Introduction: A Theory for the Popular Sectors' Quest for Inclusion in Latin America

> "We want to return to factories. We said to the [national Labor] Ministry that we are socialists; that we question the private ownership of the means of production; that we struggle for a workers' state – but that we won't wait for the revolution to return to the job market. We want to be exploited by a capitalist again."
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> – Néstor Pitrola, national *piquetero* leader of the Trotskyist Workers' Pole social movement organization (*La Nación*, April 6, 2004)

What did it take to bring a key national Trotskyist leader to demand that the government allow workers to be exploited by capitalists *again*? Although it may seem contradictory at first glance, this social movement leader's request was the logical result of the effects of neoliberal reforms on Latin American politics and society. Neoliberalism has been defined as crucial to the reformulation of state–society relations in many parts of the world.[1] In Latin America, neoliberal reforms have also caused the socio-political exclusion or *disincorporation* of the popular sectors[2] (cf. Tokman and O'Donnell 1998; Portes and Hoffmann 2003; Reygadas and Filgueira 2010). However, exclusion was intensely resisted by social movements mobilizing the popular sectors, such as the landless peasants in Brazil, the indigenous in Bolivia and Ecuador, and the unemployed in

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[1] For a discussion of the multiple dimensions that compose the definition of "neoliberalism," cf. Lee Mudge (2008), and about the crucial differences between neoliberalism in the Global South and the North-West, cf. Connell and Dados (2014).

[2] This book uses the terms "popular sectors," "workers," "laborers," and "urban/rural poor" interchangeably to refer to the poor and/or marginalized strata in society, which in Spanish is commonly rendered as *sectores populares*.

Argentina (Almeida 2007; Ondetti 2008; Silva 2009; Becker 2011), contributing to a resurgence of the left.

A growing body of literature has examined the turn toward leftist governments in the region in the past ten years (Panizza 2009; Cameron and Hershberg 2010; Weyland et al. 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011). Some scholars associate what might be considered as the end of neoliberalism with the accession to power of left-wing or populist parties in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela in the 1990s and 2000s (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2009, 2012). While the accession to power of left-wing or populist parties seems to lead to the implementation of inclusionary policies (Huber and Stephens 2012), as yet there has been no systematic study of how this has played out. In order to accomplish such a study, we need to add extra layers of empirical detail and theoretical density to the "left turn" thesis to explain the complexity of the macro-process of transformation in Latin America's socio-political arena and how it relates to the capacity of poor people's movements to influence the political agenda to include their interests.[3]

In the quest to empirically trace the historical path that gives sense to demands such as the one quoted at the beginning of this chapter, this book addresses the following questions: How did the struggle from below contribute to the halt of neoliberalism in part of Latin America? And how has the socio-political arena been expanded to include the interests of the poor and excluded strata of society? The starting point for the answer this book offers is to put poor people's movements into the long-term perspective of the societal transformations produced by neoliberalism. We still need to learn more about the relationship between macro-processes of transformation and social movements (McAdam et al. 2001).

This book proposes an explanation for the major process of transformation behind the Latin American left turn: *the second wave of incorporation of the popular sectors*. For "second wave of incorporation" I mean the second major redefinition of the socio-political arena, caused by the broad and selective inclusion of the popular sectors in the polity after being excluded or disincorporated by military authoritarian regimes and democratic neoliberal reforms. The second wave of incorporation is the result of the accumulation of transformations that were carried out to deal with the contentious struggle for reincorporation by the popular sectors,

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[3] The concept of "poor people's movement" is used following the original definition of Piven and Cloward (1979) and interchangeably with "popular movement," its equivalent for the Latin American tradition in social movement studies.

organized in territorialized social movements. The emergence of left-wing or populist parties in government is one of the by-products of two decades of struggle against disincorporation.[4]

This book presents a relational study of twenty years of a poor people's movement's pressure for inclusion and the state mechanisms for institutional change that this pressure has produced. I conceptualize the dynamics of the popular sectors' struggle for their reincorporation into the socio-political arena and analyze the role played by the main political actor related to this historical process in Argentina, the *piquetero* (picketer) movement. Given that the *piqueteros* emerged as a by-product of the transformations caused by neoliberalism, this movement of unemployed people represents a paradigmatic case of a specific type of movement I will conceptualize in this chapter: the *reincorporation movement*. This definition considers the *piquetero* movement as part of a long-term quest on the part of the poor people of Argentina for socio-political participation in the polity.

The *piquetero* movement is a key case for social movement scholars as well as students of Latin American politics because it represents the largest movement of unemployed people in the contemporary world.[5] The *piqueteros* was the main national social movement in the struggle to shape a post-neoliberal arena in Argentina.[6] Since 1996, the *piquetero* movement

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[4] When dealing with "(re)incorporation" as a concept, I am following Collier and Collier (1991) rather than social movement scholars' conceptualization of this term (Giugni 1998a). This is because rather than considering incorporation as an immediate outcome of social movement struggles, I understand it – like Luna and Filgueira (2009) and Reygadas and Filgueira (2010) – as a Latin American macro-historical process.

[5] Reiss and Perry (2011) offer several historical examples of other unemployed workers' movements.

[6] I follow the definition of post-neoliberalism proposed by Grugel and Riggirozzi (2012: 3–4): "we understand it to embody a different conceptualization of the state from that which reigned in the high period of neoliberalism, based on a view that states have a moral responsibility to respect and deliver the inalienable (that is, not market-dependent) rights of their citizens (see Almeida and Johnston 2006: 7) alongside growth. Politically, post-neoliberalism is a reaction against what came to be seen as excessive marketization at the end of the twentieth century and the elitist and technocratic democracies that accompanied market reforms. … It is, as such, part of an unfinished debate over what constitutes the transition to democracy (Peruzzotti 200[5]: 209). But changes to the portfolio of state responsibilities and a vision of a more equal distribution of national income sit alongside strong continuities from the recent past, in particular the retention of the export axis and commitment to a degree of fiscal restraint that are seen as essential for economic stability. … Crucially, in much of Latin America it is emerging in the context of an unprecedented export bonanza that permits the adoption of more expansive public spending than has been the case since the 1980s."

has mobilized the poor and unemployed people of Argentina, providing organizational structure to their quest to end neoliberalism and see themselves incorporated into a more inclusive and equal society. Moreover, this movement influenced national politics to such an extent that it became part of the governing coalition. This is the first time that a movement made up of unemployed people has come to occupy such a central position in Latin American politics.

This book offers an analysis and conceptualization of the dynamics of the second incorporation in Argentina: from the emergence of the *piquetero* movement as a means of resisting the social, economic, and political exclusion of the poor in the 1990s to the development – partially as a result of this movement – of a series of policies enabling the partial inclusion of the poor into the socio-political arena in the 2000s. To do so, this analysis applies a qualitative process-tracing method based on the triangulation of interviews with key actors, newspaper data, and archival material to study the process (the second wave of incorporation) and actor (the reincorporation movement) that have partially reshaped the socio-political arena in Argentina, and perhaps elsewhere in the region.

