012 the *Movimiento "Evita"* has operated a house on an island in the delta of Buenos Aires to train young members on ideological and strategic issues. This interest on strategic and ideological training is not unique to the *piqueteros*. In Brazil, since 2005 the Landless Rural Workers' Movement (MST) has offered courses to their own members and activists from all around the world at the "Florestan Fernandes" National School, located on the outskirts of São Paulo.

A second way that the expansion of repertoires is accomplished is through what I call "resignification"—where the original strategy is taken up by another group with different political goals and inserted within a different set of legacies.[14] One interesting case of innovation in this sense is what I term "*basista* empowerment," that is, the syncretic resignification of *basismo* and World Bank inspired entrepreneurial social policies of empowerment in the post-neoliberal context by left-wing or national-populist organizations. In the case of the *piqueteros*, the *Movimiento "Evita"* and *Barrios de Pie* specifically used it. In the words of the General Secretary of the youth branch of the *Movimiento "Evita"* and Sub-secretary of Youth in the government of the province of Buenos Aires:

> The popular organization determines the possibility for participants' appropriation of public policy decisions and of the allocation of resources. And this generates a much more solid relationship of public policy [with the beneficiaries] that makes this process more difficult to reverse. When a person in a cooperative builds fifty houses, how can you tell him that he no longer has his job? On the other hand, when the houses are built by a company, the company just submits another tender to the state. This does not produce a relationship of power in which the active participants are the people. We call this social policy as Evita [Perón] called it: "the organized popular force," "the popular power" (Interviewed August 8, 2007).

A third source of enrichment of the repertoires of strategies is transnational mutual influence among social movements. Movement leaders and members participate in many gatherings and meetings with other movements that tend to build a "community of practice" (Wenger 1998). In the case of the *piqueteros*, the community of practice acts as a source of transnational reproduction of patterns and strategies. For instance, the mutual influence and connections between the

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14 Freedman (2013, pp. 252–53, 400–04) offers a detailed narration of how this process works across diverse ideological traditions (like the contentious strategies borrowed by Engels from Claus von Clausewitz), as well as within more proximate ideological traditions, such as the diffusion of *foquismo* from "Che" Guevara's original formulation to its urban use by sectors of the Black Panthers Party in the US. Freedman's book can be also seen as an illustration of the importance of reading and writing as a conscious process of learning and resignifying strategies as I am conceptualizing it.

piqueteros in Argentina and the landless peasants' movement in Brazil is a source of some commonalities. FTV leaders told me that urban land occupations in the 1980s were inspired by the CBC experience in Brazil (cf. Isman 2004, pp. 108–09). Brazil's MST has permanent contacts with the MTR and its divisions (the FPDS, mainly), the MTD of Solano, the MTD of La Juanita, and the UTD of Mosconi through the brokerage of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo Association. These links led the MST to create its own movement of unemployed workers in Brazil, as was explained to me by national leaders of the MST in São Paulo. In addition, the CCC has links with the Poor Peasants League, the Maoist social movement organization of the Brazilian landless peasants' movement. Finally, the World Social Forum was mentioned several times as a space for mutual learning and connection. However, though these connections all have significant effects, they are only partial sources for the expansion or contraction of the repertoire of strategies.

In brief, experiential accumulation intentionally and unintentionally expands or restricts the repertoire of strategies, and thus plays a decisive additional role in the comprehension of the interactive process of change and continuity. Actors reduce or expand their repertoire of strategies by defining their past actions and how they are linked to their present choice of strategic options. This can empirically take place through a Tillyian logic of repertoire of contention (through slow and gradual changes at the state and regime levels), but also through systematic reading/studying (which happens among many philosophically or ideologically minded groups), trans-generational intentional transmission (when the older leaders give courses and informally transmit their experience and knowledge to younger and less experienced members), and so on. In other words, the repertoire of strategies is delimited by non-rationalistic principles as a result of the stock of legacies, as well as the configuration of the political context.

Conclusion

The process of interaction of a movement with allies and antagonists cannot be fully understood or explained through the study of its contentious dimension only. If we limit our analysis to the public and disruptive dimension of social movements, we see less than half of the picture. Even though pickets and intense contentious dynamics were part of the *piqueteros'* struggle for the inclusion of the urban poor as citizens and workers in the socio-political arena, this struggle also involved an extensive use of non-public and non-contentious strategies. These strategies were only partially new, as the *piqueteros* were preceded by a long history of left-wing, Christian, and Peronist struggles in Argentina. This stock of legacies can also explain why the *piqueteros* decide to use one strategy or another, and when to apply it, in their ongoing quest to end neoliberalism.

The story of the *piqueteros* shows the utility of retaining Tilly's tradition of contextualized political analysis. Adding in the context and the long-term roots of

strategies allows us to avoid universalizing that which is time-space specific, and pushes us to ask how and why certain strategies enter the predominant repertoire of a movement while others do not. Simultaneously, and in order to avoid the structuralist trap, I have proposed a collective and historical understanding of strategy making and performing that lends more weight to actors than does Tilly's repertoire of contention (Krinsky and Mische 2013).

The concepts of repertoire of strategies and stock of legacies can be used to analyze other social movements elsewhere. The identification of a predominant repertoire of strategies allows for the identification of elements fundamental to a social movement that could not have otherwise been perceived in the tracing of its narrative. First, it allows us to explain what is happening when the repertoire of contention is not deployed, narrating a much more dynamic and rich process of strategic action than is possible through the concept of repertoire of contention alone. Second, it opens the door to analyzing the internal complexity of the movement. In other words, even though there are more than 15 national organizations within the *piquetero* movement that carry out roadblocks, marches, and encampments, they do not share a common repertoire of strategies and frequently perform different strategies in the same situation, sometimes mutually learning, but in many other situations developing autonomous strategies that are a result of the stock of legacies specific to their organization. This internal richness would have never been apparent if the analysis had been reduced to the Tillyian approach alone. And third, the conceptualization of strategy making I have proposed helps to close the gap in the social movement literature between an approach that proposes the micro analysis of tactical trade-offs and the macro analysis of repertoires of contention. Instead, I offer a collective and historically rooted understanding of strategy making.

As shown in this chapter, the concepts of repertoire of strategies and stock of legacies help to bridge the artificial distinction between contentious and routine politics, observing the picture as a dynamic interaction involving the selective use of strategies based on inherited legacies that limit the perception of available options for action. In addition, the configuration of the political context and the innovative capacity of actors to perform actions that—though not always fully logical—are the result of intentionally attempting to produce a public, semi-public, or private event, leads to an analysis of strategies that may or may not involve disruption. In this way, Tilly's approach can be complemented in the analysis of the strategic actions of social movements across time.

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