This book links historical institutionalism and social movement studies to improve our relational analyses of social movements as part of macro-processes of socio-political change. On the one hand, I introduce the importance of considering timing and sequence as a manifestation of the thoroughness required by historical institutionalism (Aminzade 1992; Pierson 2000, 2004; Sewell 2005, 2008) that supplies the need – as claimed by some scholars – for dynamic studies of social movements (Tilly 1995, 2004; McAdam et al. 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2006). On the other hand, the second incorporation process included the re-routinization of rules and procedures. Based on institutions and practices of the previous context, on the movement side the second incorporation process was built through the use of a predominant repertoire of strategies, which transcended contentious politics and implied mid- and long-term goals (conceptualized in Chapter 2). In Argentina, this happened within a mostly trade unionist strategy in combination with other strategies coming from left-wing traditions. To analyze and conceptualize the historical process of strategy making and performing of social movements we need to recover the school of historical analysis of Charles Tilly while at the same time escaping from the structuralist trap of most macro studies. In other words, the concepts I will propose in Chapter 2 provide us with the elements for studying in detail how social movements' strategies differ from or coincide with the ones of the elites and also enrich the social

movement literature by contributing elements for studying what happens when contentious politics is not taking place.

This book builds on and expands previous studies of the neoliberal period in Latin America (Cavarozzi and Garretón 1989; Oxhorn 1998; Roberts 2002, 2008; Almeida 2014) by outlining what happened after the period of resistance to recommodification ended. It also complements the analyses of post-neoliberalism that have focused on trade unions (Etchemendy and Collier 2007), political parties (Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Flores-Macías 2012; Roberts 2013), and community organizations and NGOs (Collier and Handlin 2009a), along with the role played by social movements (Auyero 2003; Lucero 2008; Burdick et al. 2009; Silva 2009).

The main argument of this book is that, between 1996 and 2009, the Argentine socio-political arena was reshaped according to non-corporatist logic. Neoliberal reforms, carried out under authoritarian and democratic regimes as of the 1970s, had led to the gradual disincorporation of the popular sectors from the political and socioeconomic arenas. This consequence of the neoliberal program led to the emergence in the 1990s of the *piqueteros*, a movement of unemployed people seeking a halt to neoliberal reforms and reincorporation into the socio-political arena. However, transformations were not immediate. The state responded to the challenge posed by the *piquetero* movement with some innovations in policing at protest events but also with incremental changes and additions to social policies addressing some of the *piqueteros'* demands. In other words, the state identified a new "social question" as a result of the protests of the *piqueteros*, devising institutional responses in a bid to calm social unrest. The dynamics of interaction between claims for reincorporation and the accumulation of gradual changes on the part of the state to deal with the new "social question" were the elements that two decades later led to the rise of post-neoliberalism in Argentina.

However, this second wave of incorporation was not done through the trade union system as it had been in the 1940s but through the legitimation of a new political actor, the *piqueteros* – a territorially organized movement. As a result, once the *piqueteros* succeeded in stopping neoliberal policies, a portion of the movement began to participate in the governing coalitions.

Why does this book propose a dynamic analysis of a social movement rather than a structuralist analysis to study a macro-process like the second wave of incorporation? Because, for both periods of incorporation, the interactions of the actors involved unfolded in a pattern that led

to long-term consequences and effects that – in many cases – had not been foreseen *a priori*. However, this book does not propose a path-dependent argument: on the contrary, agency, in particular from below, is the crucial explanatory element for the second wave of incorporation in Argentina, and – as analyzed in Chapter 8 – also elsewhere. In Argentina, governmental decisions were important, but much less than what could be expected from a study that primarily focuses on the elites.

Each historical period has been associated with different types of popular movements leading the efforts for social change. During the liberal period (1870s–1930s) that preceded the first incorporation in Latin America (1930s–50s), the labor and/or peasant movements were the main organizers of the popular sectors in their claim for well-being through reform or revolution. For the second incorporation (2000s–10s), a different type of movement emerged in Latin America during the neoliberal period (1970s–90s) as the central popular actor in the drive to reverse the exclusionary consequences of authoritarianism and neoliberalism and claim the reincorporation of the popular sectors as citizens and wage-earners. The emergence of what I define as the "reincorporation movement" – a type of movement that has built upon, but also decentered, labor-based actors – is the result of important transformations that took place in the socio-political arena between the two waves of incorporation of the popular sectors.

THE TWO WAVES OF INCORPORATION OF THE POPULAR SECTORS

In Argentina, the first incorporation was a corporatist process that unfolded between 1943 and 1955.[7] It involved a combination of the mobilization of popular claims by the labor movement at the factory level and the application of populist Peronist party policies for channeling these claims into corporatist institutions.[8] The first incorporation in

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[7] "Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports" (Schmitter 1974: 93–94).

[8] Briefly, Peronism is the national-populist movement that first incorporated workers into the nation's politics. The establishment of the dominant labor tradition in Argentina is intimately related to the Peronist movement. Peronism has an emblem, a hymn, and a stable of intellectuals and is the hegemonic popular political culture of the Argentine poor

Argentina (and Latin America) has been defined as "[t]he first sustained and at least partially successful attempt by the state to legitimate and shape an institutionalized labor movement" (Collier and Collier 1991: 783).[9] This was done through the gradual creation of social policies for addressing the claims of the increasingly unionized popular sectors. The origins of first incorporation may be traced to the collapse of economic and political liberalism, the ruin of the western European and US economies in the 1930s, and decades of accumulated protests for inclusion by popular movements across most of Latin America since the late nineteenth century (Piven and Cloward 1979; Collier and Collier 1991; French 1992; Hobsbawm 1994; Botana and Gallo 1997; Gotkowitz 2007; Kurtz 2013).

The second incorporation was a territorially based process that happened between 2002 and 2009 after an extended period of disincorporation of the popular sectors. This new wave originated from the inherited institutions and actors of the first incorporation. In addition, the two waves of incorporation were *partial* and *selective*, redefining the relationship between the popular sectors and the state. Like the first, the second incorporation was a predominantly urban and industrial process; rural peasants, of marginal relevance in Argentine national politics, were not included. However, in this second wave, the main actor mobilizing the claims of the poor and excluded was the *piquetero* movement, organizing the disincorporated popular sectors at the territorial level. A Peronist party was again in charge of developing the policies for channeling these new claims, but in this case, they were not the old corporatist institutions but new or reformulated institutions conceived in response to the territorialized nature of the claims that emerged with the *piqueteros* and as a result of the weakening of corporatism caused by neoliberalism.

Incorporation waves represent major and prolonged historical processes of struggle among socioeconomic and political groups for the expansion or reduction of the socio-political arena. In analytical terms, I define the second incorporation process as sharing the same basic requisites identified by Collier and Collier (1991: 783) for the first

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since the 1940s (Germani 1973; Brennan 1988; James 1988; Torre 1990; Auyero 2000; Plotkin 2003; Karush and Chamosa 2010; Rossi 2013a).

[9] This process was not exclusive to Argentina. In Brazil, the first incorporation was done for demobilization purposes, while in Bolivia, Venezuela, and – mainly – Argentina, incorporation implied the mobilization of the labor movement. In Bolivia and Venezuela, the first incorporation also included peasants, and in Ecuador, incorporation was done by a military reformist regime with a weak labor movement (Collier and Collier 1991; French 1992; Klein 2003; Yashar 2005; Gotkowitz 2007).

TABLE 1.1 *Historical Sequence of Stages in the Popular Sectors' Struggle for Incorporation in Argentina, 1915–2009*

Years	Stage
1915–43	Reform
1943–55	Party corporatist incorporation
1955–62	Aftermath – Heritage – Coup
1962–76	Equilibrium/ Zero-sum game
1976–96	Coup – Disincorporation
1996–2002	Recognition – Legitimation
2002–9	Party territorial reincorporation

Sources: The stages for the period 1915–62 were taken from Collier and Collier (1991). Reproduced from Rossi (2015b).

incorporation process: it "occurs in relatively well defined policy periods, which we frequently refer to as the 'incorporation period'. These periods emerge as part of a larger program of political and economic reform . . . " If we apply this long-term perspective to the analysis of poor people's movements, the historical sequence of stages in the popular sectors' struggle for incorporation in Argentina can be synthesized as shown in **Table 1.1**. While according to Collier and Collier (1991: 22, figure 0.1) the initial incorporation process in Argentina followed a logic of Reform – Incorporation – Aftermath – Heritage – Coup, I suggest the following as the logic of the second incorporation process: Disincorporation – Recognition – Legitimation – Reincorporation.

Rather than a linear understanding of the progress of society, the Machiavellian recursive logic of history is the one that better grasps the dynamic of the eternal reshaping of the polity. The historical process of the first incorporation in Argentina is not the focus of this book, as this has already been successfully analyzed by Collier and Collier (1991). This book focuses on the historical continuation of what these authors studied, that is, the stages that compose the second wave of incorporation: from neoliberal disincorporation to the recognition of the claim for reincorporation (Chapter 3), the struggle for legitimation of the reincorporation movement as a new political actor (Chapter 4), and the second incorporation phase (Chapters 5 and 6). However, the advances (1943–55), stalemates (1962–76), and setbacks (1976–96) of the popular sectors' quest for inclusion in Argentine politics that link the first and second incorporations should be viewed as stages of the same historical process.

The "Social Question" Then and Now

As part of the recurring dynamics of incorporation, both waves had some elements in common in terms of the steps leading to incorporation. Both incorporation periods were preceded by a (neo)liberal phase that created a new "social question." This "social question" in both cases evolved into a *political* question with a contentious actor that was gradually recognized and legitimated. In the 1990s and 2000s, the emergence of recommodification and marginalization (unemployment, impoverishment, exclusion, etc.) as a new "social question," the modification of policing techniques, and the creation of massive social programs can be seen as a process equivalent to that of the pre-incorporation dynamics. Between the 1870s and the 1930s, anarchists, syndicalists, and socialists posing the "social question" pushed the elites to create anti-immigration and security laws (Isuani 1985; Suriano 1988) to recognize the claim to social rights and later the actor behind this new claim, the labor movement (Suriano 2000). Concerning social policies, the first-wave process, begun in 1935, eventually led to the creation of the Secretariat of Employment and Social Security in 1943 (Gaudio and Pilone 1983, 1984) and, later, the enactment of comprehensive social rights policies and constitutional reform before ending in 1955.[10] During the second wave, the process led to the creation of the Ministry of Social Development in 1999 and the establishment of wide-ranging cash-transfer policies and universal citizenship income rights policies, mainly since 2002.[11]

These transformations do not imply that the relationship between popular movements and the elites have been harmonious. The first incorporation divided movements, some supporting governments, while others becoming critical or even suffering persecution and repression. In the first wave, the labor movement maintained a conflictive relationship with Juan

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[10] Furthermore, Collier and Collier (1991: 155) argue that the connection between the period of 1935–43 and the later labor populism incorporation of 1943–55 under the first two Perón governments is "that the 'institutionalization' of this state role did not occur until Perón period – though Perón's policies should definitively be viewed as the product of a progressive 'sedimentation' of these earlier informal practices [of the process]."

[11] The Ministry of Social Development existed during the aftermath and coup stages of the first incorporation as the Ministry of Social Welfare or Social Action, from 1966 (the start of Juan Carlos Onganía's authoritarian regime) to the end of 1982. Before this, from 1955 it had been a subsidiary division of the Ministry of Health. With the neoliberal disincorporation phase and redemocratization, the Ministry of Social Welfare was again downgraded to a secretariat, until 1999 when the Ministry of Social Development was restored in response to the *piqueteros'* struggles for reincorporation (Chapters 4, 5, and 6).

Domingo Perón's governments in Argentina (James 1988).[12] This holds also true for the second wave of incorporation. The question of how to deal with the Néstor Kirchner (2003–7) and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007–15) Peronist administrations divided the *piquetero* movement into one sector that was supportive of them and another that was critical.[13] However, this is just half of the story. Cooperation with, and participation in, the coalition in government was very important, with thousands of middle- and lower-ranking members of social movements coming to office, most of them in secondary roles in state departments related to social policies (Chapter 6).

While these parallels allow us to talk about two waves of incorporation, they do not mean that history has repeated itself. There are elements of iteration and innovation in a process that is, as such, like a collage. Some crucial differences with the second incorporation are a consequence of the effects produced by the disincorporation phase (1976–96). These distinctive characteristics must be considered as defining the dynamics of the second incorporation as unique and different from the first incorporation, while the similar characteristics are the product of the historical heritage of the first incorporation. The conditions of the second incorporation that are similar to those of the first are the lack of any regulatory system (laws, institutions, etc.) for the new political actor and thus the lack of a routinized formal or informal mechanism for dealing with the specific "social question" of the reincorporation struggle in Argentina: in the case of the second, the "*piquetero* question."

It is also important to bear in mind that waves of incorporation should be equated *not* with the constitution of a more equal society or the creation of a welfare state but rather with the reshaping of the socio-political arena by redefining and expanding the number of legitimate political actors. In some countries, the urban and rural poor were first incorporated into very unequal societies, as in Brazil under Getúlio Vargas (Cardoso 2010), while in other countries, a more equal society and some

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[12] In Brazil rural incorporation was also conflictive (Welch 1999), while trade unions resisted some of the control mechanisms associated with urban incorporation (French 1992). In Bolivia, Gotkowitz (2007) argues that peasants and indigenous movements were very important in building the conditions for first incorporation but later were the main losers of incorporation policies during the Revolution of 1952.

[13] In Ecuador, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) had a very conflictive relationship with Rafael Correa's government (Becker 2011), and the Rural Landless Workers Movement (MST) was disappointed with the modest advances of agrarian reform during the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff presidencies (Chapter 8).

welfare policies emerged as a result of incorporation, as in Argentina under Perón (Torre and Pastoriza 2002).

From Neo-corporatism to Territorialism

There is another crucial distinction between the first and second incorporation waves, this one related to the path taken by the popular sectors in each historical moment. While the first incorporation was characterized by massive unionization and corporatist state arrangements, the second incorporation followed a territorialized logic that went hand in hand with an overall territorialization of Argentine politics.

The process of contemporary territorialization of politics in Argentina has its origins in the 1976–83 authoritarian regime as part of a failed attempt to gradually democratize from the local to the national level and the application of neoliberal fiscal decentralization policies (Prévôt-Schapira 1993; Falleti 2011). The increased territorialization of politics is intimately related to the provincial-centric nature of party politics (De Luca et al. 2002) that produced a political arena with territorially concentrated and personalized leaderships where local political programmatic agendas are more important than those at the national level (Calvo and Escolar 2005). For poor people's movements, territorialization means the centrality of "*basismo*" (organization of the popular sectors through territorially based grassroots assemblies) since its emergence in the 1960s (Prévôt-Schapira 1999).

Territorialization includes patronage and clientelism but is not a synonym of either. I define the territorialization of politics as the dispute for the physical control of space, be it a municipality, province, or portion of land, within one or more politically constituted entities. The territorialization of politics does not mean the emergence of a new regime type but rather the process through which the territory *re-emerges* as a new cleavage after neoliberal reforms and authoritarian regimes have weakened or dissolved neo-corporatist arrangements for the resolution of socio-political conflicts in society. It is a cleavage because central political divisions are produced as a result of the physical encounter of or distance between political actors and of the dispute for the control of a territory for socio-political goals and causes that are not always territorially defined. For this reason, what differentiates the political actors is not their ideology or class but rather their geographical location, modifying their alliances and "loyalties" based on the latter. In the intertwining of contentious and routine politics,

territorialization refers to the spatial interfusion of the grassroots actors involved in the political struggle. For this reason, it is a crucial element of governability, the one which since the mid-1990s has been under the control of Peronist party and union organizations and disputed by the *piquetero* movement.

This second wave was "territorial" because the incorporation of the popular sectors was predominantly done through institutions created or reformulated for the articulation of actors that were *not* functionally differentiated. This was a result of the emergence of contentious claims for reincorporation outside the trade union system. Instead, urban and peri-urban land occupations, neighborhoods, and shantytowns became central spaces for claim-making for the organized poor people (Cerrutti and Grimson 2004; Merklen 2005) once neoliberal reforms and authoritarian regimes had weakened or dissolved neo-corporatist arrangements for resolving socio-political conflicts (Oxhorn 1998; Collier and Handlin 2009b). For this reason, the social policies to reincorporate the popular sectors were not function- or class-based but territory-based (i.e., defined by the physical location of the actors).[14] This was an important shift from the functionalist logic of corporatism, which had articulated the popular sectors' claims through trade unions as their sole representative actor and through the Ministry of Labor as their exclusive state department. To sum up, because they were not seen as serving a clear "function" for institutions with a corporatist logic, the disincorporated popular sectors were targeted by policies based on where they were located and the multiplicity of needs associated with their situation and not only as workers without jobs or peasants without land. However, that the second incorporation was mainly defined by territory-based logics did not mean that corporatist arrangements were abandoned altogether.

Consequently, the second incorporation path differed from the first because the government and the movement were not dealing with an inter-corporatist system of relations as they had done after the first incorporation. **Table 1.2** schematically synthesizes the main differences between both waves. As I will show in Chapters 3 to 6, the second incorporation in Argentina followed a multi-level game (local, provincial, national) of territorialized interactions. The specificities of the second incorporation are due to the disincorporation consequences of neoliberal reforms.

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[14] For example, the social policies related to housing and habitat (Cravino 2013).

TABLE 1.2 *Main Differences between the First and Second Incorporation Waves in Argentina*

	First Incorporation (1943–55)	Second Incorporation (1996–2009)
Main type of state–popular sectors relationship	Neo-corporatist	Territorially based
Main political actor organizing the popular sectors	Labor movement	Reincorporation movement
Main national state department for the articulation of the claims for incorporation	Ministry of Labor	Ministry of Social Development

NEOLIBERAL DISINCORPORATION

The neoliberal reforms that started the process of recommodification of relations in the 1970s can be interpreted as a process of disincorporation, thereby redefining the main populist versus conservative political cleavage (Roberts 2002, 2008) as well as the roles of political actors involved in the first incorporation process of the 1950s. However, neoliberal disincorporation does not entail a total rupture with the past, as there are certainly elements of continuity.

In concrete terms, after the end of corporatist inclusion (1943–55), consolidated through the import substitution industrialization (ISI) model, Argentina went through a period of stalemate between the Peronist movement and the other political actors (O'Donnell 1973). This situation collapsed after the bureaucratic–authoritarian state model was imposed during the military regime of 1966–73 (O'Donnell 1988; Collier and Collier 1991), only to re-emerge after a short democratic spring (1973–76). Indeed, a new and more resolutely oppressive military coup in 1976 definitively initiated a disincorporation process by systematically applying repressive policies so as to demobilize the popular sectors and leftist groups – with the extrajudicial killing of thousands of activists – while concurrently dismantling the ISI model in favor of a more neoclassical, liberalized economy (Epstein 1987; Oxhorn 1998; Schvarzer 1998; Novaro and Palermo 2003).

Democratization in 1983 brought with it both pluralism and an expectation of the recovery of welfare through the relaunching of ISI. During Raúl Alfonsín's mandate (1983–89), representing the Radical Civic Union

(UCR), the Professional Associations Law was reformed, and this allowed the corporate structure of the Peronist General Labor Confederation (CGT) to be maintained and the labor confederation to reassert itself against other corporate structures, such as the Argentine Industrial Union, the Catholic Church, and the military. By the end of the Alfonsín presidency, the CGT had essentially maintained its monopoly of one union per industry, won back its rights to collective bargaining by sector, and regained control of its social welfare network. However, with the failure of the Austral economic stabilization plan, ISI was rapidly dismissed. At the same time, the Latin American debt crisis contributed to a 7.2 percent contraction of Argentina's economy between 1983 and 1985. The hyperinflation crisis of 1989–91 exacerbated the gravity of the situation (Smith et al. 1994; Acuña 1995; Saad-Filho et al. 2007: 10).

Beginning in 1991, a heterodox, neoliberal reform program was implemented during the presidency of Carlos Menem, of the Peronist Justicialist Party (PJ), with the urgent intention of resolving the hyperinflation crisis (Palermo and Novaro 1996). These reforms were applied in two stages. The first stage was to introduce stabilization policies to solve the debt and fiscal crises and hyperinflation. The focus was on the privatization of state-owned companies and the liberalization of ISI regulations, with a neoclassical economic perspective (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Oszlak 2003). The second stage focused on the restructuring of the public sector through the decentralization and reformulation of social policies, moving from a universalist to an individualistic approach (Orlansky 1998; Oxhorn 1998; Tokman and O'Donnell 1998). Foremost among the mixed results of the neoliberal reforms in Argentina was a rapid phase of deindustrialization. Although in 1989, 31 percent of GDP was based on manufactured products, by 2001 the rate was just 17 percent (Saad-Filho et al. 2007: 24). This led to an increase in the number of precarious and informal types of labor arrangements and a more uneven distribution of income (Beccaria and López 1996; Altimir and Beccaria 2001; Portes and Hoffmann 2003); this was related to a concomitant increase in unemployment from a historical average of 5 percent to 18.4 percent in 1995 – with a peak of 21.5 percent in 2002.[15]

In Argentina, the labor movement has traditionally been strong and well organized by the Peronist movement. The collapse of ISI and its replacement by a neoliberal model strongly affected the link between the

[15] Statistics of the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC) for 1974–2003 (www.indec.gob.ar/nuevaweb/cuadros/4/shemple01.xls, viewed August 15, 2010).

main Peronist organizations and the popular sectors.[16] The same was true for equivalent labor-based movements elsewhere in the region.[17]

Neoliberalism was also related to the metamorphosis of the dominant labor-based party – Peronist PJ – into a clientelistic and patronage machine (McGuire 1997; Levitsky 2003b; Torre 2004: xiv). The state mechanisms for the resolution of societal conflicts were also redefined, from a corporatist regime with a hegemonic Peronist CGT to a pluralized, segmented corporatist system (Etchemendy and Collier 2007). A key change in the political arena was the emergence of the *piquetero* movement as a national political actor, mobilizing a growing constituency of disincorporated popular sectors as they struggled to recover their place in wage-earning society (Chapter 3).

THE STRUGGLE FOR REINCORPORATION

Neoliberal reforms have produced a change in the focus of protest in Latin America: since the 1980s it mainly occurs in the quest for recognition by the state (Delamata 2002; Auyero 2003). This quest for recognition is part of what I call the *struggle for (re)incorporation*.[18] I use this term because although most actors in this quest present discourses of radical societal transformation, those discourses have actually unfolded as types of collective action that can be deemed "bridging with the state" (apart from the

[16] Several wide-ranging reforms affected labor relations and corporatist mechanisms; for a description of these reforms, cf. Cook (2007).

[17] In this sense, Roberts (2002: 19) argues, "neoliberal critical junctures produced sharp discontinuities in the labor-mobilizing systems. More than a simple epiphenomenon of economic crisis, this discontinuity reflects the collapse of a mode of political organization and representation that was deeply embedded in the previous development model and is increasingly out of sync with the socioeconomic landscape carved out by the process of free-market reforms. The stratified (or at least semi-stratified) cleavage structures and corporatist organizational practices of labor-mobilizing systems have been undermined by the individualizing logic of the neoliberal era, eroding class cleavages … "

[18] Honneth (1995: 165) argues that "the models of conflict that start from collective feelings of having been unjustly treated are those that trace the emergence and the course of social struggles back to moral experiences of social groups who face having legal or social recognition withheld from them. In the first case, we are dealing with the analysis of competition for scarce goods, whereas in the second case, we are dealing with the analysis of a struggle over the intersubjective conditions for personal integrity." Hobson (2003), by contrast, contends that the materialistic struggle is neither detached from nor opposed to the struggle for recognition. Moreover, "Recognition struggles often involve making claims for resources, goods, and services through state policies … But claims in recognition struggles are also connected to membership and inclusion in the polity" (Hobson 2003: 3).

unintended transformations produced by the incorporation of the actors). By "bridging with the state," I mean types of collective action that aim to (re)connect excluded segments of society with state institutions to recover – or, for the first time, gain – access to rights and benefits that the state has failed or ceased to secure or provide. The *piqueteros*' claim to unemployment subsidies, housing, and other benefits is an example of this "bridging" collective action because it reconnects the popular sectors with the state as a provider of some benefits and rights.

Much of the initial research conducted on the *piqueteros* came about because of interest in this "quest for recognition" from governments that had previously ignored the poor and unemployed. However, this literature has overlooked a crucial question: if the state is the main institution structuring social relations in a society, what exactly should movements challenge when the state reduces its structuring role? It seems that it is the absence of – or lack of due regard for – the structuring of certain types of social relations that movements must challenge. Protest is thus a substantial and moral tool for popular sectors to form a bridge between the state as it actually is and the state as it should be. In other words, what the *piqueteros* struggle for, like the landless peasants in Brazil, is the presence of the state as more than a merely repressive institution. In this sense, reincorporation struggles are linked in history to the heritage of the incorporation of the first laborers into the political arena. The consequences of the neoliberal reforms explain the demand for a return of the state presence as an articulator of social relationships.

So what differentiates recognition struggles from those for (re)incorporation? I argue that the two are intimately related. The pursuit of recognition might be defined as the initial quest linked to the popular sectors' disruptive emergence in protest. After some degree of recognition has been achieved (e.g., unemployment subsidies, media attention), the claim organized as a movement will usually lead to socioeconomic conflicts and the quest for incorporation. In societal terms, a popular sector's struggle for recognition might lead to a struggle for incorporation – or reincorporation – as a subject and member of society that merits esteem and is entitled to some of the rights that the (neoliberal) context has (abruptly) altered. In this sense, it is both a moral economy issue and a specific process attached to the constitution of the polity through its expansion or contraction.

Another reason for defining recognition and reincorporation as intimately linked struggles is that no quest for reincorporation can emerge without a prior claim for recognition; it is that first claim that constitutes a

new "social question." However, the quest for recognition does not necessarily evolve into one for reincorporation, as it can be a goal in itself (e.g., claims for a multilingual society). In other words, when discussing popular sector movements, struggles for recognition should be considered as the first stage of the legitimation of both the claim and the actor. If organized into a movement, this process will evolve toward the dynamics of incorporation. The *piquetero* movement can be defined as a type of actor that is particular to the consequences of neoliberalism and one that is related to equivalent processes of disincorporation and reincorporation in Latin America since the 1980s.

Definition of Reincorporation Movements

Reincorporation movements share many of the longstanding characteristics of the popular sector movements' drive for social transformation through inclusion, by revolution or reform. At the same time, they have specific attributes that mark them as particular expressions of the historical process of struggle for incorporation that emerged with neoliberalism (at least in Latin America). As such, reincorporation movements use the repertoire of strategies and legacies accumulated in the initial incorporation period while pushing for the reestablishment of the tie between the popular sectors and the socio-political arena in the quest for reintegration into the polity. In Argentina, this tie reconstruction was executed through the intertwining of preexisting practices in a new scenario with somewhat different actors: a social movement (albeit heavily influenced by trade unionist practices) and a state prepared to deal only with already established neo-corporatist actors. This new context for the inherited repertoire led to the recycling of strategies with new claims; for example, trade union-style negotiations for food distribution (Chapter 2). A pattern of interaction between government and movement was thus established through new institutions or the redefinition of roles of existing institutions.

Therefore, "reincorporation movements" can be defined as a gestalt composed of six categories.[19] Two of these are central and universal, with

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[19] For this conceptual proposal, I have followed the logic of Collier and Mahon (1993: 851, n. 8) for the formation of radial categories: "with radial categories it is possible that two members of the category will not share all of what may be seen as the defining attributes … with radial categories the overall meaning of a category is anchored in a 'central subcategory,' which corresponds to the 'best' case, or prototype, of the category. In the process of cognition, the central subcategory functions as a gestalt, in that it is constituted

four subcategories that logically depend on the first two and must be adapted to each cluster of cases studied to explain more specific national or regional patterns. The two central categories in this definition of reincorporation movements are the following:

1. *Period of emergence*. These movements are by-products of the disincorporation process that started in the 1970s and a result of the crisis of party communities and mass-based labor parties set up in the 1980s and 1990s.[20]
2. *Demands*. Claims for inclusion predominate, even though these could be framed by the leaders as "revolutionary" in their long-term goals.[21]

Reincorporation movements are also defined by the following non-central categories, which can be seen to have these common attributes:

3. *Method and locus of protest*. Radical methods of protest, such as insurrectional direct actions, tend to be used, while the movements are contemporaneously open to negotiation with government. Their locus of protest is generally the territory.
4. *Leadership*. Leaders come mainly from trade unions, Christian-based communities, and former guerrilla organizations.
5. *Organizational format*. These movements are loose, territorialized networks of highly vertical organizations.

by a bundle of traits that are learned together, understood together, and most quickly recognized when found together. 'Non-central subcategories' are variants of the central one. They do not necessarily share defining attributes with each other but only with the central subcategory – hence the term radial, which refers to this internal structure" (Collier and Mahon 1993: 848).

[20] Manin (1992) defines the "crisis of party communities" as the metamorphosis of political representation. Representation changed from a form based on programmatic parties reflecting the concerns of social classes or communities to a more personality-based form of politics, in which a multidimensional society is represented through governing elites that attempt to interpret public opinion.

[21] This means that reincorporation movements can follow multiple goals simultaneously, but incorporation must be the main medium-term focus. The use of "revolutionary" (or other) rhetoric by movements struggling for the second incorporation of the popular sectors does not mean that movement leaders are confused or uncertain about movement goals. Instead, it means that a movement can be defined as a "reincorporation movement" by its relation to a macro-historical process of *dis-* or *re*incorporation, even though the main long-term goal for some organizations might be something else. Thus, following this definition, all movements that have struggled for the popular sectors' incorporation since neoliberal state reforms were applied can be defined as reincorporation movements, be this a short-, medium-, or long-term goal within "revolutionary," "reformist," or "conservative" rhetorical forms.

6. *Perception of democracy.* These movements make a positive re-evaluation of the value of democracy as a political regime, insofar as it is perceived as necessary and reforms are, in some cases, achieved by electoral means.

To summarize, the basic assumption underlying the historicist definition proposed here is that the second wave of incorporation is attached to the emergence of a specific type of political actor. Therefore, many movements are not of the reincorporation type because, even though they may share some of the non-central categories, they are not explained by at least one of the central categories. Examples of this are cultural or counter-cultural movements, environmental movements, anti-immigration or xenophobic movements, and separatist or pro-independence movements. The benefit of defining a type of movement as associated with a particular historical period in a region is that this (historical and geographical) context allows for conceptualizations that encompass the distinctiveness of these types of movements.

THE PIQUETEROS AND REINCORPORATION STRUGGLES IN ARGENTINA

Since 1996, the *piquetero* movement has mobilized the poor and unemployed people of Argentina. For almost two decades, the *piqueteros* has been the main contentious actor in the resistance to the social consequences of neoliberal reforms and in the struggle for the reincorporation of the popular sectors in Argentina's socio-political arena. The name "*piqueteros*" (picketers) is based on the type of protest action that brought the movement to the public's awareness: the picketing/blocking of the country's main roads in their demand for jobs, unemployment subsidies, food, etc.[22]

The *piqueteros*, as a collection of actors, fulfills all the basic requisites to be considered a social movement.[23] Since the emergence of the first

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[22] As will be made clearer in Chapter 2, this does not mean that the *piquetero* movement only organizes pickets. Naming an actor after one of its ways of making a claim may seem confusing, but preserving in political and academic debates the name that is most well known and widely applied to this actor is a linguistically pragmatic choice to allow for a clear understanding of the movement being studied.

[23] I define a social movement as informal networks of conflict-oriented interactions composed of individuals, groups, and/or organizations that, based on shared solidarities, are provided with a collective political identity and use protest as a means – among others – to present themselves in the public arena (Melucci 1989; Diani 1992; della Porta and Diani 1999: 13–16; Snow et al. 2004: 3–15; Rossi 2006: 243–46).

unemployed workers' protests in Argentina, the movement has become increasingly organized as a network of conflict-oriented actors that almost two decades later continues to be active. As with any movement, the *piquetero* movement is composed of a number of social movement organizations (SMOs) (**Table 1.3**). The movement was founded by three main SMOs as part of a dynamic political network, their number expanding gradually over time (cf. Figures A and B in Appendix). The founding SMOs were the Guevarists and autonomists Unemployed Workers Movements (MTDs), the Maoist Classist and Combative Current (CCC), and the Liberation Theology-inspired Workers' Federation for Land, Housing and Habitat (FTV). Concerning identity, notwithstanding the disparity of ideologies held by the various SMOs that make up the movement, all participating SMOs recognize themselves (and are recognized by their opponents and allies) as part of a movement called "*piqueteros*" (cf. Svampa and Pereyra 2003: ch. 4), defined by the struggle of unemployed people for socio-political reincorporation as citizens and wage-earners. Finally, the use of protest is a constant and crucial dimension of this movement.

The relevance of this movement for Argentine politics placed it at the core of social movement studies for several years in Argentine academia. The pioneering studies of Scribano (1999), Oviedo (2000, 2004), Svampa and Pereyra (2003), and Auyero (2003) were mostly motivated by the search for explanations for the origin of the movement and its first decade of existence. However, the debate about the origin of the movement has failed to connect a long-term perspective on the quest for inclusion of poor people's movements of Argentina with the role of the left in national politics and the specific claims and grievances of the popular sectors in the 1990s (but see Benclowitcz 2013, for a study focusing on the North-East of Argentina). This will be one of the main goals of Chapter 3.

Like Oviedo in the two editions of his widely read book (2000, 2004), many other activist-scholars analyzed the *piqueteros* (Sánchez 1997; Alderete and Gómez 1999; Kohan 2002; MTD de Solano and Colectivo Situaciones 2002; Mazzeo 2004; Pacheco 2004; Flores 2005b, 2006). The importance of the FTV, CCC, and MTDs for the movement also prompted some interesting academic studies about the specificities of these SMOs (Calvo 2006; Torres 2006; Motta 2009), as well as about other cases, such as the Trotskyist Workers' Pole (PO) (Delamata 2004) and the indigenist Neighborhood Organization "Tupac Amaru" (hereafter OB "Tupac Amaru") (Battezzati 2012), among many others.

TABLE 1.3 *The* Piquetero *Movement (December 2008)*

Main Social Movement Organizations	Related Political Organizations	Ideology	Main Geographical Location (Province)
Classist and Combative Current (CCC)	Communist Revolutionary Party (PCR)	Maoist	Buenos Aires, Salta and Jujuy
Coordinator of Unemployed Workers (CTD) "Aníbal Verón"	Revolutionary Popular Movement (MPR) "Quebracho"	National-populist	Buenos Aires
"Evita" Movement	None	Left-wing Peronist	Buenos Aires
Independent Movement of the Retired and Unemployed (MIJD)	None	National-populist	Buenos Aires, Chaco and Salta
Jobless Movement "Teresa Is Alive" (MST "Teresa Vive")	Socialist Workers' Movement	Trotskyist	City of Buenos Aires
Neighborhood Organization (OB) "Tupac Amaru"	CTA since 2003	National-populist and indigenist	Jujuy and Mendoza
Popular Front "Darío Santillán" (FPDS)	None	Autonomist	Buenos Aires
Neighborhoods Standing Up (*Barrios de Pie*)	Free Homeland – Southerners' Freedom Movement	National-populist	Buenos Aires and Córdoba
Territorial Liberation Movement (MTL)	Communist Party of Argentina (PCA)	Marxist-Leninist	City of Buenos Aires
Union of Unemployed Workers (UTD) of Mosconi	None	Syndicalist	Salta
Unemployed Workers Movement (MTD) "Aníbal Verón"	Guevarist Movement	Guevarist	Buenos Aires
Unemployed Workers Movement (MTD) of La Juanita	Civic Coalition – Alliance for a Republic of Equals (CC–ARI) since 2007	Social-democratic	Buenos Aires
Unemployed Workers Movement (MTD) of Solano and allies	None	Autonomist	Buenos Aires and Río Negro
Unemployed Workers' Movement "Teresa Rodríguez" (MTR) – Neighborhood Unity Coordinator (CUBa)	Guevarist Movement and Liberation Revolutionary Party	Guevarist and Trotskyist	Buenos Aires
Workers' Federation for Land, Housing and Habitat (FTV)	Argentine Workers Union (CTA) until 2006	Liberation Theology and national-populist	Buenos Aires and Santa Fe
Workers' Pole (PO)	Workers' Party	Trotskyist	Buenos Aires and Salta

Source: Adapted from Rossi (2013b).

In their struggle for reincorporation, the *piqueteros* needed to deal with a wide array of actors, such as elected and appointed public officials, informal party and union brokers, the police, churches, and NGOs. Some authors presented studies of politics in the shantytowns and neighborhoods where the *piqueteros* have been disputing power with other political groups (Auyero 2003; Ferraudi Curto 2006; Quirós 2006) as part of a well-developed Argentine tradition of ethnographic research of politics from below. As these studies and others show (Pereyra et al. 2008; Rossi 2015b), the struggle of the *piquetero* movement cannot be explained through co-optation- or clientelism-based accounts of *piquetero*–government interactions; the process is more complex than these may suggest. This is confirmed by all quantitative research done to date, which concedes – though to varying degrees – that the gains in state social programs achieved by the *piqueteros* were more a result of protest than anything else (Lodola 2005; Weitz-Schapiro 2006; Giraudy 2007; Franceschelli and Ronconi 2009). I take this up in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, where I demonstrate that the relational pattern of reincorporation is a multi-level process that is based on two main elements: the evolution of public policies and the territorially based disputes between the movement and other political actors.

The accession to power of many leaders and grassroots members of the *piquetero* movement in the 2010s has sparked a new (and still developing) line of studies analyzing what has happened with the *piqueteros* in government (Massetti 2009; Perelmiter 2012; Pérez and Natalucci 2012). However, very few of the studies about the *piqueteros* published to date have been in English (Auyero 2003; Alcañiz and Scheier 2007; Wolff 2007; Motta 2009), and none has yet proposed a process-tracing analysis of the macro-process of transformation associated with the *piqueteros*. This book is an attempt to fill the gap of the macro question in the scholarship on the *piqueteros*.

THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS FOR SOCIAL MOVEMENT STUDIES

Chapter 2 presents the second main theoretical contribution of this book. Although dialogue between social movement scholars and historical institutionalists is quite rare (but see Aminzade et al. 2001), I draw on both literatures in my analysis of the macro-process of second incorporation. In doing so, I contribute to a promising cross-fertilization between these approaches. In social movement studies, there is a tendency to apply

concepts created in specific contexts in a universal manner (Goodwin and Jasper 2012). This standpoint sometimes produces conceptual stretching that a more historically grounded approach, such as that favored by historical institutionalism, would avoid. By contrast, historical institutionalism has a tendency to produce structurally determinist studies that do not acknowledge human agency until rational choice is added into the analysis (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 6–8). Combining the two approaches takes advantage of the empirically and conceptually rich debates on collective action within the social movement literature and allows for the preservation of the historical focus of historical institutionalism while avoiding the pitfalls of determinist structuralism and rational choice. In this same sense, Thelen (1999: 388) argues that institutions are enduring legacies of political struggles, and Pierson (2000) says that relatively small or contingent events may have far-reaching consequences. This is particularly important when analyzing how pressure from popular movements might have prompted changes to social policies and policing techniques.

The historical institutionalists that study Latin America (Collier and Collier 1991; Mahoney 2001; Roberts 2002, 2008) provide social movement scholars with long-term historical contextualization of contentious and routine dynamics performed by social movements that is generally overlooked by scholars of contentious political dynamics. In this way, social movements can be placed against a long-term historical background, as called for by Tilly (1984, 2008)[24] and as I proposed with my definition of reincorporation movements.

The social movement literature is the best suited for avoiding the structuralist trap of theory-guided narratives. However, while the introduction of contentious political dynamics into routine politics (and vice versa) can enrich the literature on historical institutionalism, the scholarship on social movements considers that the definition of the relationship between contentious and routine politics is still underdeveloped (Aminzade et al. 2001; Auyero 2003, 2007; Goldstone 2003; Tarrow

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[24] "We should build concrete and historical analyses of the big structures and large processes that shape our era. The analyses should be concrete in having real times, places, and people as their referents and in testing the coherence of the postulated structures and processes against the experiences of real times, places and peoples. They should be historical in limiting their scope to an era bounded by the playing out of certain well-defined processes, and in recognizing from the outset that time matters – that *when* things happen within a sequence affects *how* they happen, that every structure or process constitutes a series of choice points. Outcomes at a given point in time constrain possible outcomes at later points in time" (Tilly 1984: 14; italics in original).

2012). In this sense, Tilly's (1986, 1995, 2006, 2008) concept of "repertoire of contention" has allowed us to study public and disruptive events and their slow pace of change as part of what is known as "contentious politics." However, when studying the interaction of the *piqueteros* or any social movement with the state, allies, and antagonists, the public and contentious dimension of this interaction is just one part of the story. There are many other strategic activities performed by social movements as part of their effort to influence political decisions that are not contentious and public. In Chapter 2, I propose two concepts for the study of social movements' strategic interactions with the state. In doing so I aim to help bridge contentious and routine politics, linking events that happen in the public arena with those happening in semi-public and private arenas. To complement Tilly's "repertoire of contention," I propose the concepts of "repertoire of strategies" and "stock of legacies." These two concepts are important because they correspond to the element of agency that is part of the macro-historical process of second incorporation. Together, the first two chapters of this book present my joining of the structure-based approach of historical institutionalism with the agency-based approach of social movement studies. Chapter 2 closes with a synthesis of the main strategies used by the *piquetero* movement from 1996 to 2009.

In a Tillyian relational approach to social change, the strategies of movements are also linked to what is happening with the elites. The best suited concept for analyzing this from a social movement perspective is Tarrow's (1994) concept of political opportunities.[25] I apply this concept framed within a broader debate about the configuration of the political context, with the hope of avoiding some of the universalizing stretching tendencies in the literature (McAdam 1982, 1996; Tarrow 1994, 1998; Goodwin and Jasper 1999, 2012; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). In my use of Tarrow's definition, the concept of political opportunities refers specifically to the less stable, more dynamic, and eventful shifts and changes of the political context. As Gamson and Meyer (1996: 283) argue, the relatively more stable elements of the context delimit the arena where a series of actors engage in struggles and try to define the opportunities. Therefore, a divided elite creates an opportunity for movements but also affects the intensity of elite divisions and

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[25] Defined as "consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure" (Tarrow 1994: 18).

TABLE 1.4 *Horizontal and Vertical Political Opportunities*

Political Opportunities	Definition	Example
Horizontal	Divisions across functions/actors within the same scale of action.	Single-level dispute between national ministries of the same governing coalition over who will control a policy area.
Vertical	Divisions across scales of action (multi-level).	Multi-level dispute between the national cabinet, the governorship, and local authorities in the same district for the resolution of a conflictive issue.

intra-elite conflicts, which result from horizontal (*intra*-scalar) and vertical (*inter*-scalar) political opportunities (schematically shown in **Table 1.4**). Political opportunities are crucial for understanding the interplay between actors within specific configurations of the political context. Horizontal and vertical political opportunities generally work together, but it is not uncommon for them to branch into different and sometimes contradictory directions. In brief, actors making use of a predominant repertoire of strategies (Chapter 2) are the contenders that struggle for resources, positions, and the redefinition of the issues being disputed, producing and dealing with intra-elite functional and/or multi-level junctural divisions.

METHODOLOGICAL MATTERS AND SOURCES

In his short story "Del rigor en la ciencia," Jorge Luis Borges (1996 [1960]: 119) puts forth the idea that it is impossible for the human sciences to analytically reconstruct the world because this would imply the reproduction of the world itself. In this story, the attempt of cartographers to construct the most detailed map of an entire empire in all its dimensions represents not only a task that is impossible to achieve but also one that will always produce an outdated result. Any reconstruction of the world is a reconstruction of a world *as it was*. As such, any analytic historical reconstruction represents an incomplete assemblage of events based on selective memory. Continuing along these lines, could it be said that history is but the sequence of events selected by actors when reconstructing a story? This question emerged when I was faced with the challenge of historically reconstructing the *piquetero* movement. Having read some of

the literature produced about them, the *piqueteros* and some movement's antagonists have come across accounts of their own stories. Is the overlap between the accounts actors give of themselves and the subsequent academic production a result of the actors' interpretation of the research about themselves, or do the actors redefine their story as they read their own history? I recur to methodological triangulation in order to avoid the excessive thoroughness of the Borgean imperial cartographers in attempting to solve this puzzle. As the aim of this research is also historical, I provide a detailed account of some of the forgotten voices in narrating this crucial process in recent Argentine politics.

I used several data sources for my research. I consulted around 2,000 newspaper articles and archival material collected from 27 commercial and alternative newspapers and magazines, publications produced by the SMOs, websites of the movement and related institutions, quantitative data on protest events, and interviews with the main actors involved. The mass-media commercial sources were collected at the *Página/12* newspaper archive in Buenos Aires.

An important part of the data collection for this research is the forty open-ended, in-depth interviews that I carried out with almost all the main *piquetero* leaders and key state brokers in the *piquetero* public policy domain – mayors, ministries, informal brokers, and so on. These interviews, which lasted between one and a half and four hours each, were conducted in situ in the cities of Buenos Aires (the national capital) and La Plata (the capital of Buenos Aires province) as well as in some Greater Buenos Aires districts (Florencio Varela, La Matanza, Quilmes, and Tres de Febrero) over four fieldwork periods: June–October 2007, September–October 2008, December 2008, and July–August 2013. The focus of this research was the city of Buenos Aires and its suburban periphery because this is where the *piquetero* movement has mostly been concentrated: it is only in Buenos Aires that the *piquetero* movement has become a national actor with relevant links with the state, with the exception of the pioneering Union of Unemployed Workers (UTD) of Mosconi in Salta and also, since 2003, the OB "Tupac Amaru" in Jujuy.[26] The fieldwork periods also included direct observation of

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[26] Herrera (2008: 183, table 11) has quantitatively shown how between 1991 and 2002 the main sites for *piquetero* protests were the Buenos Aires, Salta, Santa Fe, Neuquén, and Río Negro provinces. Studies by the *Centro de Estudios para la Nueva Mayoría* show that in 2006, 30 percent of all pickets were staged in Buenos Aires (Chapter 3).

protest events, visits to SMO branches, and participation in movement assemblies and public governmental meetings.

I used purposive sampling as the method for selecting the persons to be interviewed. This method was used because of the relatively small number of actors with the relevant knowledge and expertise as well as crucial political positioning for the aims of this research. Starting from these sources, the sample was expanded through snowballing until I had covered almost the totality of the *piquetero* national SMOs, allies, and crucial state brokers at the national and provincial level (Buenos Aires) and in the main two local sites of contention (the Florencio Varela and La Matanza municipal governments). This did not mean always interviewing exactly the same category of actors but rather those who were functionally equivalent. In those cases where the public official (three cases), union leader (two cases), or *piquetero* leader (three cases) refused to be interviewed, alternative sources were used to track down statements made by them in interviews with journalists and other academics (mainly the collection of extensive interviews published in Germano [2005]). Substitutes were also sought as alternative interviewees, such as other officials with equal or equivalent expertise in the same ministry or other union or *piquetero* leaders of the same trade union or SMO.

The use of interviews was the only available tool for understanding, in non-ethnographic terms, what the media has ignored and what has not yet been presented in other historical accounts. Because of this methodological choice, I was faced with the Borgean cartographers' problem of full reconstruction, in relation to the actors' selective use of memory[27] in telling their own story. In process-tracing analysis there is a debate about the role played by actors' own accounts of the events that are to be historically reconstructed. As George and McKewon (1985: 35) noted: "As we understand process-tracing, it involves both an attempt to reconstruct actors' definitions of the situation and an attempt to develop a theory of action. The framework within which actors' perceptions and actions are described is given by the researcher, not by the actors themselves." This dual aim is present in this book as, while the actors' voices are overtly present, I propose a narrative that is not the depiction of any

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[27] By "memory" I mean a socially built process as defined by Traverso (2006: 12): "Memory – that is, the collective representation of the past as it is forged in the present – structures social identity by inscribing it on a historical continuum and attributing meaning to it, that is, content and direction."

one particular voice. With this methodological conundrum in mind, this book is historically minded in Tilly's sense (1984). As such, this book is the result of a theoretically guided process-tracing case study of the actors' and media narration of a social movement's pattern of interaction considered to be a paradigmatic case of a reincorporation movement. As a type of within-case analysis (Mahoney 2000: 409), I adopted process-tracing to build a detailed narrative that could provide an explanation of the second incorporation process and its relational path in Argentina through the case of a crucial actor in this story – the *piquetero* movement.

My research is also historical because the sequence of events is crucial for understanding the claims of this book.[28] Thus, although the *why* and *how* questions have been the focus of much social movement research, the *when* question should be added, and not just for the mere purpose of periodization. When recognition (Chapter 3), legitimation (Chapter 4), and reincorporation (Chapters 5 and 6) occur is as important as the time span in between each of these stages as well as the characteristics of the movement (Chapter 2). For this reason, the configurative approach of historical institutionalism is crucial because it focuses on how a sequence and temporal ordering of a relational process influences the outcome analyzed. However, I have been as conscious as possible about the fact that "the temporality of history and memory can also collide with each other in a kind of 'non-contemporaneity' or 'time discrepancy' (the *Ungleichzeitigkeit* theorized by Ernst Bloch)" (Traverso 2006: 43, italics in original). The combination of my theoretically guided narration and that voiced by the actors, attempts to partially address this limitation of historical narrations based solely on the actors' memory. The fruitfulness of attempting to bridge the social movement and historical institutionalism literatures will be apparent in the narrative chapters.

CONCLUSION

The conceptualization of the recursive logic of expansion and contraction of the socio-political arena allows us to discern the main struggle of popular movements in Latin America: their quest for (re)incorporation as citizens and wage-earners. The goal of the next chapter will be to

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[28] "Analytic narratives – theoretically structured stories about coherent sequences of motivated actions – can contribute to the construction of explanations of why things happened the way they did" (Aminzade 1992: 457–58).

introduce a theoretical perspective to the strategies developed by social movements. This proposal will be illustrated with the *piqueteros*, the main reincorporation movement in Argentina. Then, in the narrative chapters, the theoretical toolkit of Chapters 1 and 2 will be applied to the relational analysis of the second wave of incorporation.